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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
10-1491 
Ruling Below: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
10-1491 (132 S.Ct. 472). 
In 2002, 12 plaintiffs from the Ogoni area of the Niger Delta brought suit against Royal Dutch 
and other corporations pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, which allows suits for violation of 
international law. The plaintiffs alleged that Royal Dutch and other corporations engaged in oil 
exploration and production that aided and abetted the Nigerian government between 1992 and 
1995 in committing human rights abuses, including torture and extrajudicial executions. In 2006 
the United Stated District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed claims against 
corporate defendants in part, and certified entire order for interlocutory appeal. Both parties cross 
appealed. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of 
the law of nations. (2) Whether the Alien TOli Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States 
Esther KIOBEL, individually and on behalf of her late husband, Dr. Barinem Kiobel, 
Bishop Augustine Numene John-Miller, Charles Baridorn Wiwa, Israel Pyakene Nwidor, 
Kendricks Dorle Nwikpo, Anthony B. Kote-Witah, Victor B. Wifa, Dumle J. Kunenu, 
Benson Magnus Ikari, Legbara Tony Idigima, Pius Nwinee, Kpobari Tusima, individually 
and on behalf of his late father, Clement Tusima, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO., Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC, 
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., Defendant. 
United States COUli of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Filed September 17, 2010 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal presents a question that has been 
lurking for some time in our A TS 
jurisprudence. Since our first case upholding 
claims brought under the ATS in 1980, our 
Court has never directly addressed whether 
our jurisdiction under the ATS extends to 
civil actions against corporations. We have, 
in the past, decided A TS cases involving 
corporations without addressing the issue of 
corporate liability. But that fact does not 
foreclose consideration of the issue here. As 
the Supreme Court has held, "when 
questions of jurisdiction have been passed 
on in prior decisions sub silentio," the Court 
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"has never considered itself bound when a 
subsequent case finally brings the 
jurisdictional issue before [it]." 
In answering the question presented we 
proceed in two steps. First, we consider 
which body of law governs the question-
international law or domestic law-and 
conclude that international law governs. 
Second, we consider what the sources of 
international law reveal with respect to 
whether corporations can be subject to 
liability for violations of customary 
international law. We conclude that those 
sources lead inescapably to the conclusion 
that the customary international law of 
human rights has not to date recognized 
liability for corporations that violate its 
norms. 
I. Customary International Law Governs 
Our Inquiry 
The A TS grants federal district courts 
jurisdiction over claims "by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
28 U.S.C. § 1350.27 In 2004, the Supreme 
Court held in Sosa that the A TS is a 
jurisdictional statute only; it creates no cause 
of action, Justice Souter explained, because 
its drafters understood that "the common 
law would provide a cause of action for the 
modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal 
liability at the time." 
The Court in Sosa held that federal courts 
may recognize claims "based on the present-
day law of nations" provided that the claims 
rest on "norm[ s] of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms [the Court 
had] recognized." 
We conclude-based on international law, 
Sosa, and our own precedents-that 
international law, and not domestic law, 
governs the scope of liability for violations 
of customary international law under the 
ATS. 
A. International Law Defines the Scope of 
Liability for Violations of Norms 
That the subjects of international law are 
determined by international law, and not 
individual States, is evident from the 
decisions of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg ("Tribunal") in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The 
significance of the judgment of the 
Tribunal-and of the judgments of the 
tribunals established by the Allied Control 
Council pursuant to Council Control Law 
No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945)-was not simply 
that it recognized genocide and aggressive 
war as violations of international law. The 
defining legal achievement of the 
Nuremberg trials is that they explicitly 
recognized individ1lal liability for the 
violation of specific, universal, and 
obligatory norms of the customary 
international law of human rights. In its 
judgment the Tribunal noted that the 
defendants had argued that "international 
law is concerned with the actions of 
sovereign states, and provides no 
punishment for individuals." The Tribunal 
rejected that view, however, declaring that 
"international law imposes duties and 
liabilities upon individuals as well as upon 
states" and that "individuals can be punished 
for violations of international law." 
B. Sosa and Our Precedent Require Us to 
Look at International Law to Determine 
the Scope of Liability 
In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the 
142 
lower federal courts to consider "whether 
international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to 
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant 
is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual." That language requires that we 
look to international law to determine our 
jurisdiction over A TS claims against a 
particular class of defendant, such as 
corporations. That conclusion is reinforced 
by Justice Breyer's reformulation of the 
issue in his concurring opinion: "The norm 
[of international law ] must extend liability to 
the type 0.1 perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) 
the plaintiff seeks to sue." 
Our interpretation of Sosa is also consistent 
with Judge Katzmann's separate opinion in 
Khlllllmani, 504 F.3d at 264, which this 
same panel (including Judge Leval) adopted 
as the law of the Circuit in Presbyterian 
Ch1lrch. In Kh1l11lmani, Judge Katzmann 
observed that aiding and abetting liability-
much like corporate liability-'" does not 
constitute a discrete criminal offense but 
only serves as a more particularized way of 
identifying the persons involved' in the 
underlying offense." Judge Katzmann 
further explained that "[w]hile [footnote 20 
of Sosa] specifically concerns the liability of 
non-state actors, its general principle is 
equally applicable to the question of where 
to look to determine whether the scope of 
liability for a violation of international law 
should extend to aiders and abettors He 
therefore concluded that "to assure itself that 
it has jurisdiction to hear a claim under the 
[ATS], [a court] should first determine 
whether the alleged tort was in fact 
'committed in violation of the law of 
nations,' 28 U.S.c. § 1350, and whether this 
law w01lld recognize the defendants' 
responsibility for that violation." 
Significantly, it was only because we looked 
to international law that we were able to 
recogmze a norm of aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS. In Khlllumani, 
Judge Katzmann declined to rely on the 
usual presumption against aiding and 
abetting liability that applies 111 the 
interpretation of domestic statutes. Instead, 
Judge Katzmann concluded that Central 
Bank had no bearing on aiding and abetting 
liability under the A TS because, "[ u ]nder 
the [ATS] the relevant norm is prOVided not 
by domestic statute but by the law of 
nations, and that law extends responsibility 
for violations of its norms to aiders and 
abettors." 504 F.3d at 282. 
In sum, we have little difficulty holding that, 
under international law, Sosa, and our three 
decades of precedent, we are required to 
look to international law to determine 
whether corporate liability for a "violation 
of the law of nations," 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a 
norm "accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity" sufficient to 
provide a basis for jurisdiction under the 
ATS, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739. 
We have looked to international law to 
determine whether state officials, private 
individuals, and aiders and abettors, can be 
held liable under the A TS. There is no 
principled basis for treating the question of 
corporate liability differently. 
II. Corporate Liability is not a Norm of 
Customary International Law 
To attain the status of a rule of customary 
international law, a norm must be "specific, 
universal, and obligatory." Defining such 
norms "is no simple task," as "[ c ]ustomary 
international law is discerned from myriad 
decisions made in numerous and varied 
international and domestic arenas." Flores, 
414 F.3d at 247. The sources consulted are 
therefore of the utmost importance. As the 
Supreme Court re-emphasized in Sosa, we 
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look to "those sources we have long, albeit 
cautiously, recognized": 
'[W]here there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative 
act or judicial decision, resort must 
be had to the customs and usages of 
civilized nations; and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of 
labor, research and experience, have 
made themselves peculiarly well 
acquainted with the subjects of 
which they treat. Such works are 
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not 
for the speculations of their authors 
concerning what the law ought to be, 
but for trustwOlthy evidence of what 
the law really is.' 
542 U.S. at 733-34, 124 S.Ct. 2739. 
A. International Tribunals 
Insofar as international tribunals are 
established for the specific purpose of 
imposing liability on those who violate the 
law of nations, the history and conduct of 
those tribunals is instructive. We find it 
particularly significant, therefore, that no 
intemational tribunal of which we are aware 
has ever held a corporation liable for a 
violation of the law of nations. 
1. The Nuremberg Tribunals 
The Charter of the Intemational Military 
Tribunal, commonly known as the "London 
Charter," authorized the punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European Axis 
following the Second World War. The 
London Charter and the trials at Nuremberg 
that followed are collectively the single most 
important source of modern customary 
international law concerning liability for 
violations of fundamental human rights. As 
Justice Jackson explained, the London 
Charter "is a basic charter III the 
Intemational Law of the future," and the 
Nuremberg trials took great strides in 
"ma[king] explicit and unambiguous" the 
human rights norms that had "theretofore .. 
. [been] implicit in Intemational Law." 
Jackson, Final Report, ante, at 342. And as 
Judge Katzmann noted in Khul1l1nani: 
"[C]ourts, intemational bodies, and scholars 
have recognized that the principles set out in 
the London Charter and applied by the 
Intemational Military Tribunal are 
significant not only because they have 
gamered broad acceptance, but also because 
they were viewed as reflecting and 
crystallizing preexisting customary 
intemationallaw." 504 F.3d at 27l. 
It is notable, then, that the London Charter, 
which established the lntemational Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, granted the Tribunal 
jurisdiction over nat1lral persons only. 
Echoing the London Chalter's imposition of 
liability on natural persons only, the 
subsequent United States Military Tribunals, 
established under Control Council Law No. 
10, prosecuted corporate exec1ltives for their 
role in violating customary intemational law 
during the Second World War, but not the 
corporate entities themselves. This approach 
to liability can be seen most clearly in the 
tribunal's treatment of the notorious I.G. 
Farben chemical company. 
The refusal of the military tribunal at 
Nuremberg to impose liability on I.G. 
Fm'ben is not a matter of happenstance or 
oversight. This corporation's production of, 
among other things, oil, rubber, nitrates, and 
fibers was harnessed to the purposes of the 
Nazi state, and it is no exaggeration to assert 
that the corporation made possible the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity 
perpetrated by Nazi Germany, including its 
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infamous programs of looting properties of 
defeated nations, slave labor, and genocide. 
Twenty-four executives of Farben were 
charged, inter alia, with "Planning, 
Preparation, Initiation, and Waging of Wars 
of Aggression and Invasions of Other 
Countries"; "Plunder and Spoliation"; and 
"Slavery and Mass Murder." But the LG. 
Farben corporate entity was not charged, nor 
was it named in the indictment as a criminal 
organization. In issuing its judgment, the 
tribunal pointedly observed that "the 
corporate defendant, Farben, is not before 
the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be 
subjected to criminal penalties in these 
proceedings." 8 The F aI'ben Case, ante, at 
1153. The Tribunal emphasized: 
We have used the term "Farben" as 
descriptive of the instrumentality of 
cohesion in the name of which the 
enumerated acts of spoliation were 
committed. But corporations act 
through individuals and, under the 
conception of personal individual 
guilt '" the prosecution, to discharge 
the burden imposed upon it in this 
case, must establish by competent 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
an individual defendant was either a 
participant in the illegal act or that, 
being aware thereof, he authorized or 
approved it. 
In declining to impose corporate liability 
under international law in the case of the 
most nefarious corporate enterprise known 
to the civilized world, while prosecuting the 
men who led I.G. Farben, the military 
tribunals established under Control Council 
Law No.1 0 expressly defined liability under 
the law of nations as liability that could not 
be divorced from individual moral 
responsibility. It is thus clear that, at the 
time of the Nuremberg trials, corporate 
liability was not recognized as a "specific, 
universal, and obligatory" norm of 
customary international law. 
2. International Tribunals Since 
Nuremberg 
Since Nuremberg, international tribunals 
have continually declined to hold 
corporations liable for violations of 
customary international law. For example, 
the chatiers establishing both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
or ("ICTR") expressly confined the 
tribunals' jurisdiction to "natural persons." 
The commentary contained in the Report of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
on the ICTY reveals that jurisdiction over 
corporations was considered but expressly 
rejected: "[T]he ordinary meaning of the 
term 'persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law' 
would be natural persons to the excl1lsion of 
j1lridical persons." Moreover, unlike the 
International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the ICTY lacked the authority 
to declare organizations "criminal." Jd. ~ 51 
Thus, to the extent that the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg possessed 
some limited authority to declare 
corporations criminal-which, as explained 
above, operated merely as an evidentiary 
rule for later trials imposing liability on 
individ1lals-subsequent tribunals have not 
retained that procedure. 
More recently, the Rome Statute of the ICC 
also limits that tribunal's jurisdiction to 
"natural persons." Significantly, a proposal 
to grant the ICC jurisdiction over 
corporations and other "juridical" persons 
was advanced by the French delegation, but 
the proposal was rejected. As commentators 
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have explained, the French proposal was 
rejected in pati because "criminal liability of 
corporations is still rejected in many 
national legal orders" and thus would pose 
challenges for the ICC's principle of 
"complementarity." ld. The history of the 
Rome Statute therefore confirms the absence 
of any generally recognized principle or 
consensus among States concerning 
corporate liability for violations of 
customary international law. 
Conclusion 
The A TS provides federal district courts 
jurisdiction over a tort, brought by an alien 
only, alleging a "violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 
U.S.C. § 1350. When an ATS suit is brought 
under the "law of nations," also known as 
"customary international law," jurisdiction 
is limited to those cases alleging a violation 
of an international norm that is "specific, 
universal, and obligatory." 
No corporation has ever been subject to any 
form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or 
otherwise) under the customary international 
law of human rights. Rather, sources of 
customary international law have, on several 
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of 
corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability 
has not attained a discernable, much less 
universal, acceptance among nations of the 
world in their relations inter se, and it 
cannot not, as a result, form the basis of a 
suit under the ATS. 
Accordingly, the September 29, 2006 order 
of the District Court is AFFIRMED insofar 
as it dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims 
against the corporate defendants and 
REVERSED insofar as it declined to 
dismiss plaintiffs' remaining claims against 
the corporate defendants. 
LEV AL, Circuit Judge, concurring only 
in the judgment. 
The majority opinion deals a substantial 
blow to international law and its undertaking 
to protect fundamental human rights. 
According to the IUle my colleagues have 
created, one who earns profits by 
commercial exploitation of abuse of 
fundamental human rights can successfully 
shield those profits from victims' claims for 
compensation simply by taking the 
precaution of conducting the heinous 
operation in the corporate form. Without any 
support in either the precedents or the 
scholarship of international law, the majority 
takes the position that corporations, and 
other juridical entities, are not subject to 
international law, and for that reason such 
violators of fundamental human rights are 
free to retain any profits so earned without 
liability to their victims. 
Since Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir.1980), was decided in 1980, United 
States courts, acting under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which was passed by the 
First Congress in 1789, have been awarding 
compensatory damages to victims of human 
rights abuses committed in violation of the 
law of nations. Many supporters of the cause 
of human rights have celebrated the 
Filartiga line of cases as an impoliant 
advance of civilization. Not all, however, 
have viewed those cases with favor. Some 
see them as unwarranted meddling by U.S. 
judges in events that occurred far away, 
applying a body of law that we did not 
make, in circumstances carrying a potential, 
furthermore, to interfere with the President's 
conduct of foreign affairs. In 2004, a 
substantial minority of the Supreme COUli, 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
124 S.Ct. 2739, would have essentially 
nullified the A TS and overturned the 
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Filartiga line, by ruling that the A TS did no 
more than give courts jurisdiction, and that, 
absent further legislation establishing a legal 
claim, courts acting under A TS had no 
authority to grant any substantive relief. The 
majority of the Supreme Court, however, 
rejected that argument. The COUli ruled that 
under the A TS, federal courts could award 
damages for violations of the law of nations. 
For those who believe the Filartiga Sosa 
line represents a meaningful advance in the 
protection of human rights, the majority's 
decision here marks a very bad day. 
To understand this controversy, it is 
impOliant to understand exactly what is the 
majority's IUle, how it functions, and in 
what circumstances. To begin, their IUle 
relates to the most abhorrent conduct-those 
acts that violate norms of the international 
law of human rights. The ATS gives U.S. 
cOUlis jurisdiction to award tort damages to 
aliens who are victims of such atrocities. 
According to the majority, in cases where 
the norms of the law of nations were 
violated by a corporation (or other juridical 
entity), compensatory damages may be 
awarded ltnder the ATS against the 
corporation's employees, natural persons 
who acted in the corporation's behalf, b1lt 
not against the corporation that commanded 
the atrocities and earned profits by 
committing them. The corporation, 
according to my colleagues, has not violated 
international law, and is indeed incapable of 
doing so because international law does not 
apply to the conduct of corporations. 
Accordingly, a corporation which has earned 
profits by abuse of fundamental human 
rights-as by slave trading-is free to retain 
those profits without liability. 
While my colleagues see nothing strange or 
problematic in this conclusion, their position 
is that in any event they have no 
responsibility for it. They invoke the rule 
simply because, in their contention, it is 
commanded by the law of nations. 
But there is no basis for this contention. No 
precedent of international law endorses this 
rule. No court has ever approved it, nor is 
any international tribunal structured with a 
jurisdiction that reflects it. (Those courts 
that have ruled on the question have 
explicitly rejected it.) No treaty or 
international convention adopts this 
principle. And no work of scholarship on 
international law endorses the majority's 
rule. Until today, their concept had no 
existence in international law. 
The majority contend, nevertheless, that 
unambiguous jurisprudence "lead[ s] 
inescapably" to their conclusion. Maj. Op. 
125. However, the reasoning that supports 
the majority's argument is, in my view, 
illogical, misguided, and based on 
misunderstandings of precedent. 
The argument depends on its observation 
that international criminal tribunals have 
been established without jurisdiction to 
impose criminal punishments on 
corporations for their violations of 
international law. From this fact the majority 
contend an inescapable inference arises that 
international law does not govern 
corporations, which are therefore free to 
engage in conduct prohibited by the rules of 
international law with impunity. 
There is no logic to the argument. The 
reasons why international tribunals have 
been established without jurisdiction to 
impose criminal liability on corporations 
have to do solely with the theory and the 
objectives of criminal p1lnishment, and have 
no bearing on civil compensatory liability. 
The view is widely held among the nations 
of the world that criminal punishments 
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(under domestic law, as well as international 
law) are inappropriate for corporations. 
This view derives from two perceptions: 
First, that criminal punishment can be 
theoretically justified only where the 
defendant has acted with criminal intent-a 
condition that cannot exist when the 
defendant is a juridical construct which is 
incapable of having an intent; and second, 
that criminal punishments are pointless and 
counterproductive when imposed on a 
fictitious juridical entity because they fail to 
achieve the punitive objectives of criminal 
punishment. For these reasons many nations 
in their domestic laws impose criminal 
punishments only on natural persons, and 
not on juridical ones. In contrast, the 
imposition of civil liability on corporations 
serves perfectly the objective of civil 
liability to compensate victims for the 
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced 
everywhere in the world. The fact that 
international tribunals do not Impose 
criminal p1lnishment on corporations in no 
way supports the inference that corporations 
are outside the scope of international law 
and therefore can incur no civil 
compensatory liability to victims when they 
engage in conduct prohibited by the norms 
of international law. 
The majority next contend that international 
law does not distinguish between criminal 
and civil liability. This is simply incorrect. 
International law distinguishes clearly 
between them and provides differently for 
the different objectives of criminal 
punishment and civil compensatory liability. 
The majority then argue that the absence of 
a universal practice among nations of 
imposing civil damages on corporations for 
violations of international law means that 
under international law corporations are not 
liable for violations of the law of nations. 
This argument is as illogical as the first and 
is based on a misunderstanding of the 
structure of international law. The position 
of international law on whether civil liability 
should be imposed for violations of its 
norms is that international law takes no 
position and leaves that question to each 
nation to resolve. International law, at least 
as it pertains to human rights, consists 
primarily of a sparse body of norms, 
adopting widely agreed principles 
prohibiting conduct universally agreed to be 
heinous and inhumane. Having established 
these norms of prohibited conduct, 
international law says little or nothing about 
how those norms should be enforced. It 
leaves the manner of enforcement, including 
the question of whether there should be 
private civil remedies for violations of 
international law, almost entirely to 
individual nations. While most nations have 
not recognized tort liability for violations of 
international law, the United States, through 
the A TS, has opted to impose civil 
compensatory liability on violators and 
draws no distinction in its laws between 
violators who are natural persons and 
corporations. The majority's argument that 
national courts are at libe11y to award civil 
damages for violations of international law 
solely against natural persons and not 
against corporations has no basis in 
international law and, fm1hermore, nullifies 
the intention of international law to leave the 
question of civil liability to be decided 
separately by each nation. 
The majority's asserted rule is, furthermore, 
at once internally inconsistent and 
incompatible with Supreme COUl1 authority 
and with our prior cases that awarded 
damages for violations of international law. 
The absence of a universally accepted rule 
of international law on tort damages is true 
as to defendants who are natural persons, as 
well as to corporations. Because 
international law generally leaves all aspects 
148 
of the issue of civil liability to individual 
nations, there is no rule or custom of 
international law to award civil damages in 
any form or context, either as to natural 
persons or as to juridical ones. lfthe absence 
of a universally accepted rule for the award 
of civil damages against corporations means 
that U.S. cOUlis may not award damages 
against a corporation, then the same absence 
of a universally accepted rule for the award 
of civil damages against natural persons 
must mean that U.S. courts may not award 
damages against a natural person. But the 
majority opinion concedes (as it must) that 
U.S. cOUlis may award damages against the 
corporation's employees when a corporation 
violates the rule of nations. Furthermore, our 
circuit and others have for decades awarded 
damages, and the Supreme COUli in Sosa 
made clear that a damage remedy does lie 
under the A TS. The majority opinion is thus 
internally inconsistent and is logically 
incompatible with both Second Circuit and 
Supreme Court authority. 
I. The improbability that the 
humanitarian law of nations, which is 
based in moral judgments reflected in 
legal systems throughout world and seeks 
to protect fundamental human rights, 
would espouse a rule which undermines 
that objective and lacks any logical 
justification 
A. The opposition of the majority's rule to 
the objectives of international law. 
Rules of international law are not, like 
rocks, mountains, and oceans, unexplained 
natural phenomena found on the surface of 
the emih. The rules of international law have 
been created by a collective human agency 
representing the nations of the world with a 
pwpose to serve desired objectives. Those 
rules express the consensus of nations on 
goals that are shared with virtual unanimity 
throughout the world. Prior to World War II, 
the enforcement of international law focused 
primarily on relations among States and 
problems relating to the sovereign interests 
of States. It involved, for example, the 
inviolability of ambassadors in foreign 
lands, safe conducts, and the outlawing of 
piracy, which threatened the shared interest 
of all nations in trade on the high seas. 
Worldwide revulsion at the Nazi atrocities in 
the period of World War II, however, 
focused attention on humanitarian values-
values so fundamental that they were seen as 
shared by the "civilized nations" of the 
world. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. Beginning 
with the Nuremberg trials, the focus of 
international law thus broadened beyond 
practical concerns of sovereign nations 
toward universally shared moral objectives. 
Acts so repugnant that they violated the 
morality shared by the civilized world were 
recognized as violations of international law. 
The law of nations thus came to focus on 
humanitarian, moral concerns, addressing a 
small category of particularly "heinous 
actions-each of which violates definable, 
universal and obligatory norms"-conduct 
so heinous that he who commits it is 
rendered "hostis hllmani generis, an enemy 
of all mankind." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, 124 
S.Ct. 2739. These acts are generally 
understood to include such extreme, 
universally condemned conduct as genocide, 
exploitation of slaves, war crimes, and, in 
certain circumstances, imprisonment without 
cause and torture. The law of nations 
undertakes an emphatic stance of opposition 
to such acts. 
The majority's interpretation of international 
law, which accords to corporations a free 
pass to act in contravention of international 
law's norms, conflicts with the humanitarian 
objectives of that body of law. 
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II. The majority's mistaken claim that 
corporations are not "subjects" of 
international law 
The majority attempt to bolster their 
argument by employing the arcane 
terminology of international law. They 
asseli that a corporation is not a "subject" of 
international law. Maj. Op. 125-26. The 
majority explain the significance of this term 
to be that only subjects of international law 
have "rights, duties, and liabilities" under 
international law. Maj. Op. 118. Because, 
according to the majority, a corporation is 
not a subject of the law of nations, it may 
neither bring suit for violations of the law of 
nations nor be sued for offenses under the 
law of nations. 
The majority, however, cites no authority in 
support of their asseliion that a corporation 
is not a subject of international law and is 
therefore incapable of being a plaintiff or a 
defendant in an action based on a violation 
of the law of nations. And there is strong 
authority to the contrary. 
The idea that an entity was or was not a 
"subject" of international had greatest 
prominence when the rules of international 
law focused on the sovereign interests of 
States in their relations with one another. To 
the extent that a particular rule of 
international law pertains only to the 
relationship among States, it can be correct 
to say that only States are subjects. 
However, as the law of nations evolved to 
recognize that "individuals and private 
juridical entities can have any status, 
capacity, rights, or duties given them by 
international law or agreement," 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, pt. II, 
introductory note, that terminology has 
come to mean nothing more than asking 
whether the particular norm applies to the 
type of individual or entity charged with 
violating it, as some norms apply only to 
States and others apply to private non-state 
actors. 
As early as the Nuremberg trials, which 
represented the dawn of the modern 
enforcement of the humanitarian component 
of the law of nations, courts recognized that 
corporations had obligations under 
international law (and were therefore 
subjects of international law). In at least 
three of those trials, tribunals found that 
corporations violated the law of nations and 
imposed judgment on individual criminal 
defendants based on their complicity in the 
corporations' violations. 
Two opinions of the Attorney General of the 
United States further refute the majority's 
view that corporations have neither rights 
nor obligations under international law. In 
] 907, the Attorney General rendered an 
opinion that an American corporation could 
be held liable under the A TS to Mexican 
nationals if the defendant's "diversion of the 
water [of the Rio Grande] was an injury to 
substantial rights of citizens of Mexico 
under the principles of international law or 
by treaty." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 252, 253 
(1907). And in 1795, shortly after the 
enactment of the A TS, the Attorney General 
opined that a British corporation could 
pursue a civil action under the A TS for 
lllJury caused to it III violation of 
international law by American citizens who, 
in concert with a French fleet, had attacked a 
settlement managed by the corporation in 
Sierra Leone in violation of international 
law. 
This court similarly recognized claims on 
behalf of juridical entities (a corporation, a 
trust, and a partnership) against Cuba, 
premised on Cuba's expropriation of their 
propelty in violation of international law. 
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These decisions cannot be reconciled with 
the majority's contention that corporations 
are not subjects of under international law . 
III. The Complaint must be dismissed 
because its factual allegations fail to plead 
a violation of the law of nations. 
Although I do not share my colleagues' 
understanding of international law, I am in 
complete agreement that the claims against 
Appellants must be dismissed. That is 
because the pertinent allegations of the 
Complaint fall short of mandatory standards 
established by decisions of this court and the 
Supreme Couti. We recently held in 
Presbyterian Ch1lrch of S1ldan v. Talisman 
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.2009), 
that liability under the A TS for aiding and 
abetting in a violation of international 
human rights lies only where the aider and 
abettor acts with a purpose to bring about 
the abuse of human rights. Id. at 259. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), that a 
complaint is insufficient as a matter of law 
unless it pleads specific facts that "allow[ ] 
the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949. When read 
together, Talisman and Iqbal establish a 
requirement that, for a complaint to properly 
allege a defendant's complicity in human 
rights abuses perpetrated by officials of a 
foreign government, it must plead specific 
facts supporting a reasonable inference that 
the defendant acted with a purpose of 
bringing about the abuses. The allegations 
against Appellants in these appeals do not 
satisfy this standard. While the Complaint 
plausibly alleges that Appellants knew of 
human rights abuses committed by officials 
of the govemment of Nigeria and took 
actions which contributed indirectly to the 
commission of those offenses, it does not 
contain allegations suppOliing a reasonable 
inference that Appellants acted with a 
purpose of bringing about the alleged 
abuses. 
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"Supreme Court to Rule on Corporate Personhood 
for Crimes Against Humanity" 
The HlIffington Post 
October 17,2011 
Mike Sacks 
The Supreme Court on Monday morning 
agreed to hear a case over whether 
corporations can be sued in federal courts 
for human rights violations occurnng 
overseas. 
The case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 
arises out of a suit by a dozen Nigerian 
plaintiffs claiming that Royal Dutch and two 
of its Shell Oil subsidiaries worked with the 
Nigerian government to t0l1ure and 
extrajudicially execute individuals 
protesting against the companies' oil 
exploration. 
The plaintiffs filed suit in United States 
district court under the Alien Tort Statute, 
which empowers the federal courts to hear 
cases by "an alien" bringing a civil suit for 
wrongs committed "in violation of the law 
of nations." The first Congress passed the 
A TS into law in 1789. 
While the A TS indicates who can sue, it 
does not say who or what can be sued. In 
Kiobel, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 
held, by a 2-1 vote, that only natural 
persons, and not corporations, may be held 
liable under the ATS. "Corporate liability is 
not discernible" under the A TS, wrote the 
majority, because "no corporation has ever 
been subject to any form of liability 
(whether civil or criminal) under the 
customary international law of human 
rights." 
The D.C. Circuit and 7th Circuit split with 
the 2nd Circuit Sh0l1ly after its Kiobel 
decision. Judge Richard Posner of the 7th 
Circuit, in his opInIOn for a unanimous 
panel, found the "factual premise of the 
majority opinion in the Kiobel case 
incorrect," citing the allied powers' 
dissolution of German corporations that had 
aided the Nazi government in violation of 
customary international law. 
Even so, Posner continued, that fact "has 
nothing to do with the issue of corporate 
liability." Rather, as the D.C. Circuit put it, 
courts should look to whether the cause of 
action-in Kiobel, a claim such as torture-
is "clearly established in the law of nations," 
and then ask whether corporations are 
generally held liable in domestic lawsuits. 
The Supreme Court will now step in to 
resolve the circuit split, but Kiobel's outlier 
status does not signal an easy reversal. The 
D.C. Circuit's dissenter, Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh, agreed with the 2nd Circuit's 
approach in Kiobel and found that 
"customary international law does not 
recognize corporate liability." Kavanaugh's 
dissents in the past have served as clarion 
calls for the Court's conservatives, so what 
he believes may be a good indicator for how 
the justices may come out. And Kavanaugh, 
a former clerk for Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
believed that "it would be quite odd for a 
U.S. court to allow a customary international 
law-based A TS claim against a corporation 
when no international tribunal has allowed a 
customary international law claim against a 
corporation." Yet for many, it would also be 
quite odd for the Court, which found in 
Citizens United that the Framers intended 
the First Amendment to apply to corporate 
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persons, to reject the concept when it comes 
to corporate liability for crimes against 
humanity under a Founding-era statute. 
The Court wi11likely schedule oral argument 
in Kiobel for February, with a decision to be 
handed down by late June. 
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"Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction 
in a Human Rights Case" 
The New York Times 
March 6, 2012 
Adam Liptak 
Six days after hearing arguments in a major 
human rights case about whether 
corporations may be sued for complicity in 
torture abroad, the Supreme Court on 
Monday instructed the parties to address an 
even broader question. 
The court called for additional briefs to be 
filed by June and a reargument to be held 
during the court's next term, which starts in 
October. 
The original question in the case, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, No. 10-
1491, was whether corporations might be 
sued in United States courts for human 
rights violations under a 1789 law. 
At the argument last Tuesday, it emerged 
that several justices were interested in a 
larger question. 
They wanted to know whether American 
courts might ever hear disputes under the 
law for human rights abuses abroad, whether 
the defendant was a corporation or not. 
The case was brought by 12 Nigerian 
plaintiffs who said the defendants, foreign 
oil companies, had been complicit in human 
rights violations committed against them by 
the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria. 
"What business does a case like that have in 
the courts of the United States?" Justice 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. asked at the argument. 
"There's no connection to the United States 
whatsoever. " 
Monday's order instructed the parties to file 
briefs on the question of "whether and under 
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute" 
allows courts to hear claims based on 
"violations of the law of nations occurring 
within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States." 
The Alien Tort Statute is not a model of 
clarity. It allows federal courts to hear "any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States." 
The law was largely ignored until the 1980s, 
when federal courts started to apply it in 
international human rights cases. A 2004 
Supreme COUli decision, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, left the door open to some claims 
under the law, as long as they involved 
violations of international norms with 
"definite content and acceptance among 
civilized nations." 
Requests for reargument can foreshadow 
major decisions. 
In 2009, for instance, the justices asked for a 
second set of briefs and arguments in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, broadening what had been a 
quirky case into one that would give rise to 
the 2010 campaign finance blockbuster 
allowing unlimited corporate and union 
spending in candidate election. 
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"Supreme Court Says Torture Victim Law Applies 
Only to People, Not Organizations" 
The Washington Post 
April 18, 2012 
Robert Barnes 
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously 
Wednesday that a federal law that allows 
torture victims to sue their overseas assailants 
does not permit suits against corporations or 
political groups such as the Palestine 
Liberation Organization. 
The justices said the Torture Victim Protection 
Act of 1991 authorized lawsuits only against 
individuals responsible for torture and killing. 
"The text of the TVP A convinces us that 
Congress did not extend liability to 
organizations, sovereign or not," Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor wrote for the united court. 
"There are no doubt valid arguments for such 
an extension. But Congress has seen fit to 
proceed in more modest steps in the act, and it 
is not the province of this branch to do 
otherwise." 
The legislation authorizes lawsuits in U.S. 
courts against "an individual" who "under 
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of 
any foreign nation" tortures a person or takes 
part in an "extrajudicial" killing. 
The case before the court involves a lawsuit 
filed by the family of Palestinian American 
Azzam Rahim. Rahim immigrated to the 
United States in the 1970s and returned to the 
West Bank in 1995. His family alleged that he 
was arrested by Palestinian Authority 
intelligence officers and imprisoned, tortured 
and eventually killed in a Jericho prison. 
Rahim's survivors filed suit in 2005 against the 
PLO and the Palestinian Authority. A district 
judge and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, saying only 
people can be sued under the language of the 
TVP A. But other lower courts have said that 
such suits could proceed against corporations 
and other entities. 
Human rights organizations had argued that the 
law was "toothless" if suits were limited to 
individuals rather than entities that might have 
controlled the torture or killings. 
Sotomayor acknowledged that that might be 
true but wrote that "Congress appeared well 
aware of the limited nature of the cause of 
action it established in the act." 
Although the law does not define the word 
"individual," she noted, Congress seemed to go 
out of its way to make sure that the term 
referred only to people. 
The legislation's text "evinces a clear intent not 
to subject non-sovereign organizations to 
liability," she wrote. 
The case is part of an effort by human rights 
groups to use U.S. courts to avenge torture and 
killings overseas. Foreign governments are 
largely protected from suits in the United 
States because of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act. But dozens of suits have been 
filed against multinational corporations under 
the TVPA and a 1789 act, the Alien Tort 
Statute. 
The Supreme Court heard an argument this 
year about whether the A TS allows 
corporations to be held liable for human rights 
abuses committed abroad in which they might 
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have been complicit. But the justices put off a 
decision to look at a broader question next 
term: whether anyone can be sued under the 
statute for violations of international law that 
occur in other countries. 
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"u.s. Urges Narrowing Human Rights Claims" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 13,2012 
Lyle Denniston 
The Obama Administration urged the 
Supreme Court on Thursday to close the 
U.S. courts to most lawsuits involving 
claims that a foreign corporation helped a 
foreign government engage in human rights 
abuses in that country. While arguing that 
the door to American courts should be left 
somewhat ajar to allow some abuse claims, 
the options that would remain would appear 
to be quite narrow, with a variety of legal 
hurdles to overcome. The government's 
new reaction to lawsuits under the Alien 
Tort Statute, first enacted in 1789, was 
expressed in a brief filed in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum (docket 10-1491). That 
specific lawsuit, the brief argued, should not 
be permitted. 
That case, heard by the Justices in February, 
is due to be reheard in the new Term starting 
October 1. The new issue to be explored 
then-a question raised by the Court itself in 
March-is whether and under what 
circumstances an A TS lawsuit should be 
allowed based on international law 
violations that had occurred in a foreign 
land. Technically, that is the issue of 
"extraterritorial application" of the A TS. 
Previously, the Kiobel case had focused only 
on whether corporations could be sued in 
U.S. courts under the ATS for foreign 
violations of global law. 
The supplemental government brief offered 
a complex argument, attempting to move 
between a sharply negative view of lawsuits 
by private individuals that focus on foreign 
conduct, and an unwillingness to say that 
no A TS lawsuit should ever be allowed in a 
U.S. court for overseas breaches of 
international law. The views appeared to 
have been strongly influenced by State 
Department concerns that opening U.S. 
courts for many claims that involved foreign 
government actions would disrupt foreign 
policy and complicate diplomatic relations, 
and perhaps expose the U.S. to reprisals 
abroad. The ultimate conclusion was that 
the Court need not resolve all issues 
surrounding A TS claims in this one lawsuit, 
but that the Justices should embrace some 
controlling principles that generally would 
work against U.S. courts' fashioning new 
A TS claims for breaches of international 
law. 
However, there was no mistaking the clarity 
of this statement: American COUltS "should 
not create a cause of action that challenges 
the actions of a foreign sovereign in its own 
territory, where the [ sued patty] is a foreign 
corporation of a third country that allegedly 
aided and abetted the foreign sovereign'S 
conduct." Beyond that, the brief added, the 
Court should not go, leaving open the 
questions of whether an A TS lawsuit could 
proceed against a U.S. national or U.S. 
corporation, whether such a suit could be 
brought where the alleged misconduct of a 
foreign government had occurred outside its 
own territory, or where the lawsuit targeted 
the conduct of others within the U.S. or on 
the high seas. 
The brief did claim that the Obama 
Administration had softened the federal 
government's past opposition to ATS 
lawsuits. It noted that the government "in 
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recent years has advanced a more 
categorical rule against extraterritoriality 
before this Court and the courts of appeals," 
referring to one brief in 2004 in which the 
Justice Department had argued that no 
lawsuit should be recognized under the ATS 
for the conduct of foreign individuals in 
foreign countries, and another brief in 
2009 arguing against an A TS lawsuit aimed 
at conduct occurring in a foreign country. 
The new brief added: "As explained in this 
brief, the government urges the Couti not to 
adopt such a categorical rule here." 
Even so, the opening that the new brief 
would leave for A TS claims was tightly 
circumscribed. It was focused, as is the 
Kiobel case in particular, on when the coutis 
should create, on their own initiative, a right 
to sue for violations of international 
law. Accepting that Congress has wider 
power to create a right to sue for foreign 
abuses, as the lawmakers did in 1991 in the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, the brief 
suggested that there should be a "general 
assumption" that creating a right to sue for 
private individuals under ATS was "better 
left to legislative judgment." 
The filing did accept (and noted that the 
State Depmiment, too, had accepted) that a 
right to sue had been properly recognized by 
the Second Circuit Court in 1980, in the case 
of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. That was the 
decision that is generally credited with 
launching a wave of new lawsuits under the 
A TS after that law had languished for 
decades. But note the key features of the 
Filartiga ruling that the Justice and State 
Departments now endorse as valid claims: 
while that case involved a claim by 
Paraguayan individuals against a 
Paraguayan individual for abuses committed 
in that Latin American country, the claim 
was for torture, and the sued individual had 
actually been found living in the U.S., and 
that suggested that maybe the U.S. 
government could be accused of harboring 
him. And, the brief added, those 
Paraguayan individuals if suing now would 
be able to due so under the anti-toliure law, 
the TVPA. 
Turning to the Kiobel case itself, the new 
filing flatly urged that it be rejected. It 
involved, the brief noted, Nigerian nationals 
suing Dutch and British corporations for 
allegedly helping the Nigerian military and 
police forces to commit torture, killings, 
"crimes against humanity," and arbitrary 
arrest and detention-all of which had 
occurred inside Nigeria. In those 
circumstances, the brief said, "the United 
States cannot be thought responsible in the 
eyes of the international community for 
affording a remedy for the company's 
actions, while the nations directly concerned 
could." 
Even when circumstances might arise that 
would justify bringing an A TS lawsuit in the 
U.S. cOutis for abuses that occurred in 
foreign lands, the brief said, there should be 
strict requirements that those who sued 
should first have to have tried to get some 
legal relief in the courts or the government 
of that country, and, if there is an 
international claims agency available, to try 
for a remedy there. Such lawsuits, it added, 
also should be limited by the notion that a 
U.S. court might well be an inconvenient 
forum, in which it was more difficult or 
costly for a foreign government or foreign 
corporation to mount a defense many miles 
from its own shores. 
Those two limiting requirements should be 
imposed "at the outset of the litigation," and 
should be applied "with special force," the 
brief argued. In particular, when the link to 
the U.S. "is slight," the filing contended, "a 
U.S. court applying U.S. law should be a 
forum of last resOli, if available at all." 
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The Kiobel plaintiffs have already filed their 
supplemental brief on the overseas reach of 
ATS, urging that the Justices allow such an 
application of that law in their case. The 
two oil companies sued in the case are due 
to file their briefs on that issue in August. 
After that, the Kiobel parties will have a 
chance to file a reply brief. 
The Justice Department has been taking part 
in the Kiobel case since briefing began. In 
an earlier brief filed in December, it 
supported the Kiobel plaintiffs and urged the 
Court to rule that corporations could be sued 
under the A TS for overseas human rights 
abuses, saying there was nothing in the 
history of that old law that provided a basis 
for applying it only to natural persons. Its 
new position against the Kiobel claims is 
bound to draw criticism of the government 
from human rights activists, who had been 
hoping that the Justice Department would 
not file a brief against the claims in this 
case. 
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Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 
11-1025 
Ruling Below: Amnesty International USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 2012 WL 526046 (U.S. 2012). 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 to remedy abuses of 
electronic surveillance conducted for national security. FISA was amended in 2008 and codified 
as 50 U.S.C. 1881 a, establishing procedures that allow the Attorney General and Director of 
National Intelligence's to target foreign persons for surveillance without individualized 
identification in order to acquire "foreign intelligence information." The day this amendment 
was enacted, attorneys, journalists, human rights organizations, and others brought a facial 
challenge to Section 1881a, seeking a declaration that the provision is unconstitutional (under 
Aliicle III and the First and Fourth Amendments) and an injunction permanently enjoining any 
foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under the section. The case has not yet 
reached its merits as the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary 
judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to pursue their 
claim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the 
organizations had standing based upon a reasonable fear of being monitored based on a "realistic 
understanding of the world" and the costs incurred to avoid that injury. In a 6-6 split, the Second 
Circuit refused to rehear the decision en bane. 
Question Presented: Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief 
because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their 
international communications using 50 U .S.C. 1881 a-authorized surveillance and did not show 
that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881 a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their 
purported injuries. 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, Global Fund for Women, Global Rights, Human 
Rights Watch, International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, The Nation 
Magazine, PEN American Center, Service Employees International Union, Washington 
Office on Latin America, Daniel N. Arshack, David Nevin, Scott McKay, Sylvia Royce, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
James R. CLAPPER, Jr., in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence, Keith 
B. Alexander, in his official capacity as Director of the National Security Agency and Chief 
of the Central Security Service, Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney 
General of the United States, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Decided March 21, 2011 
[Excerpt; some text, footnotes and citations omitted.] 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge 
Attorneys, journalists, and labor, legal, 
media, and human rights organizations 
brought this action facially challenging the 
constitutionality of Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 ("FISA"), which was added to FISA 
by Section 101(a)(2) of the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (the "FAA"), and 
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a. Section 702 
creates new procedures for authorizing 
government electronic surveillance targeting 
non-United States persons outside the 
United States for purposes of collecting 
foreign intelligence. The plaintiffs complain 
that the procedures violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the First Amendment, Atiicle 
III of the Constitution, and the principle of 
separation of powers because they "allow[] 
the executive branch sweeping and virtually 
unregulated authority to monitor the 
international communications . . . of law-
abiding U.S. citizens and residents." 
The merits of the plaintiffs' claims are not 
before us. The only issue presented by this 
appeal is whether the plaintiffs are legally in 
a position to assert these claims in a federal 
court, not whether the claims are to any 
degree valid. Their merit is an issue for 
another comi on another day. The district 
court (Koeltl, 1.) granted the government 
summary judgment because it found that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing. On appeal, the 
plaintiffs argue that they have standing 
because the FAA's new procedures cause 
them to fear that their communications will 
be monitored, and thus force them to 
undertake costly and burdensome measures 
to protect the confidentiality of international 
communications necessary to carrying out 
their jobs. Because standing may be based 
on a reasonable fear of future injury and 
costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the 
plaintiffs have established that they have a 
reasonable fear of injury and have incurred 
costs to avoid it, we agree that they have 
standing. We therefore reverse the district 
court's judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
I. Statutory Scheme at Issue 
In 1978, Congress enacted FISA to establish 
procedures under which federal officials 
could obtain authorization to conduct 
electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence purposes, including surveillance 
of communications between persons located 
within the United States and surveillance of 
communications between persons located 
within the United States and persons located 
outside the United States. The 2008 FAA 
amends FISA. It leaves much of the 
preexisting surveillance authorization 
procedure intact, but it creates new 
procedures for the authorization of foreign 
intelligence electronic surveillance targeting 
non-United States persons located outside 
the United States. The plaintiffs complain 
that the new procedures unlawfully permit 
broader collection of intelligence with less 
judicial oversight. ... 
B. Surveillance Authorization Procedures 
After the FAA 
The FAA leaves much of the FISA 
framework intact, but the new Section 702 
creates new procedures for the authorization 
of foreign intelligence surveillance targeting 
non-United States persons located outside 
the United States. 
The FAA, in contrast to the preexisting 
FISA scheme, does not require the 
government to submit an individualized 
application to the FISC identifying the 
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particular targets or facilities to be 
monitored. Instead, the Attorney General 
("AG") and Director of National 
Intelligence ("DNI") apply for a mass 
surveillance authorization by submitting to 
the FISC a written certification and 
supporting affidavits attesting generally that 
"a significant purpose of the acquisition is to 
obtain foreign intelligence information" and 
that that information will be obtained "from 
or with the assistance of an electronic 
communication service provider." The 
certification must also attest that adequate 
targeting and minimization procedures have 
been approved by the FISC, have been 
submitted to the FISC for approval, or are 
being submitted with the certification. 
"Targeting procedures" are procedures 
designed to ensure that an authorized 
acquisition is "limited to targeting persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States," and is designed to "prevent 
the intentional acquisition of any 
communication as to which the sender and 
all intended recipients are known at the time 
of the acquisition to be located in the United 
States." "Minimization procedures" for 
electronic surveillance under the FAA must 
meet the definition of minimization 
procedures for electronic surveillance under 
FISA, set out in 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (h). The 
government's certification must further 
attest that the surveillance procedures, which 
must be included with the celiification, 
comply with the FOUlih Amendment. 
In addition, the certification must attest that 
the surveillance complies with statutory 
limitations providing that it: 
(1) may not intentionally target any 
person known at the time of 
acquisition to be located in the 
United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a 
person reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States if 
the purpose of such acquisition is to 
target a particular, known person 
reasonably believed to be in the 
United States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a 
United States person reasonably 
believed to be located outside the 
United States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any 
communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are 
known at the time of the acquisition 
to be located in the United States; 
and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
The FISC must review the government's 
certification, and targeting and minimization 
procedures, and if it finds that the 
certification includes all of the required 
elements, it must issue an order authorizing 
the government to conduct the requested 
surveillance. At that point, the AG and DNI 
"may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 
1 year . . . , the targeting of persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information. " 
If the FISC rejects an application, the 
government may appeal the denial to the 
Court of Review. During the pendency of 
that appeal, including any subsequent 
rehearing en bane, the government may 
continue to conduct the requested 
surveillance. 
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Under the FAA, in contrast to the 
preexisting FISA scheme, the FISC may not 
monitor compliance with the targeting and 
minimization procedures on an ongoing 
basis. Instead, that duty falls to the AG and 
DNI, who must submit their assessments to 
the FISC, as well as the congressional 
intelligence committees and the Senate and 
House Judiciary Committees. In its 
summary judgment submissions, the 
government asserted that "[ s ]hould such 
repOliing reveal particular minimization 
procedures to be ineffective in any respect, 
the FISC has the authority to disapprove 
such procedures in future § 1881 a 
proceedings." But the government has not 
asserted, and the statute does not clearly 
state, that the FISC may rely on these 
assessments to revoke earlier surveillance 
authorizations. 
The head of each element of the intelligence 
community acquiring communications by 
means of authorized surveillance also must 
review the ongoing surveillance procedures 
by conducting "an annual review to 
determine whether there is reason to believe 
that foreign intelligence information has 
been or will be obtained from the 
acquisition." These reviews of authorized 
acquisitions must indicate how many United 
States persons were overheard or were 
referred to in intercepted communications 
that were collected under surveillance 
designed to target non-United States 
persons. The relevant intelligence heads who 
conduct such annual reviews must use them 
"to evaluate the adequacy of the 
minimization procedures," and they must 
provide these annual reviews to the FISC, 
the AG, the DNI, the congressional 
intelligence committees, and the Senate and 
House judiciary Committees. 
C. Comparison of Pre- and Post-FAA 
Surveillance Authorization Procedures 
The plaintiffs highlight two differences 
between the pre- and post-FAA surveillance 
authorization procedures. First, whereas 
under the preexisting FISA scheme the 
government had to submit an individualized 
application for surveillance identifying the 
particular target, facility, type of information 
sought, and procedures to be used, under the 
FAA, the government need not submit a 
similarly individualized application-it need 
not identify the particular target or facility to 
be monitored. Second, whereas under the 
preexisting FISA scheme the FISC had to 
find probable cause to believe both that the 
surveillance target is a "foreign power" or 
agent thereof and that the facilities to be 
monitored were being used or about to be 
used by a foreign power or its agent, under 
the FAA the FISC no longer needs to make 
any probable cause determination at all. 
Instead, the FISC simply verifies that the 
government has made the proper 
celiifications. 
In practice, these new authorization 
procedures mean that surveillance orders 
can be significantly broader under the FAA 
than they previously could have been. Prior 
to the FAA, surveillance orders could only 
authorize the government to monitor 
specific individuals or facilities. Under the 
FAA, by contrast, the plaintiffs allege that 
an acquisition order could seek, for example, 
"[ a]ll telephone and e-mail communications 
to and from countries of foreign policy 
interest-for example, Russia, Venezuela, or 
Israel-including communications made to 
and from U.S. citizens and residents." 
Moreover, the specific showing of probable 
cause previously required, and the 
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requirement of judicial reVieW of that 
showing, have been eliminated. The 
government has not directly challenged this 
characterization. 
An additional distinction concerns who 
monitors compliance with statutory 
limitations on the surveillance procedures. 
The preexisting FISA scheme allowed 
ongoing judicial review by the FISC. But 
under the FAA, the judiciary may not 
monitor compliance on an ongoing basis; the 
FISC may review the mInImIzation 
procedures only prospectively, when the 
government seeks its initial surveillance 
authorization. Rather, the executive-
namely the AG and DNI-bears the 
responsibility of monitoring ongoing 
compliance, and although the FISC receives 
the executive's reports, it cannot rely on 
them to alter or revoke its previous 
surveillance authorizations. 
II. Prior Proceedings 
A. Parties 
The plaintiffs are attorneys and human 
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations 
whose work requires international 
communications with individuals they 
believe the government will likely monitor 
under the FAA. The plaintiffs sued the ONI, 
the AG, and the Director of the National 
Security Agency ("NSA") in their official 
capacities (collectively, "the government"). 
B. Complaint 
On July 10, 2008, the same day Congress 
enacted the FAA, the plaintiffs filed their 
complaint alleging that the FAA "allows the 
executive branch sweeping and virtually 
unregulated authority to monitor the 
international communications . . . of law-
abiding U. S. citizens and residents." The 
plaintiffs alleged that they feared that under 
the FAA the government would intercept 
their sensitive international communications 
that were necessary to carrying out their 
jobs, and that they therefore had to take 
costly and burdensome measures to protect 
the confidentiality of those communications. 
They sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief, alleging that the FAA facially violates 
the Fourth Amendment, the First 
Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, 
and the principle of separation of powers. 
C. Summary Judgment Filings 
In September and October 2008, the parties 
cross-moved for summary judgment. The 
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the FAA 
is unconstitutional. The government, in 
addition to defending the FAA's 
constitutionality on the merits, argued that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
the facial validity of the statute, contending 
that the Act could be challenged only by 
persons who had been electronically 
surveilled in accordance with its terms and 
the plaintiffs could not show that they had 
been so surveilled. The plaintiffs advanced 
what they characterized as two independent 
bases for standing to challenge the FAA's 
constitutionality: first, that they have an 
actual and well-founded fear that their 
communications will be monitored in the 
future; and, second, that in light of that fear 
they have taken costly and burdensome 
measures to protect the confidentiality of 
certain communications. 
In support of their standing arguments, the 
plaintiffs filed declat'ations and a Statement 
of Undisputed Facts pursuant to Local Rule 
56.1 ("56.1 Statement"). The plaintiffs' 
evidence tended to show that their work 
"requires them to engage in sensitive and 
sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail 
communications with colleagues, clients, 
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journalistic sources, witnesses, experts, 
foreign governmental officials, and victims 
of human rights abuses located outside the 
United States." The individuals with whom 
the plaintiffs communicate include "people 
the U.S. Government believes or believed to 
be associated with terrorist organizations," 
"political and human rights activists who 
oppose governments that are suppOlied 
economically or militarily by the U.S. 
government," and "people located in 
geographic areas that are a special focus of 
the U.S. government's counterterrorism or 
diplomatic efforts." 
The plaintiffs asselt that in their electronic 
communications with these individuals they 
exchange information that "constitutes 
'foreign intelligence information' within the 
meaning of the FAA." The plaintiffs believe 
that, because of the nature of their 
communications with these individuals, the 
communications will likely be "acquired, 
retained, analyzed, and disseminated" under 
the FAA. 
Their fear of future surveillance, according 
to the plaintiffs, inflicts present injuries. For 
instance, in order to protect the 
confidentiality of sensitive and privileged 
communications the plaintiffs have "ceased 
engaging in certain conversations on the 
telephone and bye-mail," which, in turn, 
"compromises [their] ability to locate 
witnesses, cultivate sources, gather 
information, communicate confidential 
information to their clients, and to engage in 
other legitimate and constitutionally 
protected communications." In addition, the 
FAA has "force [ d] plaintiffs to take costly 
and burdensome measures," such as 
traveling long distances to meet personally 
with individuals. 
The attorney plaintiffs asseli that they are 
obligated to take these measures in order to 
comply with their "ethical obligation to 
avoid communicating confidential 
information about client matters over 
telephone, fax, or e-mail if they have reason 
to believe that it is likely to be intercepted 
by others." In support of this assertion, the 
plaintiffs filed a declaration from Professor 
Stephen Gillers, an expert in legal ethics, 
stating that it is "the duty of a lawyer to 
safeguard confidential information." 
Gillers attested that "[ d]eterminative of how 
the lawyer may proceed is . . . whether the 
lawyer has good reason to believe that his or 
her communications are reasonably likely to 
be intercepted, even if the interception is 
lawful." He then opined that the FAA gives 
the attorneys sufficient reason to believe 
their communications will be intercepted: 
My opinion is that the lawyers have 
good reason for this belief [that their 
communications with clients and 
third parties in connection with client 
matters will be intercepted] because 
of the status of their clients, the 
identity and location of witnesses 
and sources, and the broad authority 
that the FAA grants the government. 
The lawyers' decision to avoid 
electronic means of communication 
is not discretionary. It is obligatory. 
The government did not submit any 
evidence of its own either in opposition to 
the plaintiffs' submissions, or in support of 
its own summary judgment motion. 
Additionally, at oral argument on the 
summary judgment motions, the government 
said it accepted the factual submissions of 
the plaintiffs as true for purposes of those 
motions. We therefore must accept the 
plaintiffs' evidence as undisputed 
explanations of how the FAA has affected 
them. 
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D. District Court's Summary Judgment 
Opinion 
The district court held that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge the FAA, and 
therefore granted summary judgment for 
defendants without reaching the merits of 
the plaintiffs' claims. After identifying the 
three constitutional requirements for 
standing-an injury in fact, a causal 
connection between the injury and the 
challenged statute, and redressability-the 
court stated that "[ t ]his case turns on 
whether the plaintiffs have met the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of 
personal, particularized, concrete injury in 
fact." The court denied standing because it 
found that neither of the plaintiffs' asserted 
injuries-their actual and well-founded fear 
of being monitored, and the resulting 
professional and economic costs they have 
incurred to protect the confidentiality of 
their communications-constituted the 
requisite injury in fact. 
1. Fear of Future Surveillance 
The district court found the plaintiffs' fear 
of future surveillance too speCUlative to 
confer standing. It stated: 
The plaintiffs have failed to establish 
standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the FAA on the 
basis of their fear of surveillance .... 
Indeed, the FAA neither authorizes 
surveillance nor identifies on its face 
a class of persons that includes the 
plaintiffs. Rather the FAA authorizes 
specified federal officials to seek a 
surveillance order from the FISC. 
That order cannot target the plaintiffs 
and whether an order will be sought 
that affects the plaintiffs' rights, and 
whether such an order would be 
granted by the FISC, IS completely 
speculative. 
To arrive at this conclusion, the district court 
relied on three lines of cases. First, the court 
looked to cases where plaintiffs have sought 
standing to challenge electronic surveillance 
schemes, namely United Presbyterian 
Church in the US.A. v. Reagan and ACLU 
v. NSA. Both of these cases rejected the 
plaintiffs' standing arguments, which were 
based on their fear of future injuries, 
because the plaintiffs' respective fears were 
too speCUlative. The district court found 
those cases apposite and persuasive. 
Second, the court examined "'physical 
surveillance cases' where the Supreme 
Court reached the merits of challenges to 
laws or policies authorizing drug or alcohol 
testing for specific classes of persons, 
without requiring that the plaintiffs had 
actually submitted to such testing before 
bringing such challenges." The district court 
held that those cases have "no application to 
this case, where the plaintiffs are not 
required to do anything or to submit to 
anything, and where there is no showing that 
the Government has authorized any action 
against [a class of persons including] the 
plaintiffs. " 
Finally, the district court examined standing 
cases outside the surveillance context, and 
said those cases: "stand for the proposition 
that a plaintiff may challenge a specific law 
or regulation before it is enforced against the 
plaintiff if the plaintiff is subject to that law 
or regulation and has a well-founded fear 
that it will be so enforced .... Moreover, the 
FAA does not authorize surveillance of the 
plaintiffs' communications and the plaintiffs 
have made no showing that the Government 
has sought any such surveillance pursuant to 
the general framework set forth in the statute 
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or that such survei llance has been 
authorized. " 
2. Economic and Professional Costs 
Incurred to Protect Communications 
As for the plaintiffs' economic and 
professional costs, the court found that those 
injuries are "not truly independent of the 
[plaintiffs'] first basis" for standing, because 
those costs "flow directly from the 
plaintiffs' fear of surveillance." The court 
said that "[t]o allow the plaintiffs to bring 
this action on the basis of such costs would 
essentially be to accept a repackaged version 
of the first failed basis for standing." 
Moreover, the court held that "because the 
plaintiffs have failed to show that they are 
subject to the FAA and that they face a 
threat of harm from its enforcement, the 
chilling of their speech that they attribute to 
the statute is actually the result of their 
purely subjective fear of surveillance." The 
court went on to state that the Supreme 
COUli has held in Laird v. Tatum, that such a 
subjective chill "is insufficient to support 
standing." 
DISCUSSION 
This opinion addresses only the question of 
whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge 
the FAA. It does not address the FAA's 
constitutionality. The district court did not 
reach that issue, and the parties did not brief 
it. The question before this Court is only 
whether the plaintiffs may maintain this 
lawsuit, a question that "in no way depends 
on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that 
particular conduct is illegal" "We reVIew 
questions of standing de novo. " 
I. Elements and Principles of Standing 
Article III of the United States Constitution 
empowers federal courts to hear only 
"cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. 
Ill, § 2. Standing doctrine determines 
"whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case 
or controversy' between himself and the 
defendant within the meaning of Art. Ill," 
and is therefore "entitled to have the court 
decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues." A citizen who dislikes a 
particular law may not require a court to 
address its constitutionality simply by 
stating in a complaint his belief, however 
deeply held, that the law is inconsistent with 
some provision of the Constitution. "[T]he 
[Supreme] Court has rejected all attempts to 
substitute abstract concern with a subject ... 
for the concrete injury required by Art. III." 
The plaintiff must be affected by the law in 
some concrete way. "Concrete injury, 
whether actual or threatened, is that 
indispensable element of a dispute which 
serves in part to cast it in a form 
traditionally capable of judicial resolution." 
The critical question is whether "the plaintiff 
has alleged such a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy as to warrant his 
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." 
The Supreme Court has said that "the 
irreducible constitutional mInImUm of 
standing contains three elements": 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury in fact-an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) 
concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical. Second, there must 
be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained 
of-the injury has to be fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not the result of 
the independent action of some third 
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party not before the court. Third, it must 
be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision. 
"The party invoking federal jurisdiction 
bears the burden of establishing these 
elements." These requirements "assure[] that 
there is a real need to exercise the power of 
judicial review in order to protect the 
interests of the complaining party." 
Standing doctrine serves a number of 
purposes. The Supreme Court has said 
standing is "built on a single basic idea-the 
idea of separation of powers." "[T]he 
judicial power of the United States defined 
by Alt. III is not an unconditioned authority 
to determine the constitutionality of 
legislative or executive acts." By limiting 
the exercise of judicial review of other 
branches of government to cases where it is 
necessary to protect a complaining party's 
interests, standing doctrine is "founded in 
concern about the proper-and properly 
limited-role of the courts in a democratic 
society." If we had no standing doctrine and 
instead simply allowed the comts to 
"oversee legislative or executive action," 
that would "significantly alter the allocation 
of power away from a democratic form of 
government." 
Standing doctrine also serves to improve 
judicial decision making by ensuring that a 
concrete case informs the court of the 
consequences of its decisions, and by 
ensuring that the party bringing the case has 
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation 
of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions." 
II. Plaintiffs' Asserted Grounds for 
Standing 
On appeal, the plaintiffs reaSSeIt that they 
have suffered two types of injuries. First, 
they claim that they fear that the government 
will intercept their sensitive international 
communications, because the FAA "plainly 
authorizes the acquisition of [their] 
international communications," and their 
communications are "likely to be monitored 
under it." Second, they claim that 
anticipation of this future injury also inflicts 
a present injury "by compelling them to take 
costly and burdensome measures to protect 
the confidentiality of their international 
communications" and by compromising 
their "ability to locate witnesses, cultivate 
sources, gather information, communicate 
confidential information to their clients, and 
to engage in other legitimate and 
constitutionally protected communications." 
The district comt and the parties have 
focused on whether the plaintiffs' asserted 
injuries satisfy the injury-in-fact component 
of the standing inquiry. Although they are 
correct that the plaintiffs' first asselted 
injury-the possibility of being monitored in 
the future-raises a question of injury in 
fact, because probabilistic injuries constitute 
injuries in fact only when they reach a 
certain threshold oflikelihood, the plaintiffs' 
second asselted injury alleges the most 
mundane of injuries in fact: the expenditure 
of funds. The plaintiffs' declarations, which, 
as discussed above, we must accept as true, 
establish that they have already incurred 
professional and economic costs to avoid 
interception. Having accepted the 
truthfulness of the plaintiffs' declarations for 
purposes of the summary judgment motion, 
the government cannot now dispute whether 
the plaintiffs genuinely fear being 
intercepted, or whether the plaintiffs have 
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actually incurred the costs they claim to 
have incurred. Thus, we have little doubt 
that the plaintiffs have satisfied the injury-
in-fact requirement. 
As to the second asserted injury-their 
present-injury theory-that the plaintiffs 
have demonstrated injuries in fact is not 
sufficient in itself to establish standing. The 
plaintiffs must also prove that the injuries 
are caused by the challenged statute and that 
a favorable judgment would redress them. 
The government's challenge to the 
plaintiffs' standing based on their incurred 
professional and economic costs focuses on 
whether there is a "causal connection 
between [the plaintiffs'] injury and the 
[legislation] complained of." The causal 
chain can be broken where a plaintiffs self-
inflicted mJury results from his 
"unreasonable decision ... to bring about a 
harm that he knew to be avoidable." 
However, "[s]tanding is not defeated merely 
because the plaintiff has in some sense 
contributed to his own injury .... Standing 
is defeated only if it is concluded that the 
injury is so completely due to the plaintiffs 
own fault as to break the causal chain." 
If the plaintiffs can show that it was not 
unreasonable for them to incur costs out of 
fear that the government will intercept their 
communications under the FAA, then the 
measures they took to avoid interception can 
support standing. If the possibility of 
interception is remote or fanciful, however, 
their present-injury theory fails because the 
plaintiffs would have no reasonable basis for 
fearing interception under the FAA, and 
they cannot bootstrap their way into 
standing by unreasonably incurring costs to 
avoid a merely speculative or highly 
unlikely potential harm. Any such costs 
would be gratuitous, and any ethical 
concerns about not taking those measures 
would be unfounded. In other words, for the 
purpose of standing, although the plaintiffs' 
economic and professional injuries are 
injuries in fact, they cannot be said to be 
"fairly traceable" to the FAA-and cannot 
support standing-if they are caused by a 
fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise 
unreasonable fear of the FAA. "If causation 
is to be required at all, it should demand a 
meaningful level of probability," but "[a]s 
with other elements of standing, the showing 
required might be tailored to the other facts 
that make it more or less appropriate to 
decide the case." 
Here, the plaintiffs' actions were "fairly 
traceable" to the FAA. Because, as we shall 
explain, the plaintiffs' fears were reasonable 
even under the stringent reasonableness 
standards found in jilt1tre-injllry cases, and 
because the plaintiffs incurred these 
professional and economic costs as a direct 
result of that reasonable fear, their present 
InJunes in fact clearly satisfy the 
requirements for standing. We therefore 
need not and do not decide whether the 
degree of likelihood necessary to establish a 
causal relationship between an actual 
present mJury and the challenged 
governmental action is as stringent as that 
necessary for a potential harm in itself to 
confer standing. However, the line of future-
injury standing cases provides a helpful 
framework for analyzing the plaintiffs' 
present-injury arguments. Those cases 
bolster our conclusion that the professional 
and economic harms the plaintiffs suffered 
here were fairly traceable to the FAA, and 
were not the result of an "unreasonable 
decision" on their patt "to bring about a 
harm that [they] knew to be avoidable." 
In addition to their present-injury theory, the 
plaintiffs advance a future-injury theory of 
standing. A future injury or threat of injury 
does not confer standing if it is "conjectural 
or hypothetical" and not "real and 
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immediate." To determine whether the 
plaintiffs have standing under their future-
injury theory, we would need to determine 
whether the FAA creates an objectively 
reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs' 
communications are being or will be 
monitored under the FAA. As noted above, 
we conclude that the future injuries alleged 
by the plaintiffs are indeed sufficiently 
likely to confer standing under the test 
established in the case law for basing 
standing on the risk of future harm. 
The government's first argument against the 
plaintiffs' standing-on both theories-is 
that the FAA does not create a sufficiently 
high likelihood that those communications 
will be monitored. In our judgment, 
however, for the reasons set fOith in Part III, 
below, the plaintiffs have established that 
they reasonably fear being monitored under 
the allegedly unconstitutional FAA, and that 
they have undertaken costly measures to 
avoid it. Those present injuries-fairly 
traceable to the FAA and likely to be 
redressable by a favorable judgment-
support the plaintiffs' standing to challenge 
the statute. 
The government next argues that the 
plaintiffs lack standing because any injury 
they suffer is indirect. That is, the 
government contends that because the FAA 
does not directly target the plaintiffs, any 
injury the plaintiffs suffer is a result of their 
reaction to the government's potential 
monitoring of third parties. The government 
essentially argues that this indirectness 
defeats the plaintiffs' standing because it 
attenuates the causal chain linking the 
plaintiffs' injuries to the FAA. For the 
reasons set forth in Part IV, below, we 
disagree. 
III. Likelihood of Government Action 
The government argues that the plaintiffs 
can obtain standing only by showing either 
that they have been monitored or that it is 
"effectively certain" that they will be 
monitored. The plaintiffs fall short of this 
standard, according to the government, 
because they "simply speculate that they 
will be subjected to governmental action 
taken pursuant to [the FAA]." 
But the government overstates the standard 
for determining when a present injury linked 
to a contingent future injury can support 
standing. The plaintiffs have demonstrated 
that they suffered present injuries in fact-
concrete economic and professional 
harms-that are fairly traceable to the FAA 
and redressable by a favorable judgment. 
The plaintiffs need not show that they have 
been or certainly will be monitored. Indeed, 
even in cases where plaintiffs allege an 
mJury based solely on prospective 
government action, they need only show a 
"realistic danger" of "direct injury;" and 
where they allege a prospective injury to 
First Amendment rights, they must show 
only "'an actual and well-founded fear' "of 
injury, an arguably less demanding standard. 
A. Standard 
When a plaintiff asserts a present mJury 
based on conduct taken in anticipation of 
jiltllre government action, we evaluate the 
likelihood that the future action will in fact 
come to pass. To determine whether the 
present injury "fairly can be traced to the 
challenged [ future] action," we must 
consider whether a plaintiffs present injury 
resulted from some irrational or otherwise 
clearly unreasonable fear of future 
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government action that is unlikely to take 
place. Such a disconnect between the 
present lllJury and predicted future 
government action would break the causal 
chain required for standing. 
In this context, cases that discuss whether a 
potential ji/t1lre harm is sufficiently likely 
such that the chance of that future harm 
constitutes an injury in fact can provide 
some guidance for determining whether the 
plaintiffs have satisfied the causation 
requirement for standing where their 
asseliions of present and ongoing injuries 
stem, in part, from a desire to avoid potential 
future injuries. 
In Lyons, the seminal case on standing based 
on probabilistic or prospective harm, the 
plaintiff sued the City of Los Angeles and 
certain police officers alleging that officers 
stopped him for a traffic violation and, 
without provocation, applied a choke-hold, 
rendering him unconscious and damaging 
his larynx. In addition to seeking damages, 
he sought to enjoin police officers' use of 
chokeholds. 
The Court said, "Lyons' standing to seek the 
injunction requested depended on whether 
he was likely to suffer future injury from the 
use of the chokeholds by police officers," 
emphasizing that "[t]he reasonableness of 
[the plaintiffs] fear [of future injury] is 
dependent upon the likelihood of a 
recurrence of the allegedly unlawful 
conduct. It is the reality of the threat of 
repeated injury that is relevant to the 
standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective 
apprehensions. " 
The Court held that Lyons lacked standing 
to pursue injunctive relief, because he did 
not show a sufficient likelihood that he 
would be injured. It said, "[ w]e cannot agree 
that the odds that Lyons would not only 
again be stopped for a traffic violation but 
would also be subjected to a chokehold 
without any provocation whatsoever are 
sufficient to make out a federal case for 
equitable relief." Without a "sufficient 
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a 
similar way," Lyons was "no more entitled 
to an injunction than any other citizen of Los 
Angeles; and a federal cOUli may not 
entertain a claim by any or all citizens who 
no more than assert that certain practices of 
law enforcement officers are 
unconstitutional. " 
Although the plaintiff in Lyons lacked 
standing, that case clearly aIiiculated the 
principle that a plaintiff may obtain standing 
by showing a sufficient likelihood of future 
injury. Indeed, the Court stated that Lyons 
would have established standing if he had 
been able to allege facts that would have 
made his injury sufficiently likely-such as 
another encounter with the police or a city 
policy authorizing police officers to engage 
in the conduct he feared. 
This Court has articulated the principle of 
Lyons as requiring an inquiry into the 
probability of future harm. In C1Irtis v. City 
of New Haven, where plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin police officers' use of mace in certain 
circumstances because officers stopped 
them, maced them, and gave them no 
treatment afterward, we denied standing, 
holding that "the Court made clear in Lyons 
that the critical inquiry is the likelihood that 
these plaintiffs will again be illegally 
assaulted with mace." 
Assessing whether a threatened lllJury, by 
itself, is sufficiently probable to support 
standing is a "qualitative, not quantitative" 
inquiry that is "highly case-specific." "[T]he 
question of whether anticipated future injury 
suffices to establish standing is approached 
as a question of judgment and degrees." 
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Indeed, in future-injury cases, we have said 
that "the risk of harm necessary to support 
standing cannot be defined according to a 
universal standard." 
One factor that bolsters a plaintiffs argument 
that the injury is likely to come to pass, 
according to both the Supreme Court and 
this Court, is the existence of a policy that 
authorizes the potentially harmful conduct. 
However, the cases do not establish any 
talismanic, dispositive facts a plaintiff must 
plead in order to establish a certain threshold 
of probability. Some cases suggest that the 
risk of that harm need not be particularly 
high. The probability required "logically 
varies with the severity of the probable 
harm." Ultimately, cOUlis consider the 
totality of the circumstances, and where a 
"plaintiffs interpretation of a statute is 
'reasonable enough' and under that 
interpretation the plaintiff 'may legitimately 
fear that it will face enforcement of the 
statute,' then the plaintiff has standing to 
challenge the statute." 
B. Application 
The plaintiffs have established that they 
suffered present injuries in fact-economic 
and professional harms-stemming from a 
reasonable fear of jilture harmful 
government conduct. They have asserted 
that the FAA permits broad monitoring 
through mass surveillance orders that 
authorize the government to collect 
thousands or millions of communications, 
including communications between the 
plaintiffs and their overseas contacts. The 
FAA is susceptible to such an interpretation, 
and the government has not controverted 
this interpretation or offered a more 
compelling one. 
It is significant that the injury that the 
plaintiffs fear results from conduct that is 
authorized by statute. This case is not like 
Lyons, where the plaintiff feared injury from 
officers who would have been acting outside 
the law, making the injury less likely to 
occur. Here, the fact that the government has 
authorized the potentially harmful conduct 
means that the plaintiffs can reasonably 
assume that government officials will 
actually engage in that conduct by carrying 
out the authorized surveillance. It is fanciful, 
moreover, to question whether the 
government will ever undertake broad based 
surveillance of the type authorized by the 
statute. The FAA was passed specifically to 
permit surveillance that was not permitted 
by FISA but that was believed necessary to 
protect the national security. That both the 
Executive and the Legislative branches of 
government believe that the FAA authorizes 
new types of surveillance, and have justified 
that new authorization as necessary to 
protecting the nation against attack, makes it 
extremely likely that such surveillance will 
occur. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have good reason 
to believe that their communications, in 
patiicular, will fall within the scope of the 
broad surveillance that they can assume the 
government will conduct. The plaintiffs 
testify that in order to carry out their jobs 
they must regularly communicate by 
telephone and e-mail with precisely the sorts 
of individuals that the government will most 
likely seek to monitor-i.e., individuals "the 
U.S. government believes or believed to be 
associated with terrorist organizations," 
"political and human rights activists who 
oppose governments that are supported 
economically or militarily by the U.S. 
government," and "people located in 
geographic areas that are a special focus of 
the U.S. government's counterterrorism or 
diplomatic efforts." The plaintiffs' 
assessment that these individuals are likely 
targets of FAA surveillance is reasonable, 
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and the government has not disputed that 
assertion. 
On these facts, it is reasonably likely that the 
plaintiffs' communications will be 
monitored under the FAA. The instant 
plaintiffs' fears of surveillance are by no 
means based on "mere conjecture," 
delusional fantasy, or unfounded 
speculation. Their fears are fairly traceable 
to the FAA because they are based on a 
reasonable interpretation of the challenged 
statute and a realistic understanding of the 
world. Conferring standing on these 
plaintiffs is not tantamount to conferring 
standing on "any or all citizens who no more 
than assert that certain practices of law 
enforcement offices are unconstitutional." 
Most law-abiding citizens have no occasion 
to communicate with suspected terrorists; 
relatively few Americans have occasion to 
engage in international communications 
relevant to "foreign intelligence." These 
plaintiffs however, have successfully 
demonstrated that their legitimate 
professions make it quite likely that their 
communications will be intercepted if the 
government-as seems inevitable-
exercises the authority granted by the FAA. 
The government argues the plaintiffs have 
failed to establish standing because the FAA 
does not itself authorize surveillance, but 
only authorizes the FISC to authorize 
surveillance. As a result, the government 
says the plaintiffs must speculate about at 
least two intervening steps between the FAA 
and any harm they might suffer as a result of 
the government conducting surveillance: 
first, that the government will apply for 
surveillance authorization under the FAA, 
and, second, that the FISC will grant 
authorization. 
But this argument fails. The presence of an 
intervening step does not, as a general rule, 
by itself preclude standing. Nor do the 
particular intervening steps the government 
identifies here-the government's seeking 
authorization and the FISC's approving it-
preclude standing. With respect to the first 
step, as discussed above, it is more than 
reasonable to expect that the government 
will seek surveillance authorization under 
the FAA. We therefore cannot say that 
uncertainty about this step significantly 
attenuates the link between the FAA and the 
plaintiffs' harms. 
N or does the second intervening step add 
significant unceliainty. As discussed above, 
under the FAA the FISC must enter an order 
authorizing surveillance if the government 
submits a certification that conforms to the 
statutory requirements. The FAA does not 
require or even permit the FISC to make an 
independent determination of the necessity 
or justification for the surveillance. It verges 
on the fanciful to suggest that the 
government will more than rarely fail to 
comply with the formal requirements of the 
FAA once it has decided that the 
surveillance is warranted. 
Empirical evidence supports this 
expectation: in 2008, the government sought 
2, 082 surveillance orders, and the FISC 
approved 2, 081 of them. We do not know 
how many of these applications, if any, 
came after the FAA was enacted on July 10, 
2008. At the very least, though, the evidence 
does not show that the FISC actually rejects 
a significant number of applications for 
FAA surveillance orders. Without a stronger 
showing that the FISC interposes a 
significant intervening step, we cannot find 
that the mere existence of this intervening 
step prevents the plaintiffs from obtaining 
standing to challenge the FAA. 
Because the plaintiffs' undisputed testimony 
clearly establishes that they are suffering 
injuries in fact, and because we find those 
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injuries are causally connected to the 
FAA-because they are taken in 
anticipation of future government action that 
is reasonably likely to occur-and are 
redressable by a favorable judgment, we 
find the plaintiffs have standing. 
IV. Indirectness of Harm 
The plaintiffs' asserted economic and 
professional costs incurred to protect the 
confidentiality of their communications can 
be characterized as indirect injuries, because 
the FAA does not target the plaintiffs 
themselves and the plaintiffs incur injuries 
due to their responses, and the responses of 
the third-party individuals with whom they 
communicate, to the anticipated F AA-
authorized surveillance of those individuals. 
The government argues that the indirectness 
of these injuries defeats the plaintiffs' 
standing. We disagree. 
A. Standard 
The Supreme Court has made clear that 
"when the plaintiff is not himself the object 
of the government action or inaction he 
challenges, standing is not precluded." But a 
plaintiff who is indirectly harmed by a 
regulation needs to show more than does a 
plaintiff who is directly regulated by the 
challenged law: 
When the suit is one challenging the 
legality of government action . . . , 
the nature and extent of facts that 
must be averred (at the summary 
judgment stage) . . . in order to 
establish standing depends 
considerably upon whether the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the 
action . . . at issue. If he is, there is 
ordinarily little question that the 
action or inaction has caused him 
mJury, and that a judgment 
preventing or requiring the action 
will redress it. When, however, ... a 
plaintiffs asserted injury arises from 
the government's allegedly unlawful 
regulation ... of someone else, much 
more is needed. 
It is therefore "ordinarily substantially more 
difficult" to establish standing based on 
indirect injuries than on direct injuries. 
As a fundamental requisite to establishing 
standing, a plaintiff seeking standing on the 
basis of indirect injury must satisfy the three 
constitutional requirements for standing 
discussed above: (l) an injury in fact (2) that 
is causally related to the challenged statute 
or conduct and (3) is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision. Despite not 
being directly regulated, a plaintiff may 
establish a cognizable injury in fact by 
showing that he has altered or ceased 
conduct as a reasonable response to the 
challenged statute. If the plaintiff makes 
such an allegation, he must identify the 
injury with "specificity," and he "must 
proffer some objective evidence to 
substantiate his claim that the challenged 
conduct has deterred him from engaging in 
protected activity," 
The plaintiffs have satisfied these 
requirements through their uncontroverted 
testimony that they have altered their 
conduct and thereby incurred specific costs 
in response to the FAA. As discussed above, 
we must accept that undisputed testimony, 
so the plaintiffs have established the first 
constitutional requirement for standing-an 
injury in fact. 
The heart of the government's challenge to 
the plaintiffs' standing based on the 
indirectness of their injury-much like the 
government's challenge to the plaintiffs' 
standing based on the likelihood of future 
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injury-goes to whether the plaintiffs' 
InjUrIes are causally connected to the 
challenged legislation. The causal chain 
linking the plaintiffs' indirect injuries to the 
challenged legislation is similar to that 
discussed above: it turns on the likelihood 
that the plaintiffs' communications with the 
regulated third parties will be monitored. If 
the FAA does not make it likely that the 
plaintiffs' communications with regulated 
third patiies will be monitored, then the 
costs the plaintiffs have incurred to avoid 
being monitored are the product of their own 
decisions and are not sufficiently linked to 
the FAA; for this reason, they would not be 
"fairly traceable to the challenged action." 
Conversely, if the plaintiffs' 
communications with regulated third parties 
will likely be monitored despite the fact that 
the FAA does not directly regulate the 
plaintiffs, then those costs are sufficiently 
tied to the FAA to support standing. 
The Supreme Court and this Court have 
frequently found standing on the part of 
plaintiffs who were not directly subject to a 
statute, and asserted only indirect injuries. 
Most notably, in Meese v. Keene (1987), the 
Supreme COUli found standing in a plaintiff 
who, like the instant plaintiffs, was not 
directly regulated by the statute, and alleged 
only indirect injuries. The plaintiff, a lawyer 
and state legislator, challenged a statute that 
required certain films to be labeled "political 
propaganda." The district court in that case 
made clear that "[ a ]ccording to the 
authoritative agency interpretation of the 
Act and the regulations, plaintiff [wa]s free 
to remove the ['political propaganda'] label 
before exhibiting the films." Hence, as in the 
instant case, the Meese statute did not 
directly regulate the plaintiff or require him 
to do, or refrain from doing, anything at all. 
The Meese plaintiff, however, was injured 
indirectly. He wanted to show three labeled 
films, but because he did "not want the 
Department of Justice and the public to 
regard him as the disseminator of foreign 
political propaganda," he abstained from 
screening the films. He sued to enjoin the 
application of the statute to these films. 
That the statute did not regulate him directly 
was no barrier to standing. The Court found 
he had established a cognizable harm by 
alleging "the need to take . . . affirmative 
steps to avoid the risk of harm to his 
reputation." This reaction was reasonable 
and was causally linked to the statute, 
because the plaintiff averred, with support 
from expert affidavits, that if he showed the 
films "his personal, political, and 
professional reputation would suffer and his 
ability to obtain re-election and to practice 
his profession would be impaired." The 
Court approved the district court's 
conclusion that "the Act puts the plaintiff to 
the Hobson's choice of foregoing the use of 
the three Canadian films for the exposition 
of his own views or suffering an injury to 
his reputation." Either way, the statute 
affected him in such a way as to give him 
standing to challenge it. 
More recently, in Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw, the Supreme Court recognized 
plaintiffs' standing to challenge a 
corporation's alleged Clean Water Act 
violation. The plaintiffs did not claim that 
the defendant took direct actions against 
them. Instead, they showed that because 
they feared exposure to the defendant's 
pollution they had ceased to engage in 
celiain recreational activities in the area, 
such as swimming, camping, and 
birdwatching. The Court found that the 
plaintiffs' decision to cUliail those activities 
was "enough for injury in fact," and found 
that the plaintiffs' reactions were reasonable 
responses to the threat of exposure to 
pollution. 
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These cases establish that a plaintiff has 
standing to challenge a statute that does not 
regulate him if he can show that the statute 
reasonably caused him to alter or cease 
certain conduct. In the instant case, the key 
to determining whether the plaintiffs have 
standing based on the indirect injuries they 
suffer is determining whether someone who 
wants to protect the privacy of his 
communications would reasonably take the 
measures these plaintiffs took not to be 
overheard. 
B. Application 
First, it is reasonable for the plaintiffs to 
take measures to avoid being over-heard. 
The plaintiffs have established that, because 
of their legitimate needs to communicate 
with persons who will likely be subject to 
government surveillance under the FAA, 
they are likely to be monitored. Moreover, 
the various groups of plaintiffs-attorneys, 
journalists, and human rights, labor, legal, 
and media organizations-have established 
that they have legitimate interests in not 
being monitored. Since the plaintiffs allege 
that the FAA is unconstitutional, if the 
plaintiffs' legal theory is correct, any search 
authorized by the FAA would be an illegal 
search that the plaintiffs would reasonably 
try to avoid. 
Moreover, each of the plaintiffs has alleged 
that the risk of being monitored causes 
additional injuries beyond the mere fact of 
being subjected to a putatively 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The 
risk of being monitored by the government 
threatens the safety of their sources and 
clients, impedes their ability to do their jobs, 
and implicates the attorneys' ethical 
obligations. Journalists Klein and Hedges, 
for example, assert that if their 
communications with their sources were 
overheard, those sources' identities, political 
activities, and other senSItIve information 
would be disclosed, which would expose 
them to violence and retaliation by their own 
governments, non-state actors, and the U.S. 
government. Likewise, attorney Mariner 
asserts that if her communications with 
human rights abuse victims on behalf of 
Human Rights Watch are monitored, the 
victims will draw unwanted attention to 
themselves and might risk further abuse. 
Attorneys Royce and McKay, who represent 
Guantanamo Bay prisoners and others, 
assert that they risk disclosing litigation 
strategies to the opposing party (the U.S. 
government) and violating ethical 
obligations if their communications with co-
counsel, clients and their family members, 
experts, and investigators around the world 
are monitored. The plaintiffs act reasonably 
in trying to avoid these injuries. 
Since it is reasonable for the plaintiffs to 
seek to avoid being monitored, we must 
consider whether the particular measures 
they took were reasonable. They were. In 
some instances the plaintiffs did not 
communicate certain information they 
otherwise would have communicated by e-
mail or telephone; and in other instances 
they incurred the costly burdens of traveling 
to communicate or to obtain that information 
in person rather than electronically. These 
are not overreactions to the FAA; they are 
appropriate measures that a reasonably 
prudent person who plausibly anticipates 
that his conversations are likely to be 
monitored, and who finds it important to 
avoid such monitoring, would take to avoid 
being overheard. The plaintiffs have 
therefore established that those injuries are 
linked to the statute they challenge. 
In sum, the FAA has put the plaintiffs in a 
lose-lose situation: either they can continue 
to communicate senSItIve information 
electronically and bear a substantial risk of 
176 
being monitored under a statute they allege 
to be unconstitutional, or they can incur 
financial and professional costs to avoid 
being monitored. Either way, the FAA 
directly affects them. 
The Supreme Court has said that "the gist of 
the question of standing" is whether "the 
appellants alleged such a personal stake in 
the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions." The 
instant plaintiffs are not merely random 
citizens, indistinguishable from any other 
members of the public, who want to test in 
court the abstract theory that the FAA is 
inconsistent with the Constitution; rather, 
these plaintiffs have shown that, regardless 
of which course of action they elect, the 
FAA affects them. We therefore conclude 
that they have a sufficient "personal stake" 
to challenge the FAA. That does not mean 
that their challenge will succeed; it means 
only that the plaintiffs are entitled to have a 
federal court reach the merits of their 
challenge. We need not "decide whether 
appellants' allegations ... will, ultimately, 
entitle them to any relief, in order to hold 
that they have standing to seek it." 
V. Laird v. Tatum 
The government's principal arguments 
against the above analysis rest on a single 
case, Laird v. Tatum (1972). Laird is 
unquestionably relevant to this case, as it is 
the only case in which the Supreme Court 
specifically addressed standing to challenge 
a government surveillance program. 
Because Laird significantly differs from the 
present case, however, we disagree with the 
government's contention that Laird controls 
the instant case, and that Laird created 
different and stricter standing requirements 
for surveillance cases than for other types of 
cases. 
In Laird, the plaintiffs challenged a 
surveillance program that authorized the 
Army to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
information about public activities that had 
potential to create civil disorder. The Army 
collected its data from a number of sources, 
but most of it came from "the news media 
and publications in general circulation" or 
from "agents who attended meetings that 
were open to the public and who wrote field 
reports describing the meetings." The Court 
noted that the court of appeals had 
characterized the information gathered as 
"nothing more than a good newspaper 
reporter would be able to gather by 
attendance at public meetings and the 
clipping of articles from publications 
available on any newsstand." Roughly sixty 
government agents around the country 
participated in the surveillance program. 
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the program. 
They claimed that they "disagreed with the 
judgments" made by the Executive Branch 
about the scope of the surveillance program, 
and they argued that "in the future it is 
possible that information relating to matters 
far beyond the responsibilities of the 
military may be misused by the military to 
[their] detriment," But the Court stated that 
the plaintiffs 
[did] not attempt to establish this as a 
definitely foreseeable event, or to 
base their complaint on this ground. 
Rather, [the plaintiffs] contend[ ed] 
that the present existence of this 
system of gathering and distributing 
information, allegedly far beyond the 
mission requirements of the Army, 
constitute[ d] an impermissible 
burden on [them] and other persons 
similarly situated which exercise[ d] a 
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present inhibiting effect on their full 
expression and utilization of their 
First Amendment rights. 
The Court noted the court of appeals's 
observation that the plaintiffs "have some 
difficulty in establishing visible injury .... 
They freely admit that they complain of no 
specific action of the Army against them ... 
. There is no evidence of illegal or unlawful 
surveillance activities." The Court stated 
that any alleged chilling effect arose from 
the plaintiffs' "perception of the system as 
inappropriate to the Army's role under our 
form of government," or the plaintiffs' 
"beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for 
the military to be concerned with activities 
in the civilian sector," or the plaintiffs' "less 
generalized yet speculative 
apprehensiveness that the Army may at 
some future date misuse the information in 
some way that would cause direct harm to 
respondents." Moreover, the Court noted 
that the plaintiffs had cast "considerable 
doubt" on whether the surveillance program 
had actually chilled them, and the plaintiffs 
did not identify any concrete harm inflicted 
by the program. 
The COUli therefore considered: 
whether the jurisdiction of a federal 
court may be invoked by a 
complainant who alleges that the 
exercise of his First Amendment 
rights is being chilled by the mere 
existence, witho1lt more, of a 
governmental investigative and data-
gathering activity that is alleged to 
be broader In scope than IS 
reasonably necessary for the 
accomplishment of a valid 
governmental purpose. 
The Court denied plaintiffs standing. It held 
that the plaintiffs' complaints about "the 
very existence of the Army's data-gathering 
system" and their "[a]llegations of a 
subjective 'chill' are not an adequate 
substitute for a claim of specific present 
objective harm or a threat of specific future 
harm." The Court noted that although 
previous cases have found governmental 
regulations unconstitutional based on their 
"chilling" effect, 
[i]n none of these cases, however, 
did the chilling effect arise merely 
from the individual's knowledge that 
a governmental agency was engaged 
in certain activities or from the 
individual's concomitant fear that, 
armed with the fruits of those 
activities, the agency might in the 
future take some other and additional 
action detrimental to that individual. 
Rather, in each of these eases, the 
challenged exercise of governmental 
power was regulatory, proscriptive, 
or compulsory in nature, and the 
complainant was either presently or 
prospectively subject to the 
regulations, proscriptions, or 
compulsions that he was challenging. 
The government argues that "[t]his case is 
directly governed by Laird," because the 
only specific present harms the plaintiffs 
allege flow from a subjective chill. Laird, 
however, differs dramatically from this case. 
In Laird, the plaintiffs did not clearly allege 
any injuries whatsoever. They did not claim 
that the government surveillance they sought 
to challenge, which relied principally on 
monitoring through publicly available 
sources activities conducted entirely in 
public, harmed them. They did not claim 
that they, or anyone with whom they 
regularly interacted, would be subject to any 
illegal or unconstitutional intrusion if the 
program they challenged was allowed to 
continue. Rather, they claimed only that they 
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might be injured if the information lawfully 
collected by the military were misused in 
some unspecified way at some unspecified 
point in the future, and they alleged that the 
surveillance scheme had a chilling effect, 
while essentially admitting that they 
themselves had not been chilled, and that the 
program not altered their behavior in any 
way. 
By contrast, the instant plaintiffs clearly 
have alleged specific and concrete injuries. 
Unlike the Laird plaintiffs, they do not 
challenge a program of information 
gathering that they concede is lawful, on the 
theory that the information gathered may be 
misused in the future by government agents 
acting illegally and without authorization; 
rather, they challenge a specific statute that 
expressly authorizes surveillance that they 
contend is in itself unconstitutional. They do 
not vaguely allege that they might be subject 
to surveillance under the program; rather, 
they set f011h specific, concrete reasons to 
believe they are likely to be overheard, 
because their legitimate activities bring them 
into contact with the very types of people 
who are the professed targets of the 
statutorily authorized surveillance. And far 
from alleging an undefined "chill" that has 
not affected their own behavior in any way, 
they detail specific, reasonable actions that 
they have taken to their own tangible, 
economic cost, in order to carry out their 
legitimate professional activities in an 
ethical and effective manner, which can be 
done only by taking every precaution to 
avoid being overheard in the way that the 
challenged statute makes reasonably likely. 
This case is a far cry from Laird. In this 
case, as demonstrated above, the plaintiffs 
allege injuries that establish their standing 
consistent with the standing jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court and this Court. In Laird, 
by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged no such 
injuries. Indeed, because the Laird plaintiffs 
offered so little by way of concrete injury, 
direct or indirect, Laird has little or nothing 
to say about the critical issue in this case: 
the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fear of 
future injury from the FAA, and the causal 
relation of the challenged statute to the 
tangible costs the plaintiffs claim they have 
incurred. 
The government next argues, however, that 
even if Laird does not directly govern this 
case, it created special standing rules for 
surveillance cases that are stricter than those 
that apply to other types of cases, and that 
those special rules preclude standing in this 
case. We disagree. 
First, the government argues that under 
Laird a plaintiff may challenge a 
surveillance statute only if he is "subject to" 
that statute, meaning that he belongs to a 
narrow class of individuals the statute, on its 
face, identifies as targets. In support of this 
claim, the government relies on Laird's 
comment that some previous plaintiffs who 
obtained standing to challenge a regulation 
that did not explicitly target them were able 
to do so because they were or would soon be 
"subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or 
compUlsions" they challenged. The 
government thus argues that the instant 
plaintiffs cannot obtain standing to 
challenge the FAA, because the FAA "does 
not direct intelligence gathering activities 
against the plaintiffs. Nor does it authorize 
plaintiffs to be targeted." 
Second, the government argues that Laird 
precludes standing based on chilling-effect 
injuries. The government notes that the 
Laird plaintiffs alleged that the existence of 
the Army's surveillance program produced a 
chilling effect upon the exercise of their 
First Amendment rights, and the Court 
rejected that allegation as a ground for 
standing. The government adopts United 
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Presbyterian's interpretation of Laird, 
which says that in order to obtain standing 
plaintiffs must show that they "suffer[] some 
concrete harm (past or immediately 
threatened) apart from the 'chill' itself," 
such as denial of admission to the bar or 
termination of employment. Relying on this 
interpretation of Laird, the government 
dismisses the economic and professional 
costs the plaintiffs have incurred because 
they "flow directly from the 'subjective 
chill' on plaintiffs' speech caused solely by 
the existence of [the FAA]." The 
government says those injuries are "nothing 
more than a repackaged version of the 
'subjective chill' that the Supreme COUli 
found insufficient to establish standing in 
Laird." 
We are not persuaded that Laird created 
either of these special standing rules for 
surveillance cases. Since Laird is the only 
Supreme Court precedent in which a 
plaintiff who had not been surveilled 
claimed standing to challenge a surveillance 
scheme, it is natural to look to it for 
guidance. However, the government reads 
far more into Laird than either its facts or its 
language permit. In doing so, it loses sight 
of the general principles of standing. 
First, the Laird plaintiffs so obviously 
lacked standing that the Court did not need 
to create stricter standing rules in the 
surveillance context in order to deny 
plaintiffs standing. The Laird plaintiffs 
identified no injury that they had suffered or 
would likely suffer. In the absence of any 
clear alleged injury, the COUli could not find 
that the plaintiffs had satisfied the normal 
standing requirements, and it therefore did 
not need to invent new rules to reach that 
outcome. As we have demonstrated at length 
above, the facts of Laird are simply not 
comparable to those presented in the instant 
case. That the Laird plaintiffs were held to 
lack standing does not imply that the instant 
plaintiffs similarly have failed to allege 
injury. Any statement in Laird of a general 
rule applicable to all surveillance cases 
could only be dictum. 
Second, Laird in fact contains no such 
purported special rules for surveillance 
cases. Nothing in Laird supports the 
conclusion that the COUli intended to change 
the standing rules, nor does it explain any 
need to create standing rules for surveillance 
cases distinct from the rules applicable in 
other contexts. To the contrary, Laird's final 
sentence makes clear that the result in that 
case was dictated by the well-established 
general principles of standing: 
[T]here is nothing in our Nation's 
history or in this Court's decided 
cases, including our holding today, 
that can properly be seen as giving 
any indication that actual or 
threatened injury by reason of 
unlawful activities of the military 
would go unnoticed or unremedied. 
The language quoted by the government-
that some previous plaintiffs who obtained 
standing to challenge a regulation were or 
would soon be "subject to the regulations, 
proscriptions, or compulsions" they 
challenged,-does not purport to establish a 
fixed requirement for standing in the 
surveillance context or in any other; it 
merely contrasts the situation of the Laird 
plaintiffs with those of other plaintiffs who 
were found to have standing. 
Third, while the government relies heavily 
on ACLU v. NSA and United Presbyterian to 
support its interpretation of Laird, those 
cases do not bind us, and they are factually 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
Moreover, we do not find their 
interpretations of Laird to be persuasive. 
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They read Laird essentially the same way 
the government does, without explaining 
why we should read Laird to have ratcheted 
up the standing requirements in surveillance 
cases, sub silentio, where the plaintiffs at 
issue clearly lacked standing under the 
normal rules. We do not see any reason why 
the law of standing should be stricter or 
different in the surveillance context, and 
those cases do not offer any such reasons. 
Under the traditional, well-established rules 
of standing, the plaintiffs here have alleged 
that they reasonably anticipate direct injury 
from the enactment of the FAA because, 
unlike most Americans, they engage in 
legitimate professional activities that make it 
reasonably likely that their privacy will be 
invaded and their conversations overheard-
unconstitutionally, or so they argue-as a 
result of the surveillance newly authorized 
by the FAA, and that they have already 
suffered tangible, indirect injury due to the 
reasonable steps they have undertaken to 
avoid such over-hearing, which would 
impair their ability to carry out those 
activities. Nothing more is required for 
standing under well-established principles. 
And nothing in Laird, where the plaintiffs 
alleged no comparable injury, purpOlis to 
change those principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs' uncontroverted testimony that 
they fear their senSItive international 
electronic communications being monitored 
and that they have taken costly measures to 
avoid being monitored-because we deem 
that fear and those actions to be reasonable 
in the circumstances of this case-
establishes injuries in fact that we find are 
causally linked to the allegedly 
unconstitutional FAA. We therefore find 
that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the FAA in federal court. 
181 
"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case 
on Electronic Surveillance" 
The Washington Post 
May 21,2012 
Robert Barnes 
The Supreme Court will decide next term 
whether a group of lawyers, human rights 
activists and journalists may challenge the 
federal government's widespread use of 
electronic surveillance to monitor suspected 
terrorist activities overseas. 
The Americans challenging the program say 
they have a "well-founded fear" that their 
phone calls and other communications with 
overseas clients and sources are swept up in 
the "dragnet surveillance." 
But the justices, in the term beginning in 
October, will not rule on whether the 2008 
law that authorized the program violates the 
Americans' Fourth Amendment right to 
protection from unreasonable searches. 
Instead, the question is whether such a fear, 
and the actions the plaintiffs have taken 
because of the law, give them a right-
which courts call "standing"-to proceed in 
challenging the law. 
A federal judge in New York ruled that they 
did not. But a panel of the U.S. COUli of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, 
and a request by the government that the 
entire cOUli overturn that decision failed on 
a tie vote. 
U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Ven-illi 1r. 
asked the high court to step in. He said the 
concerns of the plaintiffs, who are 
represented by the American Civil Liberties 
Union, reflect only "bare conjecture that the 
government will choose to expend its 
limited resources to target respondents' 
foreign contacts." 
The program began during the nation's 
response to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 
and eventually led to a broadening of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which 
said the government generally must obtain a 
search warrant from a judge to listen in to 
conversations in the United States involving 
people suspected of being spies or ten-orists. 
The New York Times revealed in 2005 that 
President George W. Bush had approved an 
extensive program of "warrantless 
wiretapping" to intercept international phone 
conversations and e-mails that began or 
terminated in the United States, in order to 
monitor potential plots. 
In 2008, Congress responded to criticism 
that the program was unconstitutional by 
approving amendments to FISA. They gave 
the attorney general and the director of 
national intelligence broad powers to 
monitor communications in the United 
States, as long as one patiy in the 
communication was abroad and the targets 
were foreigners believed to be outside the 
United States. 
The ACLU filed its lawsuit the day the 
amendments became law, saying the secret 
orders permitted by the law would 
undoubtedly ensnare Americans. Its clients 
regularly spoke on the phone or exchanged 
e-mails with those who might be included in 
such surveillance orders. 
182 
The law "allows the government to collect 
these communications en masse without 
specifying the individuals or facilities to be 
monitored; without observing meaningful 
limitations on the retention, analysis, and 
dissemination of acquired information; 
without individualized warrants based on 
criminal or foreign intelligence probable 
cause; and without prior judicial or even 
administrative determinations that the 
targets of surveillance are foreign agents or 
connected in any way, however remotely, to 
terrorism," the ACLU told the court. 
The group said the lower court was correct 
in agreeing that its clients had standing to 
challenge the law because they had a 
reasonable fear that their communications 
would be targeted and disseminated. And it 
said these clients had suffered "concrete" 
damages because of the law, such as having 
to travel overseas to meet their contacts in 
person rather than communicating on the 
phone or via e-mail. 
If the plaintiffs have no standing to question 
the program, the ACLU said, there could be 
no judicial oversight of the law. 
The case is Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA. 
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"Standing to Challenge Wiretap 
Law Divides Circuit" 
New York Law J01lrnal 
September 22, 2011 
Mark Hamblett 
The constitutionality of an amended national 
security wiretapping law has triggered a 
sharp split at the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit. 
In a decision that sets up a trip to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit by the 
narrowest of margins voted yesterday to 
deny hearing en banc a decision recognizing 
that lawyers, journalists and human rights 
groups have standing to challenge 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) because they fear 
their conversations are being, or will be, 
intercepted by the U.S. government. 
With a majority of the full panel of active 
judges needed to win rehearing, judges in 
favor of en banc review fell one vote ShOli, 
with the panel splitting 6-6. 
Judges Debra Ann Livingston, Dennis 
Jacobs, Jose Cabranes, Reena Raggi and 
Richard Wesley dissented, delivering or 
joining in three opinions arguing that the full 
court should rehear the case. The sixth vote 
came from Judge Peter Hall, who did not 
join the other dissenting opinions but said he 
believed en banc review was merited 
because the case involved a question of 
"exceptional impoliance." 
The plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute 
should be rejected because they cannot be 
targeted under the statute, the dissenters 
said, and they charged the original panel that 
issued its decision in March in Amnesty 
International United States v. Clapper, 09-
4112-cv, had turned the standard for 
standing on its head. 
Judge Gerard Lynch issued the lone opinion 
defending the denial of rehearing. He first 
agreed that the case met the "exceptional 
importance" standard and acknowledged 
that the original opinion "may be in tension" 
with those of other circuits. 
"But I dispute the dissenters assertions that 
Amnesty somehow distorts the law of 
standing, or, in Judge Livingston's words, 
'threatens a sub silentio transformation of 
this Circuit's case law, '" he said. 
Judge Lynch was on the original panel that 
decided the case last spring along with 
Senior Judges Robeli Sack and Guido 
Calabresi. That decision reversed Southern 
District Judge John Koelti, who had ruled in 
2009 that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 
The other active judges on the circuit who 
joined Judge Lynch in denying rehearing are 
Rosemary Pooler, Robert Katzmann, Denny 
Chin, Raymond Lohier and Susan Carney. 
Judge Lynch said the original opinion spoke 
for itself and he was writing only to respond 
to points raised by the dissent. 
In March, the panel said lawyers, journalists, 
human rights groups, labor groups and 
others could challenge §702 of FISA, 50 
U.S.C. §1881a, a provision that was added 
in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
(F AA) and set new procedures for electronic 
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surveillance of non-U.S. citizens abroad. 
It allows the executive branch to apply to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for 
mass surveillance authorization instead of 
making an individualized application 
focused on specific targets or facilities, 
requiring only a certification that "a 
significant purpose of the acquisition is to 
obtain foreign intelligence information" and 
that the information will be obtained "from 
or with the assistance of an electronic 
communication service provider." 
Plaintiffs argue the statute's provisions for 
"targeting" to ensure authorization is limited 
to people outside the United States and 
"minimization procedures" designed to 
ensure compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment are inadequate. 
Jameel Jaffer of the American Civil 
Liberties Union argued before the Second 
Circuit in 2010 that the new monitoring 
regime had a chilling effect on the plaintiffs' 
speech, as the fear of having their 
conversations with their clients taped forced 
them to take steps, such as traveling, to 
avoid being overheard by the U.S. 
government. 
Douglas Letter, an appellate litigation 
counsel with the U.S. Department of Justice, 
argued that plaintiffs had no standing 
because the contended injury to them was 
too speculative. 
In March, the three-judge panel said the 
plaintiffs had alleged a "reasonable fear of 
future injury and costs incurred to avoid that 
injury." 
'Unprecedented' Rule 
Yesterday, Judge Raggi issued a 40-page 
dissent to the denial of en banc reVIew, 
joined in by all of the dissenters save Judge 
Hall. 
She said the March panel found standing 
"even though plaintiffs cannot be targeted 
for surveillance under that statute, cannot 
demonstrate actual or imminent interception 
of any of their communications, and may in 
fact never experience such interception." 
She added, "A rule that allows a plaintiff to 
establish standing simply by incurring costs 
in response to a not-irrational fear of 
challenged conduct is unprecedented. On 
that theory, every mobster's girlfriend who 
pays for a cab to meet with him in person 
rather than converse by telephone would be 
acting on a not-irrational fear of a Title III 
interception, and, therefore, have standing to 
challenge." 
The Supreme Court, she said, has held "that 
subjective fear of challenged government 
conduct is insufficient to support standing, 
and that forbearance action can only do so 
when a plaintiff would otherwise certainly 
be subject to the challenged conduct." 
Judge Livingston, joined by the same four 
judges, said the March panel threatened to 
upset case law regarding '''probabilistic 
harm' meaning the narrow circumstances in 
which this court has recognized injury in 
fact to exist based on the risk of some future 
harm." 
The panel, she said, "did not explain its 
disregard of the Supreme Court's 
requirement that injury must be actual or 
imminently threatened," expressed in 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 
(2009). 
Judge Jacobs, speaking for himself, said the 
plaintiffs' averments on harm "seem to me 
inadequate, implausible, and illusory." 
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He said it was a "defect" in the panel 
opinion to avoid even a glance at merits 
review that is needed to determine a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 
Such a review, he said, "refutes harm and 
redressability, and should therefore have 
defeated standing." 
The judge took aim at the "supposed 
anxieties" of the plaintiffs. 
Of those plaintiffs who submitted affidavits, 
Judge Jacobs said, only two were lawyers 
who represent clients: Scott McKay and 
Sylvia Royce, who represent Guantanamo 
detainees. But Mr. McKay did not specify a 
single trip he took to avoid monitoring and 
Ms. Royce took only one trip--to New York 
to meet another lawyer for a conversation 
she could have had by phone, Judge Jacobs 
said, a call that would not have been subject 
to the act. 
In closing, Judge Raggi took issue with 
Judge Lynch's statement that denying 
standing would "close" courthouse doors. 
"Rather, it is our remaining colleagues who 
decline to consider whether a questionable 
standing standard should become the law of 
this circuit," she said. "There is, however, 
another courthouse, and those of us here in 
dissent can only hope that its doors will be 
opened for further discussion of this case." 
In his opinion, Judge Lynch took issue with 
the "theme that runs through all the 
dissents"-that the panel should have been 
more skeptical about the plaintiffs' 
averments. 
He said the case came to the panel on 
summary judgment, where a court must take 
the allegations as true. 
He agreed that, where subject matter 
jurisdiction is at issue, there was an 
independent obligation to question even 
undisputed facts. 
"Certainly, parties cannot confer jurisdiction 
on the court by stipulating to facts that are 
false," Judge Lynch said. "But this is hardly 
an example of collusive stipulation to facts 
that, as Chief Judge Jacobs would have it, 
are fanciful," he said, adding that the 
reasons for plaintiffs' belief that their 
"communications are likely to be intercepted 
by the government" under the amended act 
"are anything but implausible." 
Broadened Risk 
Judge Lynch continued, "As the panel 
opinion explains, the FAA indisputably and 
significantly broadens the risk of 
interception, lowers the government's 
probable-cause burden, and decreases the 
oversight role of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court." 
Before, he said, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court would issue a warrant 
only if it saw probable cause that the target 
was a foreign power or its agent and that the 
target was using or about to use the facility 
to be monitored. The court, he said, "had to 
find probable cause for each specific search, 
and maintained a continuing oversight role 
after each probable cause determination." 
But no longer, he said. Under the current 
administration, the FISA court does not 
monitor the "targeting" and "minimization" 
procedures-that is left to the attorney 
general, the Director of National Intelligence 
and the Senate and House Judiciary 
committees. 
Judge Lynch said that, contrary to the 
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dissents, the panel's OpInIOn did anything 
but muddle the well-established 
requirements of "injury in fact, causation 
and redressability." 
He said the dissents "seem to misunderstand 
our injury analysis," as the panel had 
addressed both present and future injury. 
Despite Judge Jacobs emphasis on two 
lawyers, he said the panel made it 
"abundantly clear" that it went beyond 
lawyers and found "all of the plaintiffs 
incurred professional and economic costs in 
order to protect clients or sources." 
Judge Lynch said it was "hard to take 
seriously" the dissents' charge that the 
plaintiffs' assertion their overseas contacts 
are likely to be government targets was 
"speculative. " 
"As the opinion explains, the plaintiffs 
overseas contacts include, for example, 
alleged al Qaida members (and Guantanamo 
detainees) Khalid Sheik Mohammed and 
Mohammedou QuId Salahi, as well as those 
men's families," he wrote. 
Judge Lynch said the plaintiffs faced "a 
difficult road" in proving that the law 
violates the Fourth Amendment in the face 
of the "paramount necessity of protecting 
the nation' security against very real and 
dangerous external threats." But the 
argument should be heard in open court, he 
said. 
"To reject the plaintiffs' arguments not 
because they lack merit, but because we 
refuse to hear them, runs a much graver risk 
than whatever invasion of plaintiffs' privacy 
might be occasioned by the surveillance 
authorized by the challenged statute," he 
said. 
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"Amnesty International USA v. Clapper and Standing to 
Challenge Secret Surveillance Regimes" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
March 24, 2011 
Orin Kerr 
On Monday, the Second Circuit handed 
down a very imp011ant decision on standing 
to challenge secret surveillance programs in 
Amnesty International USA v. Clapper. 
The decision, by Judge Gerard Lynch and 
joined by Judges Calabresi and Sack, offers 
a very easy way for plaintiffs to have Article 
III standing to challenge secret surveillance 
statutes. The opinion strikes me as puzzling, 
however, and it appears to be in conflict 
with other Courts of Appeals cases on 
standing to challenge surveillance regimes. I 
suspect Supreme Court review is a serious 
possibility. 
The new decision holds that the plaintiffs 
have established Article III standing to 
challenge Section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, which creates 
new procedures for authorizing government 
electronic surveillance targeting non-United 
States persons outside the United States for 
purposes of collecting foreign intelligence. 
The plaintiffs in the case are attorneys, 
journalists, and labor, legal, media, and 
human rights organizations who claim to 
believe that they may be monitored in the 
future pursuant to the statute, and they are 
claiming that their fear of surveillance-and 
costly measures they have taken to 
circumvent the monitoring that they think is 
likely-gives them Al1icle III standing to 
challenge the surveillance program. Al1icle 
III standing requires three elements: (1) 
injury in fact, which means an invasion of a 
legally protected interest that is concrete and 
particularized; (2) a causal relationship 
between the injury and the challenged 
conduct, which means that the injury fairly 
can be traced to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and (3) a likelihood that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision. 
The opinion is pretty complicated, but here's 
the basic idea as I understand it. According 
to Judge Lynch, there is obviously injury in 
fact: By spending money to avoid 
surveillance, the plaintiffs suffered an 
injury-in-fact of losing money. Judge Lynch 
then concludes that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the surveillance if the plaintiffs' 
belief that they are going to be monitored is 
reasonable. Here's the key passage: 
If the plaintiffs can show that it was 
not unreasonable for them to incur 
costs out of fear that the government 
will intercept their communications 
under the FAA, then the measures 
they took to avoid interception can 
support standing. If the possibility of 
interception is remote or fanciful, 
however, their present-injury theory 
fails because the plaintiffs would 
have no reasonable basis for fearing 
interception under the FAA, and they 
cannot bootstrap their way into 
standing by unreasonably incurring 
costs to avoid a merely speculative 
or highly unlikely potential harm. 
Any such costs would be gratuitous, 
and any ethical concerns about not 
taking those measures would be 
unfounded. In other words, for the 
purpose of standing, although the 
plaintiffs' economic and professional 
injuries are injuries in fact, they 
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cannot be said to be "fairly 
traceable" to the FAA-and cannot 
support standing-if they are caused 
by a fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise 
unreasonable fear of the FAA. 
Of course, no one really knows who is being 
monitored or when. But Judge Lynch 
concludes that the plaintiffs have standing 
because their fear of being monitored does 
not seem fanciful based on "a realistic 
understanding of the world." From the 
OpInIOn: 
The plaintiffs have established that 
they suffered present injuries in 
fact-economic and professional 
harms-stemming from a reasonable 
fear of future harmful government 
conduct. They have asserted that the 
FAA permits broad monitoring 
through mass surveillance orders that 
authorize the government to collect 
thousands or millions of 
communications, including 
communications between the 
plaintiffs and their overseas contacts. 
The FAA is susceptible to such an 
interpretation, and the government 
has not controverted this 
interpretation or offered a more 
compelling one. 
The [plaintiffs] fears are fairly 
traceable to the FAA because they 
are based on a reasonable 
interpretation of the challenged 
statute and a realistic understanding 
of the world. . .. These plaintiffs ... 
have successfully demonstrated that 
their legitimate professions make it 
quite likely that their 
communications will be intercepted 
if the government-as seems 
inevitable-exercises the authority 
granted by the FAA. 
The government argues the plaintiffs 
have failed to establish standing 
because the FAA does not itself 
authorize surveillance, but only 
authorizes the FISC to authorize 
surveillance. As a result, the 
government says the plaintiffs must 
speculate about at least two 
intervening steps between the FAA 
and any harm they might suffer as a 
result of the government conducting 
surveillance: first, that the 
government will apply for 
surveillance 6 authorization under 
the FAA, and, second, that the FISC 
will grant authorization. 
But this argument fails. The presence 
of an intervening step does not, as a 
general rule, by itself preclude 
standing. Nor do the particular 
intervening steps the government 
identifies here-the government's 
seeking authorization and the FISC's 
approving it-preclude standing. 
With respect to the first step, as 
discussed above, it is more than 
reasonable to expect that the 
government will seek surveillance 
authorization under the FAA. We 
therefore cannot say that uncertainty 
about this step significantly 
attenuates the link between the FAA 
and the plaintiffs' harms. Nor does 
the second intervening step add 
significant unceliainty .... It verges 
on the fanciful to suggest that the 
government will more than rarely 
fail to comply with the formal 
requirements of the FAA once it has 
decided that the surveillance is 
warranted. 
How do the judges know these things? As 
best I can tell, they just sort of know, based 
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on some news stories, an occasional FISA 
report, and their "realistic understanding of 
the world." 
If this new decision is right, then 
challenging secret surveillance statutes 
would seem to be pretty easy-in stark 
contrast with the previous understanding 
that it was extremely difficult. Other courts 
have held that standing requires a showing 
of actually being monitored. Under that 
standard, it is almost impossible to challenge 
new statutory surveillance authorities under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
According to Judge Lynch, however, a 
reasonable fear of being monitored is 
enough. Since no one knows what the new 
secret programs actually are, but lots of 
people fear that they are very broad, you just 
need to get a broad class of people together 
who are really afraid of the surveillance, and 
then have them spend some money. On 
summary judgment, the plaintiffs facts will 
be treated as true. Since the Government 
won't say what the new secret surveillance 
program is, but the news reports usually 
report the scope of surveillance programs as 
extremely broad, no one will rebut the fears 
of surveillance and the judges will find the 
fears reasonable, creating A11icle III 
standing. True, the judges won't know what 
the program is, either. But because they 
believe their own opinions are realistic, their 
lack of actual knowledge is no longer a 
barrier to standing. If this new decision 
holds, Article III standing to challenge 
surveillance programs would seem to now 
be pretty simple. 
Whether you like the new decision or not, I 
suspect it's not the last we've heard on this 
issue. The opinion strikes me as in pretty 
direct tension with cases like ACLU v. NSA, 
the 6th Circuit's case rejecting standing for 
the NSA's warrantless surveillance program 
during the Bush years. Given the importance 
of the issue, and the tensions among the 
circuits, I would suspect this case may be 
headed upstairs. 
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"Why Clapper Matters: The Future 
of Programmatic Surveillance" 
Lavtjare 
May 22,2012 
Steve Vladeck 
In light of the Supreme Court's grant of 
certiorari yesterday to review the Second 
Circuit's decision in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International, I thought I'd put together a 
background post trying to explain why, in 
my view, Clapper is such an important case. 
To be sure, the Justices are only being asked 
to decide a technical legal question, i. e., 
whether these plaintiffs have Article III 
standing to challenge the key provisions of 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. But as 
is often the case with standing, I think the 
Justices' view of the merits may have a lot 
to say about whether or not they agree with 
the Second Circuit that this suit should be 
allowed to go forward. And so some 
discussion of the merits seems (for lack of a 
better word) warranted: 
I. FISA and the FISA Amendments Act 
When it was enacted in 1978, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act was designed 
to serve as a compromise-between 
individual privacy values enmeshed within 
the Fourth Amendment and the 
government's need to be able to conduct 
clandestine foreign intelligence surveillance. 
Thus, although the Supreme Court had 
repeatedly held that search warrants could 
only issue upon a showing of individualized 
suspicion, one of the central moves of FISA 
was to shift the requisite burden: instead of 
demonstrating probable cause to believe that 
the surveillance will produce evidence of 
criminal activity (the ordinary standard for 
"Title III" warrants), FISA requires the 
government only to demonstrate probable 
cause to believe that the target of the 
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent 
thereof. In other words, "FISA warrants" are 
still predicated upon individualized 
suspicion, but suspicion to believe that the 
target is an agent of a foreign power, not that 
s/he is actively engaged in specific criminal 
activity. As a helpful CRS memo put it, 
FISA orders are based "upon the probability 
of a possibility; the probability to believe 
that the foreign target of the order may 
engage in spying, or the probability to 
believe that the American target of the order 
may engage in criminal spying activities." 
Thus, whatever else might be said about 
FISA, this lesser probable cause requirement 
has been repeatedly upheld by lower courts 
[although never the Supreme Court] against 
Fourth Amendment challenges, largely 
because it still requires a particular form of 
individualized suspicion. 
Although this is largely speculation, I think 
it's widely believed that the individualized 
suspicion requirement is a big part of why 
the Bush Administration went around FISA 
(and the FISA Court) in conducting the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). After 
all, it's difficult to reconcile programmatic 
surveillance (wherein the government 
intercepts all communications going through 
particular nodes) with the individualized 
suspicion and minimization requirements of 
FISA. And so when Congress stepped back 
into the fray, first in the Protect America Act 
of 2007, and then in the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008, it was to provide statutory 
authority for such programmatic 
surveillance, as well. 
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The centerpiece of the FISA Amendments 
Act is new 50 U.S.c. § J88Ja(a) (also 
known as "section 702(a)"), which provides 
that "the Attorney General and the Director 
of National Intelligence may authorize 
jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the 
effective date of the authorization, the 
targeting of persons reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States to 
acquire foreign intelligence information." In 
other words, without having to seek the 
approval of the FISA Court (which merely 
reviews certifications to ensure that they-
and not the surveillance itself-comply with 
the various statutory requirements), the AG 
and the DNI can engage in sweeping 
programmatic surveillance for one year at a 
time. 
To be sure, the FISA Amendments Act 
includes a series of limitations on such 
sweeping authority, lest the government mn 
roughshod over individual privacy interests. 
Thus, 50 U.S.C. § J88Ia(b) provides that: 
An acquisition authorized under 
subsection (a)-
(1) may not intentionally target any 
person known at the time of 
acquisition to be located in the 
United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a 
person reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States if 
the purpose of such acquisition is to 
target a patiicular, known person 
reasonably believed to be in the 
United States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a 
United States person reasonably 
believed to be located outside the 
United States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any 
communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are 
known at the time of the acquisition 
to be located in the United States; 
and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner 
consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
In other words, the programmatic 
surveillance cannot be designed to acquire 
communications within the United States or 
communications by U.S. persons outside the 
United States. But the statute says nothing 
about accidentally acqUll'lng 
communications within the United States or 
by U.S. persons through overbreadth or 
overzealousness; it just bars intentional 
targeting of such communications. Thus, so 
long as the government isn't intentionally 
trying to target U.S. persons or U.S. 
communications, the first four limitations 
won't matter no matter how many of such 
communications are actually intercepted. 
Instead, the fifth limitation-the Fourth 
Amendment-is the key (and would've been 
even had the statute not expressly said so). 
II. The Fourth Amendment and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Exception 
Yet even the Fourth Amendment may not be 
the constraint we'd expect. ... Thanks to the 
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Verd1lgo-
Urq1lidez, non-citizens outside the United 
States are going to have a very hard time 
arguing that programmatic surveillance 
violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to 
their communications. But individuals 
within the United States, and U.S. citizens 
everywhere, are another matter. Thus, to the 
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extent section 1881 a( a) authorizes 
warrantless programmatic surveillance that 
intercepts communications within the United 
States or by U.S. citizens abroad, it seems 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment in 
general, and the Warrant Clause, III 
pat1icular. 
In 2008, the FISA Court of Review 
sidestepped this problem in its In re 
Directives decision, formally recognizing 
for the first time a "foreign intelligence 
surveillance" exception to the Fourth 
Amendment. Specifically, the court held that 
"a foreign intelligence exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
exists when surveillance is conducted to 
obtain foreign intelligence for national 
security purposes and is directed against 
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers 
reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States." Just to be clear, such an 
exception dovetails perfectly with section 
1881 a(a), and, if sustained, would render the 
Fourth Amendment limitation on such 
surveillance entirely nugatory. 
But it's hardly a given that such an 
exception sho1lld be sustained given the 
consequences-i.e., massive and effectively 
unreviewable programmatic surveillance, 
including the almost certain widespread 
interception of us. communications. And 
this, finally, is where the Clapper litigation 
comes in. Decisions by the FISA COUl1 of 
Review are not adversarial. As a result, it is 
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to 
challenge them directly (as the ACLU 
learned in trying to contest the COUl1 of 
Review's 2003 decision in In re Sealed 
Case, and in unsuccessfully trying to 
intervene in proceedings under the FISA 
Amendments Act). Thus, unless someone 
could challenge the existence of such an 
exception in some other judicial proceeding, 
it seemed likely that the limits on the 
government's authority under section 
1881 a(a) would be entirely political. 
Enter Amnesty International and the other 
plaintiffs in Clapper. At its core, the claim 
on the merits is that section 1881a(a) is 
unconstitutional to the extent it authorizes 
the government to obtain the plaintiffs' 
international communications, both because 
it violates the Fourth Amendment and 
because it will have a chilling effect on the 
plaintiffs' First Amendment speech rights. 
And resolving the Fourth Amendment claim 
necessarily turns on the existence (vel non) 
of the foreign intelligence surveillance 
exception recognized by the FISA Court of 
Review in In re Directives. In other words, 
for better or worse, the central merits issue 
in Clapper is whether there will be a foreign 
intelligence surveillance exception going 
forward. If courts reach the merits, and 
disagree with the FISA Court of Review 
over the existence of such an exception, then 
the Fourth Amendment could indeed 
become a significant constraint on the scope 
of section 1881a(a)-and the future of 
programmatic (as opposed to individualized) 
foreign intelligence surveillance. 
III. Article III Standing in Clapper 
Thus far, of course, the lower courts haven't 
gotten to the merits in Clapper. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the 
government based on the plaintiffs' lack of 
standing, and a unanimous panel of the 
Second Circuit reversed. As Judge Lynch 
explained, "Because standing may be based 
on a reasonable fear of future injury and 
costs incurred to avoid that injury, and the 
plaintiffs have established that they have a 
reasonable fear of injury and have incurred 
costs to avoid it, we agree that they have 
standing." There's more to say about the 
substance of the Court of Appeals' standing 
analysis (with which I largely agree), 
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although I'll save that for later. For now, let 
me just note that, as I've suggested before, 
there is here (unlike in the AeLU v. NSA 
case, in which the Sixth Circuit rejected 
standing in a challenge to the TSP) "a 
specific (and public) statutory authorization 
for surveillance that necessarily gives some 
fairly strong clues (to both private parties 
and the courts) as to how those whom the 
statute bars the government from targeting 
could nevertheless end up having their 
communications intercepted." Indeed, as we 
noted last week in our discussions of the 
Hedges case, one can hardly blame courts 
for finding standing when the government 
refuses to concede that it will not undertake 
the measures to which plaintiffs fear they 
may be subjected. 
But at a more fundamental level, there's one 
more point worth making: Readers are likely 
familiar with Alex Bickel's Passive Virt1les, 
and his thesis that, especially on such 
sensitive questions where constitutional 
rights intersect with national security, courts 
might do best to rely on justiciability 
doctrines to duck the issue-and to thereby 
avoid passing upon the merits one way or 
the other. [Think Joshua at the end of 
WarGames: "The only winning move is not 
to play."] And at first blush, this looks like 
the perfect case for Bickel's thesis, given the 
implications in either direction on the 
merits: recognizing a foreign intelligence 
surveillance exception and thereby 
endorsing such sweepmg, warrantless 
interceptions of previously protected 
communications vs. removing this particular 
club from the government's bag .... 
And yet, the foreign intelligence 
surveillance exception only exists because it 
has already been recognized by a circuit-
level federal couti, to wit, the FISA Court of 
Review. Whether the passive virtues might 
otherwise justify judicial sidestepping in 
such a contentious case, the fact of the 
matter is that this is a problem largely (albeit 
not entirely, thanks to the FISA 
Amendments Act) of the c01lrts' making. To 
duck at this stage would be to let the FISA 
Couti of Review-the judges of which are 
selected by the Chief Justice-have the last 
word on such a momentous question of 
constitutional law. In my view, at least, that 
would be unfortunate, and it's certainly not 
what Bickel meant. ... 
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Chaidez v. United States 
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Ruling Below: Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
2012 WL 1468539 (U.S. 2012). 
In 2003 Chaidez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1977, became 
involved in an insurance scheme in which she falsely claimed to have been a passenger in 
a car collision and received $1,200 in the scheme. She pleaded guilty to fraud, but 
claimed that her attorney at the time never informed her that by doing so would result in 
automatic deportation. In 2010, Chaidez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis 
arguing that her attorney was required to inform her of the consequences of pleading 
guilty to fraud. The court found that the Supreme Court's holding in Padilla v. Kent1lcky, 
applied to this case retroactively and therefore her attorney was required to inform her of 
those consequences. 
Questions Presented: Whether the holding in Padilla v. Kentllcky requiring counsel to 
inform a defendant of immigration consequences of guilty plea applied retroactively. 
Roselva CHAIDEZ, Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
Decided August 23, 2010 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
FLAUM, Circuit Judge: 
In Padilla v. Kentllcky, U.S. --, 130 
S.Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), 
the Supreme Court held that an attorney 
provides ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to inform a client that a guilty plea 
carries a risk of deportation. The district 
court concluded that Padilla did not 
announce a new rule under the framework 
set forth in Teaglle v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), 
and consequently applied its holding to 
Petitioner Roselva Chaidez's collateral 
appeal. Because we conclude that Padilla 
announced a new rule that does not fall 
within either of Teague's exceptions, we 
reverse the judgment of the district court. 
I. Background 
Chaidez entered the United States from her 
native Mexico in 1971, and became a lawful 
permanent resident in 1977. In June 2003, 
Chaidez was indicted on three counts of 
mail fraud in connection with a staged 
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accident insurance scheme in which the loss 
advice of counsel, Chaidez pled guilty to 
two counts on December 3, 2003. She was 
sentenced to four years' probation on April 
1, 2004, and judgment was entered in her 
case on April 8, 2004. Chaidez did not 
appeal. 
Federal law provides that an alien who is 
"convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable." 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Chaidez's plea of guilty 
to a fraud involving a loss in excess of 
$10,000 rendered her eligible for removal 
from the United States as an aggravated 
felon. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The 
government initiated removal proceedings in 
2009, after Chaidez unsuccessfully filed an 
application for U.S. citizenship. 
In an effOli to avoid removal, Chaidez 
sought to have her conviction overturned. 
To that end, she filed a motion for a writ of 
coram nobis in her criminal case on January 
25, 2010. She alleges ineffective assistance 
of counsel in connection with her decision to 
plead guilty, claiming that her defense 
attorney failed to inform her that a guilty 
plea could lead to removal. Chaidez 
maintains that she would not have pled 
guilty if she had been made aware of the 
immigration consequences of such a plea. 
On March 31, 2010, while Chaidez's motion 
was pending before the district cOUli, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Padilla. In a thoughtful opinion, Judge 
Gottschall acknowledged that this case 
presents a close call. She concluded that 
Padilla did not announce a new rule for 
Teague purposes, but rather was an 
application of the Court's holding in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Having concluded that Padilla 
applied to Chaidez's case, the district cOUli 
considered the merits of her coram nobis 
to the vIctIms exceeded $10,000. On the 
petition. The court granted the petition and 
vacated Chaidez's conviction. The 
government appeals the district court's 
underlying ruling regarding the retroactive 
effect of Padilla. 
II. Discussion 
The writ of coram nobis, available under the 
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (a), provides 
a method for collaterally attacking a 
criminal conviction when a defendant is not 
in custody, and thus cannot proceed under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Folak, 
865 F.2d 110, 112-13 (7th Cir.1988). The 
writ is an extraordinary remedy, allowed 
only where collateral relief is necessary to 
address an ongoing civil disability resulting 
from a conviction. Because a writ of error 
coram nobis affords the same general relief 
as a writ of habeas corpus, we proceed as we 
would in a habeas case. Our review is de 
novo. 
In Padilla, the Court considered the 
petitioner's claim that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by erroneously 
advising him that pleading guilty to a drug 
distribution charge would not impact his 
immigration status. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court had rejected Padilla's claim, 
concluding that advice regarding the 
collateral consequences of a guilty plea 
("i.e., those matters not within the 
sentencing authority of the state trial cOllli"), 
including deportation, is "outside the scope 
of representation required by the Sixth 
Amendment." 130 S.Ct. at 1481. As the 
Padilla Court noted, many state and federal 
courts had similarly concluded that a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel was limited 
to advice about the direct consequences of a 
guilty plea (i.e., length of imprisonment), 
and did not extend to information regarding 
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collateral consequences (i.e., deportation). 
Justice Stevens, the Padilla Court concluded 
that "advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 130 
S.Ct. at 1482. Noting that it had "never 
applied a distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences to define the scope 
of constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' required under Strickland," the 
Court declined to consider the 
appropriateness of the direct/collateral 
distinction generally. lei. at 1481. Rather, it 
found such a distinction "ill-suited to 
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the 
specific risk of deportation." lei. at 1481-82. 
The majority based that conclusion on "the 
unique nature of deportation"-specifically, 
its severity as a penalty and its close 
relationship to the criminal process. lei. at 
1481. The Court noted that recent changes in 
federal immigration law, including the 
Immigration Act of 1990 and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), had 
served to further "enmesh[ ] criminal 
convictions and the penalty of deportation," 
by making "removal nearly an automatic 
result for a broad class of noncitizen 
offenders." lei. at 1478-81. Those changes 
convinced the COUlt that "deportation is an 
integral pmt ... of the penalty that may be 
imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
plead guilty to specified crimes," and cannot 
be "divorce[ d] ... from the conviction." lei. 
at 1480-81. As a result, the Court concluded 
that Strickland applied to Padilla's 
ineffective assistance claim. 
The Court went on to consider the first 
Strickland prong-whether Padilla had 
established that his counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. In order to determine what 
constituted reasonable representation under 
However, in a majority opinion authored by 
the circumstances, the COUlt looked to 
prevailing professional norms set forth by 
the American Bar Association and numerous 
other authorities. The Court found that, 
dating back to the mid-1990s, those 
authorities had been in agreement that 
counsel must advise his or her client 
regarding the risk of deportation. Thus, the 
Court held that defense counsel provides 
constitutionally deficient representation by 
failing to inform a defendant that a guilty 
plea carries a risk of depOltation. 
Chaidez seeks to have Padilla applied to her 
case on collateral review, despite the fact 
that the criminal case against her was final 
on direct review when Padilla was decided. 
Teague governs our analysis. Under Teag1le, 
a constitutional rule of criminal procedure 
applies to all cases on direct and collateral 
review if it is not a new rule, but rather an 
old rule applied to new facts. A new rule 
applies only to cases that still are on direct 
review, unless one of two exceptions 
applies. In particular, a new rule applies 
retroactively on collateral review if (1) it is 
substantive or (2) it is a "'watershed rul[ e] 
of criminal procedure' implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the 
criminal proceeding." 
The parties agree that if Padilla announced a 
new rule neither exception to non-
retroactivity applies. Therefore, whether 
Padilla announced a new constitutional rule 
of criminal procedure is the sole issue before 
us. The district courts that have addressed 
that issue-including those in this circuit-
are split. The Third Circuit recently became 
the first of our sister circuits to weigh in, 
holding that Padilla simply applied the old 
Strickland rule, such that it is retroactively 
applicable on collateral review. 
A rule is said to be new when it was not 
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"dictated by precedent existing at the time 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. That definition of 
what constitutes a new rule reflects the fact 
that Teague was developed in the context of 
federal habeas, which is designed "to ensure 
that state convictions comply with the 
federal law in existence at the time the 
conviction became final, and not to provide 
a mechanism for the continuing 
reexamination of final judgments based 
upon later emerging legal doctrine." Thus, 
the Court has explained that Teague 
"val i dates reasonab Ie, good-fai th 
interpretations of existing precedents made 
by state courts even though they are shown 
to be contrary to later decisions." Saffle v. 
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) The 
peltinent inquiry here is whether Padilla's 
outcome was "susceptible to debate among 
reasonable minds." Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. 
Put differently, "our task is to determine 
whether a ... court considering [Chaidez's] 
claim at the time [her] conviction became 
final"-pre-Padilla-"would have felt 
compelled by existing precedent to conclude 
that [Padilla] was required by the 
Constitution." Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488. 
That task is a "difficult" one where, as here, 
the decision at issue "extends the reasoning 
of . . . prior cases," as opposed to 
"explicit[ly] overruling . . . an earlier 
holding." However, the Court's retroactivity 
jurisprudence provides guidance. In 
assessing whether the outcome of a case was 
susceptible to reasonable debate, the COUlt 
has looked to both the views expressed in 
the opinion itself and lower court decisions. 
Lack of unanimity on the Court in deciding 
a particular case supports the conclusion that 
the case announced a new rule. Similarly, if 
the lower COUltS were split on the issue, the 
Court has concluded that the outcome of the 
case was susceptible to reasonable debate. 
These considerations convince us that 
Padilla announced a new rule. 
the defendant's conviction became final." 
The majority opinion in Padilla drew a 
concurrence authored by Justice Alito and 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as a 
dissenting opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. That 
the members of the Padilla Court expressed 
such an "array of views" indicates that 
Padilla was not dictated by precedent. 
O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 159. Moreover, the 
views expressed in each of the opinions 
SUppOlt that conclusion. Statements in the 
concurrence leave no doubt that Justice 
Alito and Chief Justice Robetts considered 
Padilla to be ground-breaking. And the two 
dissenting Justices, who expressed the view 
that the majority's extension of the Court's 
Sixth Amendment jurisplUdence lacked 
"basis in text or in principle," certainly did 
not see Padilla as dictated by precedent. 
Even the majority suggested that the lUle it 
announced was not dictated by precedent, 
stating that while Padilla's claim 
"follow[ ed] from" its decision applying 
Strickland to advice regarding guilty pleas in 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), Hill 
"does not control the question before us." It 
seems evident from Supreme COUlt 
precedent that Padilla cannot be an old rule 
simply because existing case law 
"inform[ ed], or even control[led] or 
govern[ed]," the analysis. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 
488. Nor will the rule of Padilla be deemed 
old because precedent lent "general support" 
to the rule it established, Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 
236, or because it represents "the most 
reasonable . . . interpretation of general 
law," Lambrix v. SingletalY, 520 U.S. 518, 
538 (1997). Padilla can only be considered 
an old lUle if Supreme Court precedent 
"compel[ledJ "the result. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 
490. The majority's characterization of Hill 
suggests that it did not understand the rule 
set forth in Padilla to be dictated by 
precedent. 
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Our conclusion that Padilla announced a 
new rule finds additional support in pre-
Padilla decisions by state and federal comis. 
Prior to Padilla, the lower federal courts, 
including at least nine Comis of Appeals, 
had uniformly held that the Sixth 
Amendment did not require counsel to 
provide advice concerning any collateral (as 
opposed to direct) consequences of a guilty 
plea. Courts in at least thirty states and the 
District of Columbia had reached the same 
conclusion. 87 CORNELL L.REV. at 699. 
Such rare unanimity among the lower courts 
is compelling evidence that reasonable 
jurists reading the Supreme Court's 
precedents in April 2004 could have 
disagreed about the outcome of. 
In concluding that Padilla did not announce 
a new rule, the Third Circuit downplayed the 
significance of the contrary lower court 
decisions, reasoning that they generally pre-
dated the adoption of the professional norms 
relied on by the Padilla Court. Grocio, 645 
F.3d at 639-40. Not so. While Justice Alito 
cited primarily pre-1995 cases in his 
concurrence, in the years preceding Padilla, 
the lower federal courts consistently 
reaffirmed that deportation is a collateral 
consequence of a criminal conviction and 
that the Sixth Amendment does not require 
advice regarding collateral consequences. In 
doing so, three Courts of Appeals explicitly 
rejected the argument that the enactment of 
the IIRIRA altered the calculus. 
We acknowledge that "the mere existence of 
conflicting authority does not necessarily 
mean a rule is new." Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362,410 (2000). But, in our view, "an 
objective reading of the relevant cases" 
demonstrates that Padilla was not dictated 
by precedent. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 
222, 237 (1992). It is true that, unlike so 
many lower courts, the Supreme Court has 
"never applied a distinction between direct 
and collateral consequences to define the 
scope of constitutionally 'reasonable 
professional assistance' required under 
Strickland." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. As 
such, prior to Padilla, the Court had not 
foreclosed the possibility that advice 
regarding collateral consequences of a guilty 
plea could be constitutionally required. But 
neither had the Court required defense 
counsel to provide advice regarding 
consequences collateral to the criminal 
prosecution at issue. 
Moreover, the distinction between direct and 
collateral consequences was not without 
foundation in Supreme Court precedent. It 
can be traced to the Court's jurisprudence 
regarding the validity of guilty pleas. To be 
valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary 
and intelligent. Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 747 (1970). The Court has long 
held that a plea is voluntary where the 
defendant is "fully aware of the direct 
consequences" of the plea. The Court also 
has said that where "a defendant is 
represented by counsel during the plea 
process and enters his plea upon the advice 
of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 
depends on whether counsel's advice 'was 
within the range of competence demanded 
of attorneys in criminal cases. '" Hill, 474 
U.S. at 56. At least some lower cOUlis 
extrapolated from these holdings that 
counsel performs effectively by advising a 
client as to the direct consequences of 
conviction. 
Therefore, we "cannot say that the large 
majority of federal and state cOUlis that 
ha[ d] rejected" ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims based on advice about the 
deportation consequences of a plea were 
"unreasonable" in their reading of existing 
Supreme Court precedent. Sajjle, 494 U.S. at 
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490. We consequently remain persuaded by 
2004, a jurist could reasonably have reached 
a conclusion contrary to the holding in 
Padilla, such that Padilla announced a new 
rule for purposes of Teag1fe. 
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court recently noted, "[t]here is no question 
that the holding in Padilla is an extension of 
the rule in Strickland," "[ n ]or is there any 
question that the Supreme Court was 
applying the first prong of the Strickland 
standard when it concluded that the failure 
of counsel to provide her client with 
available advice about an Issue like 
deportation was constitutionally deficient." 
Clarke, 460 Mass. at 37, 949 N.E.2d 892. 
However, we disagree with that court's 
conclusion that, because "the OpInIOn in 
Padilla relies primarily on citation to 
Strickland itself," Padilla was dictated by 
Strickland. Id. at 44, 949 N.E.2d 892. Under 
Teague, a rule is old only if it sets forth the 
sole reasonable interpretation of existing 
precedent. Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 538. The 
fact that Padilla is an extension of 
Strickland says nothing about whether it was 
new or not. 
We recognize that the application of 
Strickland to unique facts generally will not 
produce a new rule. However, that guiding 
principle is not absolute. We believe Padilla 
to be the rare exception. Before Padilla, the 
Court had never held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires a criminal defense 
attorney to provide advice about matters not 
directly related to their client's criminal 
prosecution. In Padilla, the Court held that 
constitutionally effective assistance of 
counsel requires advice about a civil penalty 
imposed by the Executive Branch (now the 
Department of Homeland Security, formerly 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service) 
after the criminal case is closed. In our view, 
that result was sufficiently novel to qualify 
the weight of lower court authority that, in 
as a new rule. Indeed, if Padilla is 
considered an old rule, it is hard to imagine 
an application of Strickland that would 
qualify as a new rule. Perhaps in the future 
the Court will conclude, given the breadth 
and fact-intensive nature of the Strickland 
reasonableness standard, that cases 
extending Strickland are never new. But 
until that time, we are bound to apply 
Teague in the context of Strickland. 
The specific contours of the Padilla holding 
further indicate that it is a new rule. Under 
the rule set forth in Padilla, the scope of an 
attorney's duty to provide immigration-
related advice varies depending on the 
degree of specialization required to provide 
such advice accurately. In particular, the 
Court held that "when the deportation 
consequence [of a guilty plea] is truly clear," 
counsel has a duty to "give correct advice." 
130 S.Ct. at 1483. But "[w]hen the law is 
not succinct and straightforward," such that 
"the dep0l1ation consequences of a 
particular plea are unclear or uncertain," "a 
criminal defense attorney need do no more 
than advise a noncitizen client that pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences." That nuanced, 
new analysis cannot, in our view, be 
characterized as having been dictated by 
precedent. 
The district court relied on the fact that 
Padilla itself was before the Court on a 
motion for post-conviction relief for its 
conclusion that the Court intended for 
Padilla to apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral appeal. In light of the fact that 
Kentucky did not raise Teag1fe as a defense 
in Padilla, we do not assign the significance 
to Padilla's procedural posture that the 
district com1 did. While "[ r ]etroactivity is 
properly treated as a threshold question," 
Teag1fe "is not 'jurisdictional' in the sense 
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that [the] Court ... must raise and decide the 
497 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1990). Therefore, if a 
State does not rely on Teague, the Court has 
no obligation to address it, and can consider 
the merits of the claim. We believe it is 
more likely that the Court considered 
Teaglle to be waived, than that it silently 
engaged in a retroactivity analysis. 
Finally, the district court reasoned that the 
best way to make sense of the Padilla 
Court's discussion (and dismissal) of 
concerns that its ruling would undermine the 
finality of plea-based convictions was to 
conclude that the majority intended Padilla 
to apply retroactively. 130 S.Ct. at 1484-85. 
The Third Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion. That is a reasonable reading, and 
certainly is the most compelling argument 
that Padilla is an old rule. However, we are 
hesitant to depart from our application of the 
test set forth in Teague and its progeny-
which points clearly in the direction of new 
rule-based on inferences from indirect 
language. Moreover, to the extent that we 
attempt to discern whether members of the 
COUli understood Padilla to be a new rule, 
we find the clearest indications in the 
concurrence and dissent, which leave no 
doubt that at least four Justices view Padilla 
as new. 
III. Conclusion 
The Supreme COUli has defined the concept 
of an old rule under Teag1le narrowly, 
limiting it to those holdings so compelled by 
precedent that any contrary conclusion must 
be deemed unreasonable. While determining 
whether a rule is new can be challenging, 
and this case provides no exception, we 
conclude that the narrow definition of what 
constitutes an old rule tips the scales in favor 
of finding that Padilla announced a new 
rule. Moreover, that numerous cOUlis had 
failed to anticipate the holding in Padilla, 
issue Sua sponte." Collins v. Y01lngblood, 
though not dispositive, is strong evidence 
that reasonable jurists could have debated 
the outcome. For the foregoing reasons, we 
REVERSE the judgment of the district court 
and REMAND the case for fUliher 
proceedings. 
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
At the time Roselva Chaidez, a lawful 
permanent resident since 1977, entered her 
plea, prevailing professional nOllTIS placed a 
duty on counsel to advise clients of the 
removal consequences of a decision to enter 
a plea of guilty. I would join the Third 
Circuit in finding that Padilla v. Kentucky, 
_U.S. _,130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 
284 (2010), simply clarified that a violation 
of these norms amounts to deficient 
performance under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). As such, 
Padilla did not announce a "new rule" under 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and is 
therefore retroactively applicable to 
Chaidez's coram nobis petition seeking to 
vacate her guilty plea on the grounds that 
her counsel was ineffective. For the reasons 
set fOlih below, I dissent. 
I do not disagree that Teague holds that a 
"case announces a new rule when it breaks 
new ground or imposes a new obligation on 
the States or Federal Government," and "if 
the result was not dictated by precedent 
existing at the time the [petitioner's] 
conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 301. I do, however, disagree with the 
majority as to how Teaglle's holding applies 
in the context of Strickland v. Washington. 
In Padilla, the Court found that because 
"deportation is a particularly severe 
'penalty,' ... advice regarding deportation 
is not categorically removed from the ambit 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 
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The Court then stated that the first inquiry 
representation "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness," Stricklancl, 466 
U.S. at 688, is "necessarily linked to the 
practice and expectations of the legal 
community." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 
Noting that Strickland's standard looked to 
"reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms," the Padilla Court held 
that "[t]he weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports the view that counsel must 
advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation. 
By citing and relying on Strickland, and 
applying that case to Padilla's claim, the 
Court "broke no new ground in holding the 
duty to consult also extended to counsel's 
obligation to advise the defendant of the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea." 
United States v. Gracia, 645 F.3d at 639. 
The decision "is best read as merely 
recogmzmg that a plea agreement's 
immigration consequences constitute the 
sort of information an alien defendant needs 
in making 'impOliant decisions' affecting 
'the outcome of the plea process,' and 
thereby come within the ambit of the 'more 
particular duties to consult with the 
defendant' required of effective counsel." 
Under such a reading, Padilla was a mere 
application of Strickland to the facts before 
the Court, and therefore not a "new rule." 
Following Teag1le, the early Supreme Court 
retroactivity cases cast the "new rule" 
inquiry as whether or not "reasonable 
jurists" would agree that a rule was not 
"dictated" by precedent. But this narrow 
conception of the "dictated" language from 
Teague is not the relevant inquiry in the 
Strickland context. "The often repeated 
language that Teag1le endorses 'reasonable, 
good-faith interpretations' by state courts is 
an explanation of policy, not a statement of 
law." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 383 
under Strickland, whether counsel's 
(2000). As the Court has stated, and as the 
majority today recognizes, "the Strickland 
test provides sufficient guidance for 
resolving virt1lally all ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims." "[W]here the starting 
point is a rule of general application such as 
Strickland, it will be the infrequent case that 
yields a result so novel that it forges a new 
rule, one not dictated by precedent," Wright 
v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992). 
Given this clear language regarding 
Teag1le's applicability in the Strickland 
context, I cannot find that the Supreme 
Court's retroactivity cases where Strickland 
is not implicated compel a finding that the 
rule announced in Padilla is "new." 
In Williams, the Court was addressing 
Strickland under the "clearly established 
law" requirement of 28 U .S.C. § 2254( d)(1), 
which a plurality found codified Teag1le's 
requirement that federal habeas courts must 
deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of 
law not "clearly established" at the time the 
state conviction became final. 529 U.S. at 
379-80. Parts 1, III, and IV of the opinion 
were on behalf of a majority. The opinion of 
the Court stated: 
It is past question that the rule set 
forth in Strickland qualifies as 
"clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Comi of 
the United States." That the 
Strickland test "of necessity requires 
a case-by-case examination of the 
evidence," Wright, 505 U.S., at 308, 
112 S.Ct. 2482, obviates neither the 
clarity of the rule nor the extent to 
which the rule must be seen as 
"established" by this Court. This 
Court's precedent "dictated" that the 
Virginia Supreme Court apply the 
Strickland test at the time that court 
enteliained Williams' ineffective-
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assistance claim. . . . And it can 
right to effective counsel "breaks 
new ground or imposes a new 
obligation on the States." 
529 U.S. at 391. Where such a "case-by-case 
examination" is required, "we can tolerate a 
number of specific applications without 
saying that those applications themselves 
create a new rule." Wright, 505 U.S. at 
308-09. 
This case is one of those "specific 
applications" that does not create a new rule. 
In applying Strickland to this particular set 
of facts, the Court found that prevailing 
professional norms in place at the time of 
the defendant's plea required counsel to act 
in accordance with those norms, and that the 
advice required was clear and apparent. 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. That the Padilla 
Court began by addressing whether 
Strickland applied to Padilla's claim is of no 
consequence. As the Third Circuit 
recognized, the true question addressed by 
Padilla is whether counsel has been 
constitutionally adequate in advising a 
criminal defendant as to whether or not to 
accept a plea bargain. Grocio, 645 F.3d at 
637-38. The analytical mechanism by which 
the Court applied Strickland does not detract 
from the fact that Strickland is the general 
test governing ineffective assistance claims, 
and that the Padilla Court did no more than 
recognize that removal is the type of 
consequence that a defendant needs to be 
informed of when making the decision of 
whether to plea. 
Given how Teague and Strickland co-exist, I 
would not find that the concurring and 
dissenting views in Padilla compel a finding 
that the majority's opinion is a "new rule." 
Despite using dissenting views to inform the 
analysis of whether reasonable jurists could 
differ on whether precedent dictates a 
hardly be said that recognizing the 
particular result, the Court has "not 
suggest[ ed] that the mere existence of a 
dissent suffices to show that the rule is 
new." Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,416 n. 
5 (2004). And where the Court has relied on 
an "array of views" to find a rule "new," the 
underlying case that the petitioner sought to 
have applied in fact had no majority opinion. 
The existence of concurring and dissenting 
views does not alter the fact that the 
prevailing professional norms at the time of 
Chaidez's plea required a lawyer to advise 
her client of the immigration consequences 
of a guilty plea. Even in light of dissenting 
views, "Strickland did not freeze into place 
the objective standards of attorney 
performance prevailing in 1984, never to 
change again." Grocio, 645 F.3d at 640. The 
concurring and dissenting opinions do not 
alter the straightforward application of 
Strickland that the majority engaged in. In 
Padilla, even the concurring Justices agreed 
that counsel must, at the very least, advise a 
noncitizen "defendant that a criminal 
conviction may have adverse immigration 
consequences." And Justices have disagreed 
on whether an outcome was "dictated" by 
precedent where a majority found that a 
novel application of an old precedent was 
not a "new rule." 
The strongest argument that the government 
and majority opinion make is the unanimity 
among the lower courts prior to Padilla that 
the Sixth Amendment does not require 
counsel to warn clients of the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea. The early 
cases, however, relied on the categorization 
of removal or deportation as a "collateral" 
consequence. This is a classification that the 
Padilla court specifically rejected. The 
Court found that deportation is "intimately 
related to the criminal process," and that 
"[ o]ur law has enmeshed criminal 
convictions and the penalty of dep0l1ation 
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for nearly a century." The Court also found 
have made removal nearly an automatic 
result for a broad class of noncitizen 
offenders." The Court therefore found it 
'''most difficult' to divorce the penalty from 
the conviction in the depOliation context." 
Despite the drastically changed immigration 
landscape following the passage of IIRlRA 
in 1996, more recent lower cOUli decisions 
did not revisit earlier holdings regarding 
deportation's collateral nature, and declined 
to find deportation any less collateral. These 
cases, however, cannot change the fact that 
the Supreme Court itself "never applied a 
distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' required under Strickland, ... " 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481, a more relevant 
inquiry for Teague purposes. Not only did 
the Supreme Court never make this 
distinction, but in 2001 the Court stated that 
"preserving the client's right to remain in 
the United States may be more impOliant to 
the client than any potential jail sentence." 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001). 
The flaw in the collateral versus direct 
consequences distinction was known at the 
time of Chaidez's plea. And as the majority 
recognizes, "the mere existence of 
conflicting authority does not necessarily 
mean a rule is new." Williams, 529 U.S. at 
410. The only question for Teaglle purposes 
in the Strickland context is whether counsel 
was constitutionally adequate in advising a 
criminal defendant as to whether or not to 
accept a plea bargain. Gracia, 645 F.3d at 
637-38. Relying on lower court decisions to 
the contrary would overlook Strickland's 
straightforward language that "[t]he proper 
measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms"-professional norms 
that the Padilla Court found had been in 
place for at least fifteen years prior to its 
that "recent changes in our immigration law 
holding. I would therefore not find the 
unanimity among the lower courts pre-
dating Padilla "compelling" for purposes of 
our current Teag1le analysis. 
My colleagues downplay the plain language 
in Padilla that itself signals anticipated 
retroactive application. The majority in 
Padilla specifically stated that its decision 
will not "open the floodgates" to challenges 
of convictions and further stated that "[i]t 
seems unlikely that our decision today will 
have a significant effect on those 
convictions already obtained as the result of 
plea bargains." This floodgates argument is 
a clear reference to petitions such as the one 
at hand that challenge the past deficient 
performance of counsel. The Court's use of 
the past tense in Padilla forecloses an 
argument that it was only referring to 
prospective challenges, especially when the 
two subsequent sentences of the opinion 
speak of professional norms over the "past 
15 years" and that courts should presume 
that counsel satisfied their obligation "at the 
time their clients considered pleading 
guilty." Such a discussion would be 
unnecessary if the Court intended that 
Padilla only apply prospectively. The 
government argues that the floodgates 
discussion referred only to state post-
conviction proceedings, as states are free to 
offer post-conviction relief without regard to 
Teag1le. However, in its floodgates 
discussion, the Padilla Court relied on 
research that included both state andfederal 
post conviction proceedings when citing 
how many habeas petitions filed arise from 
guilty pleas. 
As the COUli in Padilla signaled, if mere 
applications of Strickland are "old rules," it 
does not necessarily follow that every 
petitioner will be able to take advantage of 
those mere applications. First, the Padilla 
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Court relied on the professional norms in 
Padilla's counsel "could have easily 
determined that his plea would make him 
eligible for deportation simply from reading 
the text of the statute. . . ." Not every 
noncitizen who pled to an offense will be in 
that position. Additionally, Strickland also 
requires a showing of prejudice. Showing 
prejudice, much like deficient performance, 
is adjudicated depending on the facts of each 
particular case, and the fact that courts must 
engage in such case-by-case analysis should 
not influence whether or not the rule itself is 
"new." 
place at the time of plea, and the fact that 
We can rest assured that defense lawyers 
will now advise their clients prior to 
pleading guilty about the immigration 
consequences of such a plea, as the Court 
has clarified that such advice is required 
under the Sixth Amendment. But given 
today's holding, this is of no consequence to 
Roselva Chaidez despite the fact that 
professional norms in place at the time of 
her plea placed the same duty on her 
counsel. Because I find that Padilla simply 
extended the Supreme Court's holding in 
Strickland, and itself signaled an intent to be 
applied to noncitizens in Chaidez's position, 
I respectfully dissent. 
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"New Look at Lawyers' Advice" 
SCO TUSb log 
April 30,2012 
Lyle Denniston 
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to 
settle a dispute among lower courts on 
whether to give more immigrants the benefit 
of a ruling that requires their lawyers to 
advise them more clearly on what can 
happen if they plead guilty to a crime. At 
issue in the new case of Chaidez v. United 
States (11-820) is the potential retroactivity 
of the Court's 2010 ruling in Padilla v. 
Kent1lcky. This was the only new case 
granted on Monday; it will be heard and 
decided in the new Term starting October 1. 
In the Padilla decision, the Court ruled that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
includes a right for a non-citizen living in 
the U.S. to be advised by a lawyer of the 
consequences under immigration law of 
pleading guilty to a crime that could lead to 
deportation. The majority noted that, under 
dramatic changes recently in immigration 
law, deportation is virtually automatic after 
one is convicted of an "aggravated felony." 
Relying on the constitutional standard that a 
lawyer's professional advice to clients must 
satisfy a minimum level of performance, the 
Court in Padilla found that prevailing 
standards dictate that a lawyer for a non-
citizen faced with a criminal charge must 
advise that individual of the risk of being 
depOlied if a plea of guilty is entered. If the 
immigration law outlook is not clear, the 
Court said, the lawyer at least must tell the 
client that there could be adverse 
immigration consequences. 
The sequel case arose before the Padilla 
decision was issued, and the Seventh Circuit 
Court ruled that the non-citizen 
involved-Roselva Chaidez, now living in 
Chicago-could not take advantage of that 
precedent because it did not apply 
retroactively. The Padilla decision came 
down on March 31, 2010, and the Seventh 
Circuit said that it established a new rule of 
criminal law and thus, under Supreme Court 
precedent, it could not apply to any case in 
which a guilty plea had been entered prior to 
that March 2010 date. 
Chaidez, a native of Mexico, came to the 
U.S. in the 1970s, and became a lawful 
permanent resident in 1977. She has three 
children and three grandchildren, all of 
whom are U.S. citizens. She had been 
involved in an insurance fraud scheme, in 
which others had persuaded her to claim 
falsely that she had been a passenger in a car 
involved in a collision; she had received 
$1,200 for her role. In 2003, she was 
charged with two counts of mail fraud for 
two separate billings after the underlying 
dispute was settled out of court. 
Her lawyer did not advise her about the risk 
of deportation if she pleaded guilty, and did 
not seek to negotiate a plea deal for her. She 
pleaded guilty. It is not disputed that, had 
she known of the deportation prospect, she 
would not have pleaded guilty. She was 
sentenced to four years on probation and 
ordered to pay the insurance company a total 
of $22,500. Her conviction became final in 
2004. Three years later, federal officials 
became aware of her conviction, and moved 
to deport her. She challenged that in federal 
cOllli, claiming that her lawyer had failed to 
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advise her fully. That was the claim the 
Seventh Circuit rejected. Other federal 
courts, however, disagree on the 
retroactivity point. 
While the U.S. Solicitor General argued to 
the Supreme Court that the Seventh Circuit 
was correct in denying retroactivity, it 
nevertheless urged the Court to hear the case 
to clear up the conflict among lower courts. 
The Justices accepted that advice. 
207 
"7th Circuit Holds Lawyer Rule on Impact of Guilty Plea for 
Immigrants not Retroactive" 
The Indiana Lawyer 
August 24, 2011 
Michael Hopkins 
A three-judge panel for the 7th Circuit 
Court of Appeals has determined a 
landmark decision from the Supreme 
Court of the United States last year isn't 
retroactive. That rule required criminal 
defense attorneys to advise clients about 
the immigration impact of signing a 
guilty plea, and this means past cases 
wouldn't benefit from that holding even 
if those individuals had been deprived of 
that Sixth Amendment right. 
The ruling came Tuesday in Roselva 
Chaidez v. U.S., No. 10-3623, a 
Northern District of Illinois case 
involving a woman from Mexico who 
entered the United States and became a 
lawful resident in the 1970s. She was 
indicted in 2003 on mail fraud in 
connection with a staged accident 
insurance scheme that took more than 
$10,000 from the victims. On the advice 
of her counsel, Chaidez pleaded guilty to 
two counts and received a sentence of 
four years probation. 
The federal government began 
deportation proceedings in 2009 because 
the law dictates that for anyone 
convicted of an aggravated felony. In an 
attempt to halt the deportation, Chaidez 
tried to have her conviction overturned 
despite not originally appealing the 
conviction and sentence. Filing a motion 
for the court to correct a previous error 
that couldn't be fixed by any other 
remedy, Chaidez in January 2010 
alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
in connection with her decision to plead 
guilty, and she claimed that her defense 
attorney failed to infOlm her that a guilty 
plea could lead to her depOliation. 
While the motion was pending before 
the Northern District of Illinois, the 
Supreme COUli on March 31, 2010, 
decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1486 (2010). The holding in that 
case upheld the argument Chaidez was 
trying to make. 
Considering that new holding, U.S. 
Judge Joan Gottschall in Illinois ruled 
later in the year that this was a close call 
but that Padilla didn't announce a new 
rule and should apply retroactively to 
Chaidez's case. The District judge 
applied that ruling to this case and 
granted the petition, vacating Chaidez's 
conviction. 
The federal government appealed that 
ruling regarding the retroactive effect 
of Padilla, an issue that mUltiple District 
and Circuit courts have addressed 
recently and ruled on differently. Now, 
the 7th Circuit has chimed in, with the 
full Circuit rejecting a request to rehear 
the case en bane despite objections from 
Judges David Hamilton, Ilana Diamond 
Rovner, Diane Wood, and Ann C. 
Williams, who would have reheard the 
case. Judges William Bauer and Joel 
Flaum were in the majority reversing the 
lower District couli, while Judge 
Williams disagreed and penned a 
lengthy dissent. 
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Despite the court's division, the holding 
is now in place for TIIinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin: Padilla is not retroactive 
prior to March 31, 2010. 
Specifically under SCOTUS precedent 
from 1989, a constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure applies to all cases 
on direct and collateral review if it's not 
a new rule but rather is an old rule 
applied to new facts. That is what the 
federal cOUlis are debating 
about Padilla, and whether that holding 
is a new rule that should apply to future 
cases. 
Examining pre-Padilla caselaw from 
nine federal appellate courts, the two-
judge majority for the 7th Circuit panel 
found that those other jurisdictions had 
uniformly held that the Sixth 
Amendment did not require counsel to 
provide advice about collateral 
consequences of guilty pleas. 
The 7th Circuit panel described Judge 
Gottschall's rationale as reasonable and 
compelling-that the SCOTUS majority 
intended Padilla to apply retroactively 
because of concerns that its ruling would 
undermine the finality of plea-based 
convictions. But the majority hesitated to 
turn away from its long-established 
application of the test it had used prior to 
the SCOTUS decision and found that it 
was a new groundbreaking rule that 
couldn't have been anticipated and 
should not be retroactive. 
"While determining whether a rule is 
new can be challenging, and this case 
provides no exception, we conclude that 
the narrow definition of what constitutes 
an old rule tips the scales in favor of 
finding that Padilla announced a new 
rule," Judge Flaum wrote. "Moreover, 
that numerous courts had failed to 
anticipate the holding in Padilla, though 
not dispositive, is strong evidence that 
reasonable jurists could have debated the 
outcome." 
In her 12-page dissent, Judge Williams 
wrote that Padilla's plain language 
indicates it anticipated retroactivity 
because it used past tense and discussed 
application to convictions already 
obtained, not only prospective 
challenges. 
"We can rest assured that defense 
lawyers will now advise their clients 
prior to pleading guilty about the 
immigration consequences of such a 
plea, as the Court has clarified that such 
advice is required under the Sixth 
Amendment. But given today's holding, 
this is of no consequence to Roselva 
Chaidez despite the fact that professional 
norms in place at the time of her plea 
placed the same duty on her counsel," 
Judge Williams wrote. "Because I find 
that Padilla simply extended the 
Supreme Court's holding (from 1984) 
and itself signaled an intent to be applied 
to noncitizens in Chaidez's position, I 
respectfully dissent." 
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"Opening the Gate to Criminal Alien Appeals" 
UP] 
May 6, 2012 
Michael Kirkland 
Is the u.s. Supreme Court about to open 
the appeal floodgates for legal aliens 
who committed crimes in the United 
States, pleaded guilty but weren't told 
they would face deportation under 
federal law? 
Maybe. Argument on the issue will be 
heard next term, which begins on the 
first Monday of October. 
The genesis of the dispute arose in 2010, 
when the Supreme COUli ruled in Padilla 
vs. Kentllcky that non-citizens who 
pleaded guilty to felonies, but weren't 
advised by their lawyers they 
automatically would be depOlied, were 
unconstitutionally deprived of their Sixth 
and 14th Amendment rights to effective 
counsel. 
The vote was 7-2. 
Now the Supreme Court has agreed to 
review whether the Padilla ruling should 
be made retroactive. In other words, 
should it be applied to any non-resident 
who pleaded guilty to a felony without 
effective counsel from 1996, when the 
depoliation law was passed, to 2010, 
when the decision was handed down. 
How big a universe would be affected is 
up for speculation. 
In urging that the new case, Chaidez vs. 
USA, be reviewed to resolve conflicting 
rulings in the lower courts, the Obama 
administration told the Supreme Court: 
"Many non-citizens are now attempting 
to overturn their long-final convictions 
based on this court's decision in Padilla. 
These collateral proceedings threaten 
society'S interest in the finality of 
criminal convictions." 
The issue, the administration said, "also 
will have a significant impact on the 
federal government's efforts to enforce 
this nation's immigration laws against 
those who have become removable as a 
result of pre-Padilla criminal 
convictions." 
A friend-of-the-court brief filed by the 
National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, the National 
Immigration Project of the National 
Lawyers Guild, the Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center and the Immigrant 
Defense project, refers to "countless" 
defendants. 
"The lack of a remedy [for pre-Padilla 
ineffective counsel] imposes intolerably 
harsh consequences on countless non-
citizens facing detention and deportation 
as a result of wrongfully procured plea-
based convictions," the brief said. "For 
these non-citizens and their families-
which often include both citizen and 
non-citizen children-the grave 
misfortune of a pre-Padilla final 
conviction in a federal judicial circuit 
that does not recognize a remedy for 
such Padilla violations, is deeply unjust 
and damaging: It can separate long-time 
residents from their loved ones and 
communities; tear apali families; impair 
children's health and education; and 
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cause severe economic hardship. 
Moreover, the conflict creates a 
regrettable disuniformity in the 
enforcement of federal immigration 
law." 
Another friend-of-the-court brief filed in 
support of the defendant in the new case 
points out that the rights involved have a 
deep history. 
The brief by the Constitutional 
Accountability Center, based in 
Washington, cites the "landmark English 
Treason Act of 1696, which first 
affirmed a right of counsel, explicitly 
spoke of[c]ounsellearned in the law." 
It also cites James Madison, a founding 
father and one of principal drafters of the 
Constitution who argued against the 
Alien and Sedition Act. 
"If the banishment of an alien ... be not 
a punishment, and among the severest of 
punishments, it will be difficult to 
imagine a doom to which the names can 
be applied," Madison wrote. 
Even if the number of non-U.S. citizens 
who would be affected by applying 
Padilla retroactively is just a small 
fraction of those aliens being held in 
detention for deportation, the number 
itself could be large. 
The Esperanza Immigrant Rights 
Project, a program of Catholic Charities, 
says the "number of non-citizens who 
are arrested, detained and placed into 
removal proceedings is rising every year. 
In 2010 approximately 400,000 non-
citizens were detained by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement." 
The Dallas Post also reported last week 
the number of deportations "has steadily 
increased over the past few years, rising 
from 291,060 in fiscal year 2007 to 
396,906 in fiscal year 2011, according to 
ICE." 
The number being detained pending 
deportation "has also skyrocketed. At the 
end of fiscal year 2002 the average daily 
population of detainees was 19,922. That 
rose to 33,330 in fiscal year 2011." 
The Post said there were 32,191 
immigrants detained nationwide as of 
last Feb. 20, at an average cost of $122 
per day. The newspaper said that equates 
to $3.9 million each day, or $1.43 billion 
for this year. 
Though most illegal immigrants who 
have received a final removal order are 
depOited within a month, the American 
Civil Liberties Union says "there are 
hundreds of cases, particularly those 
involving immigrants seeking political 
asylum and those convicted of criminal 
charges, that can take a year or more," 
the Post reported. 
The new case accepted by the Supreme 
Court for next term involves Roselva 
Chaidez, who was born in Mexico but 
has lived in the United States since the 
1970s. She has been a lawful permanent 
U. S. resident since 1977 and lives in 
Chicago with her three U.S.-citizen 
children and two U.S.-citizen 
grandchildren, her petition to the high 
COUlt says. 
"Several years ago, Chaidez became 
involved III an insurance scheme," the 
petition says. "As the government 
explained, she was 'not aware of the 
specifics of the scheme,' but others 
persuaded her to falsely claim to have 
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been a passenger in a car involved in a 
collision. . .. Chaidez received $1,200 
for her minor role. . . . [and] the 
insurance company paid a total of 
$26,000 to settle the claims that Chaidez 
and others made." 
That was enough to push the fraud into 
"aggravated felony" territory under a 
1996 federal law. Prosecutors charged 
Chaidez in 2003 with two counts of mail 
fraud for two separate mailings related to 
collecting her settlement. Her attorney 
recommended she accept a plea bargain 
offered by the government. 
Her petition said Chaidez was not told 
by her attorney if she pleaded guilty she 
would be deported, as required by law. 
She pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 
probation and ordered to pay $22,000 
restitution. 
When she later applied for U.S. 
citizenship, drawing the attention of 
officials, the government began 
deportation proceedings. After the lower 
courts ruled against her, she asked the 
Supreme Court for review. 
Chaidez' case is one of a dozen or so 
accepted by the Supreme Court for 
argument next term. Given the 7-2 vote 
in Padilla, her chances of success at the 
high court level may be quite good. 
But first her lawyers will have to get 
through Justice Antonin Scalia, who 
dissented in Padilla and was joined 
by Justice Clarence Thomas. 
"In the best of all possible worlds, 
criminal defendants contemplating a 
guilty plea ought to be advised of all 
senous collateral consequences of 
conviction, and surely ought not to be 
misadvised," Scalia wrote in the 2010 
dissent. "The Constitution, however, is 
not an all-purpose tool for judicial 
construction of a perfect world; and 
when we ignore its text in order to make 
it that, we often find ourselves swinging 
a sledge where a tack hammer is needed. 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
accused a lawyer for his defense against 
a 'criminal prosecutio[n]'-not for 
sound advice about the collateral 
consequences of conviction." 
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"On the Two Year Anniversary of Padilla v. Kentucky, Preziosi Says 
Supreme Court Decision's Significance Still Debated" 
PRWeb 
March 28, 2012 
While the United States Supreme Court 
ruled on Padilla v. Kentllcky nearly two 
years ago, courts in New York and 
around the country have made little 
progress on implementing the decision. 
So says Stephen Preziosi, New York 
Criminal Appeals Lawyer, who now 
tries to offer a framework for moving 
forward. 
"It has been almost two years since the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Padilla v. 
Kentucky (130 S.Ct. 1473176 (2010)), 
and courts across the State of New York 
and across the Nation are still struggling 
and disagreeing on how the holding in 
the Padilla case should be applied," said 
Preziosi. "Some coutis say it is a new 
rule and should not be applied 
retroactively, with some exceptions; 
other courts say that it is an old rule 
being applied to a new set of facts and 
should be applied retroactively; finally, 
there are various coutis that say it is a 
rule that should only be applied 
retroactively on cases of direct appellate 
review and not on collateral review. I 
believe the correct interpretation is that 
the decision applies retroactively." This 
is an impOliant concept in both federal 
criminal appeals and state criminal 
appeals. 
"The retroactive application of the rule 
in Padilla is significant for many cases 
working their way through the court 
systems in New York right now. This 
means that many noncitizens should 
have the opportunity to have their cases 
re-opened by submitting an Article 440 
motion to the trial court to request that 
the conviction be vacated. 
In the majority opinion offered by 
Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held 
that if an attorney fails to warn a client 
about adverse immigration consequences 
of a plea in a criminal case, this fulfills 
the first part of the two-part test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel outlined 
in Strickland v. Washington (Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
The question becomes whether all 
defendants agreeing to plea deals under 
these circumstances should have their 
cases reconsidered, or if that 
reconsideration should be extended to 
only certain of these defendants. 
"Two impOliant cases that were decided 
shortly after Padilla shed light on how I 
believe the law will be applied," said 
Preziosi. "Although neither of them 
received equivalent acclaim, they may 
help to clear the air on the subject of 
retroactivity of the Padilla rule, and on 
the issue of applicability of that rule on 
direct versus collateral review." 
In both Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 
U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2340, 176 
L.Ed.2d 559 (2010) and Chapa v. United 
States, _ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 3504, 177 
L.Ed.2d 1086 (2010), the Supreme Court 
vacated the decision of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals and remanded the 
cases to be decided in light of Padilla v. 
Kent1lcky. 
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In the Santos-Sanchez case the defendant 
had been a legal resident of the United 
States since 2001. According to court 
documents, he was arrested in 2003 and 
charged with aiding and abetting the 
illegal entry of an alien into the US. He 
pleaded guilty after consulting with an 
Assistant Public Defender and was 
sentenced to one year of probation. As a 
result of his guilty plea the Department 
of Homeland Security found Santos-
Sanchez removable because of his plea 
in the criminal case. 
He filed a Writ of Errors Coram Nobis 
(collateral review) before a Magistrate 
Judge in the Southern District of Texas 
who granted the writ and vacated the 
conviction; however, the District COUli 
for the Southern District of Texas 
eventually vacated the Magistrate's 
ruling and denied the petition for a Writ 
of Errors Coram Nobis; Santos-Sanchez 
appealed. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that deportation is a collateral 
consequence of the plea in the criminal 
case and that the defendant's attorney 
was, therefore, not obligated to inform 
him of the immigration consequences of 
his guilty plea, and his counsel was 
therefore not ineffective. Santos-Sanchez 
v. u.s., 548 F.3d 327 (2008). 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari (just one week after Padilla v. 
Kentllcky was decided) and vacated the 
judgment of the Fifth Circuit and 
remanded the case with an order that it 
be re-decided in light of the holding in 
Padilla v. Kent1lcky-the Supreme 
COUli's direction to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was to retroactively 
apply the Padilla holding in a case that 
was on collateral review. 
Approximately three months after the 
Supreme COUli decided Padilla v. 
Kent1lcky they decided the case of Chapa 
v. United States, U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 
3504, 177 L.Ed.2d 1086 (2010). 
In the Chapa case the defendant argued 
on direct appeal that her plea counsel 
had failed to warn her that it was a 
virtual celiainty she would be deported 
because of her plea. The Fifth Circuit 
COUli of Appeals, citing to its prior 
decision in Santos-Sanchez, held that 
counsel was not ineffective in failing to 
warn his client of the immigration 
consequences of a plea in a criminal case 
and affirmed the conviction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
celiiorari and vacated the Fifth Circuit's 
judgment and remanded the case for it to 
be decided in light of the holding of 
Padilla v. Kent1lcky, again, directing that 
the holding in Padilla be applied 
retroactively to a case that was on direct 
appellate review. 
"In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that the holding in Padilla is 
applicable retroactively, and 
furthermore, it is applicable on both 
direct appellate review and on collateral 
review of criminal cases," said Preziosi. 
In New York the issue of the retroactive 
application has not yet reached the 
appellate courts and has yet to be 
definitively decided. New York Criminal 
Appeals Lawyer Stephen Preziosi will 
be arguing two cases in the Appellate 
Division with regard to issue of 
retroactivity of Padilla in the coming 
months. 
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Moncrieffe v. Holder 
11-702 
Ruling Below: Moncreiffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1857 
(2012). 
Born in Jamaica, Adrian Moncriffe became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 
1984. In Georgia in 2008, he was arrested and pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute. Two years later, the Department of Homeland Security began removal 
proceedings, arguing that Moncrieffe should be removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony. The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals endorsed felony 
classification of Moncrief fe's act, holding that the Georgia state law he was convicted under was 
analogous to a section of the Controlled Substances Act that makes possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for 
review, arguing that the conviction was not an aggravated felony but rather equivalent to a 
misdemeanor due to the small amount, thus he would not be removable. The Fifth Circuit denied 
Moncrieffe's petition, holding that Moncrieffe bore the burden of proof in establishing a 
misdemeanor over a felony, and he failed to meet this burden at the immigration hearing. The 
deportation order was upheld. 
Questions Presented: Whether a conviction under a provision of state law that encompasses but 
is not limited to the distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration constitutes 
an aggravated felony, notwithstanding that the record of conviction does not establish that the 
alien was convicted of conduct that would constitute a federal felony. 
Adrian Phillip MONCRIEFFE, Petitioner, 
v. 
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Decided November 8, 2011; As Corrected November 14, 2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted] 
EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge 
Adrian Moncrieffe petitions for review of a 
removal order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeal's ("BIA"). After he pled guilty to 
possessing marijuana with intent to 
distribute in Georgia, the Department of 
Homeland Security ("DHS") charged 
Moncrieffe with being removable for this 
crime, which it contends should be 
considered a felony under the Controlled 
Substances Act ("CSA") and an "aggravated 
felony" under immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The immigration judge 
("IJ") agreed, and on appeal, the BIA 
endorsed the felony classification and 
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dismissed Moncrieffe's appeal. For the 
following reasons we DENY the Petition for 
Review. 
BACKGROUND 
Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, entered the 
United States legally as a permanent resident 
in 1984 at the age of three. Moncrieffe pled 
guilty to "Possession of Marijuana With 
Intent to Distribute" under Georgia law in 
2008 and was sentenced to five years 
probation. Because of his guilty plea, DHS 
charged Moncrieffe with being removable 
under both 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a)(2)(B) relating 
to controlled substances offenses and under 
§ 1227(a)(2) "as an aggravated felon" 
because the conviction was for a "drug 
trafficking crime" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c). DRS produced the Georgia 
judgment and charging document at the 
immigration hearing in support of its 
position. The IJ ruled that the state 
conviction was analogous to a federal felony 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and that 
Moncrieffe was thus removable as an 
aggravated felon. 
Moncrieffe appealed to the BIA arguing that 
the Georgia crime should not be considered 
an aggravated felony. Moncrieffe argued 
that GA. CODE § 16-13-30(j) punishes acts 
that are equivalent to misdemeanors under 
the CSA. Specifically, distribution of "a 
small amount of marijuana for no 
remuneration" falls under the Georgia 
provision but is only a misdemeanor under 
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(4). The charging 
document and Georgia judgment did not 
indicate how much marijuana Moncrieffe 
possessed. Because the government did not 
prove that there was remuneration or more 
than a small amount of marijuana, 
Moncrieffe argued that his conviction 
should be considered a federal 
misdemeanor. In an unpublished Fifth 
Circuit case, Jordan v. Gonzales, 204 
Fed.Appx. 425 (5th Cir. 2006), this court 
held that a conviction for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute was 
considered a federal misdemeanor under 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) in the absence of proof 
of remuneration or of more than a small 
amount of marijuana. 
The BIA was not swayed by Jordan. Under 
BIA precedent, a state conviction for 
possessing an indeterminate amount of 
marijuana with intent to distribute is 
considered an aggravated felony under the 
CSA.In re Matter of Arlma, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
452,2008 WL 512678 (BIA Feb. 26,2008). 
The BIA found no reversible error in the IJ's 
decision to follow its precedent rather than 
an unpublished, non-precedential circuit 
court opinion. Moncrieffe petitions for a 
review of the BIA decision dismissing his 
appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court has jurisdiction to review 
questions of law in petitions from the BIA. 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). We review such 
questions de novo. Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 
F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). Whether a 
prior state conviction falls within the federal 
definition of aggravated felony is also 
reviewed de novo because "[ d]etermining a 
particular federal or state crime's elements 
lies beyond the scope of the BIA's delegated 
power or accumulated expertise." Id. We 
review only the BIA decision "unless the 
U's decision has some impact on the BIA's 
decision." Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 
306 (5th Cir. 1997). Factual findings are 
reviewed for substantial evidence and are 
overturned only if "the evidence is so 
compelling that no reasonable factfinder 
could reach a contrary conclusion." Chen v. 
Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
216 
DISCUSSION 
An alien who is convicted of an "aggravated 
felony" is removable. 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). "Drug trafficking crimes" 
are considered "aggravated felonies." 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). "Drug trafficking 
crimes" include any felony punishable under 
the CSA, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), even if 
the offense is a misdemeanor under state 
law. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 
(2006) (noting that there "is no reason to 
think Congress meant to allow the States to 
supplant its own [misdemeanor/felony] 
classifications when it specifically 
constructed its immigration law to turn on 
them"). Felonies under § 924( c )(2) are those 
crimes that are punishable by more than one 
year in prison. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 56 n. 7. 
The Fifth Circuit uses a categorical approach 
to determine whether a state conviction 
qualifies as a felony under the CSA. Omari 
v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 
2005). Under the categorical approach, the 
court considers whether the elements of the 
state statute are analogous to a federal 
felony instead of looking at the underlying 
facts of the crime. Id. If a state statute is 
divisible, meaning that some conduct would 
be punished as a felony but other conduct 
only punished as a misdemeanor under the 
CSA, then some evidence of the underlying 
criminal act can be considered in the 
determination. Id. at 308. We have limited 
the government to presenting evidence 
approved in Shepard v. United States, 544 
U.S. 13 (2005), to determine whether a 
guilty plea conviction under a divisible state 
law was an aggravated felony. Omari, 419 
F.3d at 308. Acceptable evidence includes 
the "charging document, written plea 
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and 
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge 
to which the defendant assented." Shepard, 
544 U.S. at 16. 
Ordinarily, convictions for possession with 
intent to distribute are felonies under the 
CSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. A subsection of 
the provlSlon, however, provides for 
misdemeanor treatment for distribution of 
small amounts of marijuana without 
remuneration. 21 U.S.c. § 841 (b)(4). When 
a state criminal statute covers both the 
felony and misdemeanor conduct proscribed 
by § 841, the courts of appeals are split on 
whether the conviction, if lacking specifics 
of the underlying criminal conduct, should 
be treated as a felony or a misdemeanor. The 
First and Sixth Circuits hold that the default 
punishment under § 841 is a felony, while 
the Second and Third Circuits hold that the 
default punishment is a misdemeanor. In an 
unpublished opinion preceding these circuit 
cases, Jordan, 204 FedAppx. 425, this court 
held that when there was no evidence of 
how much marijuana was involved or of 
remuneration, the state conviction could not 
be considered a federal felony. Jordan, 
however, conflicts with published Fifth 
Circuit precedent construing the CSA. We 
decline to follow it and adopt the First and 
Sixth Circuits' approach. 
While acknowledging the circuit split, the 
Sixth Circuit recently ruled that the felony 
provision, not the misdemeanor sub-section 
(§ 841 (b)( 4)), is "the default provision for 
punishing possession of the drug with intent 
to distribute." Garcia, 638 F.3d at 516. The 
amount of marijuana is not, the court noted, 
an element that prosecutors must establish 
for conviction under the felony provision. 
Id. (citing United States v. Bartholomew, 
310 F.3d 912, 925 (6th Cir. 2002)). As a 
result, the misdemeanor provision "is 'best 
understood as a mitigating sentencing 
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provision' and not 'a standalone 
misdemeanor offense. '" Id. (quoting J1Iice, 
530 F.3d at 34-36). 
The Second and Third Circuits, in contrast, 
focus on the doctrine of "least culpable 
offense." Martinez, 551 F.3d 113; Je1lne, 
476 F.3d 199. The Second Circuit 
emphasized that "only the mInimUm 
criminal conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under a given statute is relevant" 
to the categorical approach. Martinez, 551 
F.3d at 118 (quoting Gertsenshteyn v. 
M1Ikasey, 544 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
Because a New York statute covered 
offenses involving only two grams of 
marijuana, the court concluded that the 
conviction at issue could possibly have been 
a non-remunerative transfer of a small 
amount of marijuana and therefore should be 
treated as a misdemeanor under § 841(b)(4). 
Jd. at 120. 
Published Fifth Circuit case law compels us 
to reject the Second Circuit's approach and 
agree with the First and Sixth Circuits. In 
United States v. Walker, 302 F.3d 322, 324 
(5th Cir. 2002), this court held that the 
default sentencing range for a marijuana 
distribution offense is the CSA's felony 
provision, § 841 (b)(1 )(D), rather than the 
misdemeanor provision. Prior to Walker, 
this cOUli held that for sentencing purposes, 
when no jury determination of drug quantity 
is available, the default punishment is a 
felony-based maximum of five years under § 
841 (b)(1 )(D). United States v. Garcia, 242 
F.3d 593, 599 (5th Cir. 2001). The First 
Circuit relied on Walker as evidence that the 
default punishment for any possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute is 
equivalent to a felony under the CSA and 
that the defendant bears the burden of 
producing mitigating evidence in order to 
qualify for misdemeanor treatment. J1Iice, 
530 F.3d at 35. We adopt the same 
interpretation of § 841 for immigration 
purposes as for sentencing purposes. United 
States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505, 
509 (5th Cir. 2001) ("We fail to see the 
validity of interpreting this statute 
differently based on this distinction between 
sentencing and immigration cases; it is, after 
all, the same words of the same phrase from 
the same statute that is being interpreted in 
each instance."), overruled on other 
gr01lnds, Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60; see also 
Lopez, 549 U.S. at 58 (concluding that 
Congress incorporated "its own statutory 
scheme of felonies and misdemeanors" in 
the immigration removal context). While 
this approach conflicts with the unpublished 
opinion in Jordan, it is important to follow 
our published Fifth Circuit sentencing cases. 
See Garcia, 638 F.3d at 517-18 (Sixth 
Circuit "declin[ing] to interpret a drug-based 
aggravated felony differently in immigration 
and criminal-sentencing contexts"). B1It see 
Martinez, 551 F.3d at 121 (Second Circuit 
acknowledges conflict between its own 
sentencing and immigration cases 
interpreting § 841). 
Based on this reading of § 841, we deny 
Moncrieffe's Petition for Review. He pled 
guilty to possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute under GA. CODE § 16-13-
30(j). Even if that section of the Georgia 
code could cover conduct that would be 
considered a misdemeanor under § 
841 (b)(4), Moncrieffe bore the burden to 
prove that he was convicted of only 
misdemeanor conduct. In re Matter of 
Aruna, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 457. Otherwise, as 
is true for federal defendants charged under 
§ 841, his crime is equivalent to a federal 
felony. The petitioner's other arguments are 
without merit. 
Petition DENIED. 
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"Supreme Court to Review Moncrieffe v. Holder" 
Bromberg, Kohler Maya & Maschler 
May 1,2012 
Jennifer Miller 
On April 2, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Comi 
granted certiorari in Moncrieffe v. Holder to 
review the judgment of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme 
Court will decide whether a conviction 
under state law that encompasses but is not 
limited to the distribution of a small amount 
of marijuana without remuneration 
constitutes a "drug trafficking crime" within 
the meaning of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as well as an "aggravated 
felony." 
In 2008, Georgia police arrested Adrian 
Moncrieffe, a Lawful Permanent Resident 
(LPR) for possessing 1.3 grams of marijuana 
(about the weight of a paperclip). Mr. 
Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to the offense of 
"Possession of Marijuana With Intent To 
Distribute," pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 16-
13-30(j)(1). This statute is not limited to a 
minimum amount of marijuana and does not 
require proof that Mr. Moncrieffe obtained 
payment in exchange for the drugs. 
In April of 2010, the Department of 
Homeland Security charged that Mr. 
Moncrieffe had been convicted in Georgia 
of an aggravated felony, which under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
subjects any noncitizen to removal 
( deportation), and initiated removal 
proceedings against him. A state law offense 
may constitute an aggravated felony if it is 
the equivalent of a felony punishable under 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(2). Under the CSA, while a person 
who possesses with intent to distribute less 
than 50 kilograms of marijuana commits a 
felony and is subject to up to five years 
imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. § 841, an offense 
involving distributing a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration is viewed as 
simple possession, a misdemeanor, id. §§ 
841 (b)( 4), 844, thus not being considered an 
aggravated felony and not triggering 
removal proceedings. 
Although it may seem that Mr. Moncrieffe 
committed a misdemeanor under the CSA 
because the amount of marijuana he 
possessed was so small, and because there 
was no evidence in the record of conviction 
that Mr. Moncrieffe's offense involved 
payment, the immigration judge held that 
Mr. Moncrieffe had committed the 
aggravated felony of drug trafficking, a 
decision upheld by the BIA and then by the 
Fifth Circuit. Despite the Court's 
recognition that the courts of appeals are 
split on whether a conviction that lacks the 
details of the criminal conduct should be 
presumed to be a felony or a misdemeanor, 
the Court did not disturb the finding that Mr. 
Moncrieffe had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony. Mr. Moncrieffe then 
filed the petition for a writ of certiorari in 
order for the Supreme Court to review the 
case. 
This case highlights discrepancies between 
state and federal immigration laws and the 
injustice that can result from these 
differences. It is unconscionable that the 
Court would deem Mr. Moncrieffe's 
possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana to be 
an aggravated felony, which would make a 
long-term LPR not only removable, but also 
ineligible for discretionary relief, 
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permanently barred from readmission to the 
U.S., ineligible for asylum, and barred from 
establishing "good moral character" for the 
rest of his life. Mr. Moncrieffe's case also 
highlights the importance of having criminal 
and immigration attorneys confer In 
reaching a plea and/or establishing the 
record of conviction. Our office awaits the 
Supreme Court's decision in this case, 
which will be argued in the fall of2012. 
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"Supreme Court to Revisit 'Aggravated Felony' Provision: Is a Crime That 
Might be a Federal Misdemeanor a Drug Trafficking Offense?" 
crimmigration 
April 2, 2012 
Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez 
Having just decided in February that two tax 
crimes constitute aggravated felonies under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
u.s. Supreme Court will again jump into the 
messy nuances of the aggravated felony 
provision in Moncrieffe v. Hohler, in which 
the court granted certiorari today. 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, No. 11-702 (see order 
granting cert). This time the Court will 
decide whether possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute comes within this broad 
category of offenses that significantly 
decreases a non-citizen's ability to remain in 
the United States. 
Last November, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that a Georgia 
convIctIOn for possessing marijuana with 
intent to distribute constitutes a drug 
trafficking type of aggravated felony. 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387, No. 10-
60826, slip op. (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) 
(Jones, Haynes, and Crone, JJ.). Chief Judge 
Jones wrote the panel's opinion. 
This case involved a lawful permanent 
resident who pleaded guilty to possessing 
marijuana with intent to distribute, Ga. Code 
§ 16-13-300). Originally, the Department of 
Homeland Security alleged that this was 
both a controlled substances offense (CSO), 
INA § 237(a)(2)(B), and a drug trafficking 
aggravated felony, INA § 101(a)(43)(B). 
Because the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BTA) only decided the aggravated felony 
issue, however, the Fifth Circuit had no need 
to address the CSO charge. Moncrieffe, No. 
10-60826, slip op. at 2. 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by 
explaining that "[ d]rug trafficking crimes' 
include any [crime that would constitute a] 
felony punishable under the CSA 
[Controlled Substances Act], see 18 U.S.c. 
§ 924( c )(2), even if the offense is a 
misdemeanor under state law." Moncrieffe, 
No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4 (citing Lopez v. 
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). In 
Lopez, the Supreme Court determined that 
while "[ m Jere possession is not ... a felony 
under the federal CSA," possession with 
intent to distribute is. Lopez, 549 U.S. at 53. 
The only exception to this rule is for 
possession with intent to distribute "small 
amount[ s]" of marijuana, which is classified 
as a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4). 
The Fifth Circuit was then left with the 
challenge of determining whether 
Moncrieffe's conviction under Georgia law 
was for conduct that fell within the 
misdemeanor or felony provision of the 
federal CSA. To do this, the court stated that 
it applied "a categorical approach to 
determine whether a state conviction 
qualifies as a felony under the CSA." 
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4. 
Despite the court's reference to a 
"categorical" analysis, it actually applied a 
modified categorical approach. The 
categorical approach allows a court to 
consider only the state statute of conviction 
in comparison with the relevant federal 
provisions, while the modified categorical 
approach allows consideration of the record 
of conviction in state court as well. Indeed, 
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it is appropriate that the Fifth Circuit applied 
a modified categorical approach because the 
Georgia statute is divisible-that is "some 
conduct would be punished as a felony," 
thus coming within the drug trafficking 
definition of aggravated felony, "but other 
conduct only punished as a misdemeanor 
under the CSA," thus not constituting a drug 
trafficking type of aggravated felony. 
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 4. 
Here, Moncrieffe's record of conviction did 
not specify the quantity of marijuana 
involved in his conviction. This fact is 
critical because "[ 0 ]rdinarily, convictions 
for possession with intent to distribute are 
felonies under the CSA," but the federal 
statute "provides for misdemeanor treatment 
for distribution of small amounts of 
marijuana without remuneration." 
Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. at 5 
(citing 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(4)). 
If Moncrieffe were convicted for possession 
of a quantity of marijuana that would 
constitute a federal misdemeanor, then his 
conviction would not be an aggravated 
felony. If, however, he were convicted for 
an amount punishable as a federal felony, 
then his conviction would be an aggravated 
felony. Even if, on remand, he is found to 
have been convicted of a CSO, which the 
Georgia offense almost certainly is, not 
falling within an aggravated felony 
provision has real consequences for his 
chance to remain in the country. An 
aggravated felony conviction would render 
him removable and ineligible for the most 
charitable form of relief from removal that 
currently exists in immigration law, 
cancellation of removal, relief that would 
still be available if his conviction is only for 
a CSO. INA § 240A(a). 
Because the record of conviction did not 
indicate the amount of marijuana involved, 
the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether 
not knowing the amount means that the 
conviction should be treated as a 
misdemeanor or felony. After recognizing a 
circuit split on this issue (with the "First and 
Sixth Circuits hold[ing] that the default 
punishment under § 841 is a felony, while 
the Second and Third Circuits hold that the 
default punishment is a misdemeanor."), the 
Fifth Circuit chose to treat the conviction as 
a felony. Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip op. 
at 5. 
Relying on the Sixth Circuit's approach, the 
Fifth Circuit determined that "the 
misdemeanor provision [of the federal 
possession with intent to distribute offense] 
'is best understood as a mitigating 
sentencing provision' and not a stand alone 
misdemeanor offense." Moncrieffe, No. 10-
60826, slip op. at 6 (quoting United States v. 
Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 925 (6th Cir. 
2002)). 
Borrowing from the comparable criminal 
sentencing context involving the same 
federal statute, the Fifth Circuit explained 
that it previously held "the default 
sentencing range for a marijuana distribution 
offense is the CSA's felony provision, § 
841 (b)(1 )(D), rather than the misdemeanor 
provision." Moncrieffe, No. 10-60826, slip 
op. at 6 (discussing United States v. Walker, 
302 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
Following this logic, the Fifth Circuit went 
on to hold that the burden is on the LPR to 
show that his conviction involved an amount 
of marijuana that would fall within the 
misdemeanor provision rather than require 
the government to show that the conviction 
involved a felony amount. In the comi's 
words, "Even if that section of the Georgia 
code could cover conduct that would be 
considered a misdemeanor under § 
841 (b)( 4), Moncrieffe bore the burden to 
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prove that he was convicted of only 
misdemeanor conduct." MoncriefJe, No. 10-
60826, slip op. at 7. The court placed the 
burden on Moncrieffe despite the INA's 
explicit provision that the government bears 
the "burden of establishing by clear and 
convincing evidence that, in the case of an 
alien who has been admitted to the United 
States, the alien is deportable." INA § 
240( c )(3). 
Thus, the Supreme Court will decide 
whether a state possession with intent to 
distribute conviction that includes 
distribution of small amounts of marijuana 
constitutes an aggravated felony 
"notwithstanding that the record of 
conviction does not establish that the alien 
was convicted of conduct that would 
constitute a federal law felony." Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, MoncriefJe v. Holder, No. 
11-702 (Dec. 7,2011). 
Attesting to the nebulous state of many 
crime-based immigration law provisions, 
today's grant follows two decisions already 
issued this Term about other aspects of the 
intersection of criminal law and immigration 
law: Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. -, No. 10-
1211, slip op. (March 28 2012), and 
Kawashimi v. Holder, 565 U.S. __ , No. 
10-577, slip op. (Feb. 21, 2012). Hovering 
above all of these cases, of course, is the 
Court's much anticipated consideration of 
Arizona v. United States, Arizona's attempt 
to revive its controversial immigration law 
(Senate Bill 1070), scheduled for oral 
argument on April 25. 
Arizona is likely to be a blockbuster 
decision, no matter what the Court decides. 
Moncrieffe won't get the media attention of 
Arizona, but it will ensure that the Court's 
efforts to make sense of Immigration law 
will continue. 
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Garcia v. Thomas 
Ruling Below: Garcia v. Benov, 395 Fed.Appx. 329 (9th Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc 
granted, Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Hedelito Trinidad y Garcia was charged in the Philippines with kidnapping for ransom. 
He was arrested by FBI agents at his residence in Los Angeles, California in 2004. 
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rica had ordered his return to the Philippines for 
prosecution, but a Federal District Court in California ruled that a transfer would violate 
his rights under the anti-torture treaty, and ordered him released. The Ninth Circuit 
initially agreed. The case went to rehearing en bane. 
Question Presented: Whether an extraditee like Trinidad may challenge the Secretary of 
State's decision to extradite him based on the conditions he expects to face upon return to 
the requesting country. 
Hedelito TRINIDAD Y GARCIA, Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
Linda THOMAS, Warden, Metropolitan Detention Center-Los Angeles, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Argued and Submitted En Bane June 23, 2012 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PER CURIAM: 
Trinidad y Garcia alleges that his extradition 
to the Philippines would violate his rights 
under the Convention Against Torture 
(CA T) and the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause. The CAT is a treaty signed 
and ratified by the United States, but is non-
self-executing. Congress, however, has 
implemented the treaty by statute as part of 
the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). 8 
U.S.C. § 1231 note. That statute declares it 
"the policy of the United States not to ... 
extradite . . . any person to a country in 
which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture." The statute 
requires that "the appropriate agencies . . . 
prescribe regulations to implement the 
obligations of the United States under 
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture." 
The appropriate agency is the Department of 
State, and it adopted regulations specifying 
that, "[i]n each case where allegations 
relating to torture are made ... , appropriate 
policy and legal offices review and analyze 
information relevant to the case in preparing 
a recommendation to the Secretary as to 
whether or not to sign the surrender 
warrant." 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(a). An extraditee 
may be surrendered only after the Secretary 
makes a determination regarding possible 
torture. lei. § 95.2-.3. 
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1. The district court had jurisdiction over the 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2241, which 
makes the writ of habeas corpus available to 
all persons "in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States," and under the Constitution. 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas 
corpus historically provides a remedy to 
non-citizens challenging executive 
detention. 
2. Neither the REAL ID Act (8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(4)) nor FARRA (8 U.S.C. § 1231 
note) repeals all federal habeas jurisdiction 
over Trinidad y Garcia's claims, as the 
govemment asselis. A statute must contain 
"a particularly clear statement" before it can 
be construed as intending to repeal habeas 
jurisdiction. Even if a sufficiently clear 
statement exists, cOUlis must determine 
whether "an altemative interpretation of the 
statute is 'fairly possible' "before 
concluding that the law actually repealed 
habeas relief. 
PARRA lacks sufficient clarity to survive 
the "patiicularly clear statement" 
requirement. The REAL ID Act can be 
construed as being confined to addressing 
final orders of removal, without affecting 
federal habeas jurisdiction. Given a 
plausible alternative statutory construction, 
we cannot conclude that the REAL ID Act 
actually repealed the remedy of habeas 
corpus. The government also suggests that 
the rule of non-inquiry precludes the 
exercise of habeas jurisdiction. But the rule 
implicates only the scope of habeas review; 
it does not affect federal habeas j1lrisdiction. 
3. The CAT and its implementing 
regulations are binding domestic law, which 
means that the Secretary of State m1lst make 
a tOliure determination before surrendering 
an extraditee who makes a CAT claim. 
PARRA and its regulations generate 
interests cognizable as liberty interests under 
the Due Process Clause, which guarantees 
that a person will not be "deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of 
law." 
4. The process due here is that prescribed by 
the statute and implementing regulation: The 
Secretary must consider an extraditee's 
torture claim and find it not "more likely 
than not" that the extraditee will face torture 
before extradition can occur. 22 C.P.R. § 
95.2. An extraditee thus possesses a narrow 
liberty interest: that the Secretary comply 
with her statutory and regulatory 
obligations. 
5. The record before us provides no 
evidence that the Secretary has complied 
with the procedure in Trinidad y Garcia's 
case. The State Department has submitted a 
generic declaration outlining the basics of 
how extradition operates at the Department 
and acknowledging the Depatiment's 
obligations under the aforementioned treaty, 
statute and regulations, but the Department 
gives no indication that it actually complied 
with those obligations in this case. 
Trinidad y Garcia's liberty interest under the 
federal statute and federal regulations 
entitles him to strict compliance by the 
Secretary of State with the procedure 
outlined in the regulations. He claims that 
the procedure has not been complied with, 
and the Constitution itself provides 
jurisdiction for Trinidad y Garcia to make 
this due process claim in federal court. 
In the absence of any evidence that the 
Secretary has complied with the regulation, 
we lack sufficient basis in the record to 
review the district cOUli's order granting 
Trinidad y Garcia's release. We remand to 
the district court so that the Secretary of 
State may augment the record by providing 
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a declaration that she has complied with her 
obligations. Counsel for the government 
represented that the Secretary would provide 
such a declaration if the court so instructs. 
We so instruct. 
6. If the district court receives such a 
declaration, it shall determine whether it has 
been signed by the Secretary or a senior 
official properly designated by the 
Secretary. If so, the court's inquiry shall 
have reached its end and Trinidad y Garcia's 
liberty interest shall be fully vindicated. His 
substantive due process claim is foreclosed 
by Muna! v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
The doctrine of separation of powers and the 
rule of non-inquiry block any inquiry into 
the substance of the Secretary's declaration. 
To the extent that we have previously 
implied greater judicial review of the 
substance of the Secretary's extradition 
decision other than compliance with her 
obligations under domestic law, we overrule 
that precedent. 
7. The district court's order is vacated, and 
the case is remanded to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
THOMAS, Circuit Judge, concurring, 
with whom WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, 
joins and BERZON, Circuit Judge, joins 
as to Part I: 
I concur in the Per Curiam opinion. I write 
separately to express my views on 
jurisdiction and the scope of our habeas 
reVIew. 
I 
The district court had jurisdiction over 
Trinidad y Garcia's claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 and the Constitution of the 
United States. 
II 
Once a federal court has completed its 
extradition determinations under 18 U.S.c. § 
3184, the Secretary of State in her discretion 
may determine whether the alien should be 
surrendered to the custody of the requesting 
state. We have long held that it is the 
Secretary's role, not the courts', to 
determine "whether extradition should be 
denied on humanitarian grounds or on 
account of the treatment that the fugitive is 
likely to receive upon his return to the 
requesting state." However, celiain aspects 
of the Secretary's decision are reviewable. 
The Convention Against Torture (CAT), as 
implemented by FARRA and State 
DepaIiment regulations, is binding domestic 
law. Before finalizing an extradition order, 
the Secretary of State has a clear and 
nondiscretionary duty pursuant to the 
implementing regulations to consider 
whether a person facing extradition from the 
U.S. "is more likely than not" to be tOliured 
in the State requesting extradition when 
determining whether to surrender a fugitive 
to a foreign country by means of extradition. 
In assessing whether the Secretary has 
complied with her statutory and regulatory 
obligations, our review differs from the 
ordinary analysis that we apply to petitions 
for review of decisions on CAT claims by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
Immigrations judges and the BIA are 
charged with deciding CAT claims on the 
evidence presented. Therefore, in reviewing 
BIA decisions, we have a developed 
administrative record before us. 
Our role in reviewing the Secretary's 
extradition determinations is far different 
because the surrender of a person to a 
foreign government is within the 
Executive's powers to conduct foreign 
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affairs and the Executive is "well situated to 
consider sensitive foreign policy issues." 
The Judiciary is "not suited to second-guess 
such determinations" because the Executive 
"possess[ es] significant diplomatic tools and 
leverage the judiciary lacks." Therefore, the 
proper separation of powers among the 
branches prevents us from inquiring into the 
merits of the Secretary's extradition 
decision. 
Although we cannot review the merits of the 
Secretary's internal extradition review, the 
Secretary's legal obligation to comply with 
the CAT, as implemented by FARRA and 
accompanying State Department regulations, 
is not a part of that review process. 
Therefore, the scope of habeas review 
allows courts to examine whether the 
Secretary has complied with her non-
discretionary obligations. This limited 
review process of simply determining that 
the Secretary has complied with the law is 
the least intrusive method of maintaining the 
delicate balance between the competing 
concerns of respecting executive prerogative 
in foreign relations and ensuring that the law 
has been followed. 
Once the district court determines that the 
Secretary has complied with her legal 
obligations, its review ends. Any further 
inquiry into the executive branch's internal 
extradition review process would exceed our 
proper role under the Separation of Powers 
doctrine. 
III 
In this case, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the Secretary has fulfilled her 
non-discretionary obligations. The 
government suggested in briefing that the 
Secretary's signature on the surrender 
warrant itself should be considered as proof 
of her determination that Trinidad y Garcia 
is not likely to be tortured. But the surrender 
warrant is not in the record. 
Trinidad y Garcia has alleged in his habeas 
petition that the Secretary has not complied 
with FARRA's implementing regulations 
and violated his right to due process. In the 
absence of any evidence that the Secretary 
has complied with the regulation, we lack 
sufficient basis in the record to review the 
district court's order granting Trinidad y 
Garcia's release. Therefore, the appropriate 
remedy is to vacate the district court order 
and remand the case to the district court with 
directions that the government may be 
afforded the opportunity to supplement the 
record with an appropriate declaration that 
the Secretary has complied with her non-
discretionary statutory and regulatory duties. 
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom 
Circuit Judges CLIFTON, M. SMITH, 
and IKUTA join, dissenting: 
A 
Trinidad raises two distinct rationales for 
why he may not be extradited. First, he 
contends that he may "invoke the writ to 
challenge the Secretary's decision to 
surrender him in violation of his substantive 
due process right to be free from torture" at 
the hands of a foreign government. 
Alternatively, he asselis that even in the 
absence of a constitutionally protected 
interest to be free from the specter of foreign 
torture, he possesses a statutory right under 
the Convention and the F ARR Act that 
precludes the United States from extraditing 
him to a country where torture is "more 
likely than not" to occur. 
Long ago, the Court established that 
extraditees may not oppose their extraditions 
on the ground that the law of the receiving 
country does not provide them the full 
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panoply of rights guaranteed them by the 
Constitution of the United States. Munaf, 
553 U.S. at 696-97 (discussing Neely). 
Trinidad's second claim is not so easily 
resolved, however. As the Court recognized 
in Valentine, the Executive does not possess 
plenary power to extradite. Accordingly, 
extradition proceedings "must be authorized 
by law" and compoti with peliinent statutory 
limits. Thus, Trinidad is correct insofar as he 
argues that we must determine whether any 
of the pertinent statutory limits on which he 
relies actually limit Executive authority 
under the relevant treaty. 
Trinidad misjudges the effect of that inquiry, 
however. Even were we to agree that either 
the Convention, the F ARR Act, or the 
regulations limit Executive authority, it does 
not necessarily follow that the scope of our 
habeas review would grow in kind. Rather, 
because the Rule of Non-Inquiry remains, 
these limits would only establish the 
concerns that might be cognizable on habeas 
review. It is only when Congress pairs a 
limitation on the Secretary's extradition 
authority with an express invitation for 
judicial review that the Rule of Non-Inquiry 
retracts to permit that review. 
The scope of our habeas review 111 the 
extradition context wholly depends on the 
will of Congress. The judiciary participates 
in the extradition process only by 
congressional invitation, and thus our power 
extends no further than the bounds of that 
invitation. When, as under the 1890 form of 
§ 5270, Congress prefers that the courts play 
a minimal role, our review is just that, 
minimal. 
1 
There are a number of indicators that 
Congress intended § 1252(a)(4) to be 
applicable only in the immigration context. 
Among other things, Congress enacted § 
1252(a)(4) as pmi of the REAL ID Act. 
And, as the House Committee Repoti 
explicitly states, Congress did not intend to 
"preclude habeas review over challenges to 
detention that are independent of challenges 
to removal orders Finally, the section title 
itself, "Judicial revIew of orders of 
removal," and the subchapter title, 
"Immigration," only further reaffirm this 
cabining of the section's effect. 
2 
Having concluded that we have habeas 
jurisdiction, I move to the first merits 
question: whether, as Trinidad contends, 
Congress actually intended to restrict the 
Executive's extradition authority via the 
Convention, the F ARR Act, or the 
implementing regulations. To resolve that 
question, I consider each in turn. 
The Convention satisfies neither condition. 
The Senate expressly conditioned its 
ratification of the Convention on the fact 
that it was "not self-executing." And, as 1 
will explain shortly, the F ARR Act did not 
implement the Convention in a manner that 
curtails the Secretary's authority to 
extradite. The Convention therefore cannot 
affect the Executive's authority under § 
3184 except to the extent directed by the 
relevant regulations. 
ii 
The F ARR Act requires greater scrutiny. In 
relevant detail, it provides: 
(a) Policy.-It shall be the policy of 
the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the 
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involuntary return of any person to a 
country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the 
person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of 
whether the person is physically 
present in the United States. 
Subsection (a) "is too thin a read to support 
the rights and obligations read into it by" 
Trinidad. It only "fits" as part of a 
"harmonious whole" with the entirety of the 
Act if interpreted as a "nudge" by Congress 
indicating Congress' "preference" that when 
implementing the mandated regulations, the 
agency heads bear in mind the general 
policy of the United States "not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary 
return of any person to a country in which 
there are substantial grounds for believing 
the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture." It does no more. 
iii 
Finally, we reach those regulations 
promulgated to implement the obligations of 
the United States under the Convention: 22 
C.F.R. §§ 95.1-95.4. 
Decisions oj the Secretary concerning 
s1lrrender oj jifgitives Jar extradition are 
matters oJexec1ltive discretion not s1lbject to 
judicial review. Furthermore, pursuant to 
section 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 
105-277, notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review these regulations, and 
nothing in section 2242 shall be construed as 
providing any court jurisdiction to consider 
or review claims raised under the 
Convention or section 2242, or any other 
determination made with respect to the 
application of the policy set f01ih in section 
2242(a), except as part of the review of a 
final order of removal pursuant to section 
242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1252), which is not applicable to 
extradition proceedings. 
In sum, neither the Convention, the F ARR 
Act, nor the implementing regulations alter 
the historically recognized discretion 
accorded to the Secretary by Congress to 
determine whether "to surrender [a] fugitive 
to the requesting State, to deny surrender of 
the fugitive, or to surrender the fugitive 
subject to conditions." 
BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom 
Judge W. FLETCHER joins: 
I begin by outlining the basic building 
blocks of Trinidad's substantive, statute-
based claim. 
First, we may grant a writ of habeas corpus 
where a prisoner is "in custody in violation 
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 
Second, Aliicle 3 of the Convention Against 
Tmiure (CAT), which entered into force for 
the United States in 1994, states: 
No State Party shall expel, return 
("reJouler") or extradite a person to 
another state where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger of being 
sUbjected to torture. 
United Nations Convention Against Torture 
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted by unanimous agreement of the 
U.N. General Assembly. 
Contrary to Judge Kozinski's assertion, 
Trinidad's claim is not that he is entitled to 
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habeas because of the treatment he is likely 
to face in the Philippines. Rather, his claim 
is a claim that because the F ARR Act 
prohibits extradition if, on the information 
available to the Secretary, he more likely 
than not will be tortured, the Secretary's 
decision to extradite him would be illegal 
under positive, Congressionally enacted 
federal law. 
Neither the Supreme COUli's decision in 
M1lna! nor the rule of non-inquiry entirely 
forecloses our ability to review the 
lawfulness of an extradition decision by the 
Executive. I would hold, therefore, that we 
have the authority-and, indeed, the 
obligation-to review the Secretary of 
State's determination and to decide-under 
a standard highly deferential to the Secretary 
and procedures carefully tailored to ensure 
the protection of the Secretary's diplomatic 
concerns-whether it is more likely than not 
that petitioners such as Trinidad will be 
tOliured if extradited. For that purpose, it 
may be that in many circumstances a 
declaration such as the one the majority 
requires will suffice. 
Chief Judge KOZINSKI, dissenting in 
part: 
1. The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
2241, simultaneously provides jurisdiction 
to hear habeas petitions and remedies for 
successful ones. Just because someone in 
custody files a document styled "habeas 
petition" doesn't mean a federal court has 
jurisdiction to entertain it. Instead, the 
petitioner must allege a type of claim 
cognizable on habeas. In the extradition 
context, habeas corpus isn't available to 
challenge just any aspect of the executive 
branch's authority an extraditee seeks to 
question. Rather, the case law-including 
our own opinion in Cornejo-Barreto v. 
Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009-10 (9th 
Cir.2000)-makes clear that an extraditee 
may raise only certain claims on habeas. 
Trinidad y Garcia fails to make out a claim 
cognizable on habeas by invoking the 
Convention Against Torture ("CAT") and 
alleging that, if extradited, he'll face tOliure 
at his destination. What's been historically 
cognizable on habeas review in the 
extradition context is (l) whether the 
executive branch has the authority to detain 
the extraditee in the first place and whether 
the judicial branch has exercised proper 
jurisdiction over him, all of which has 
already been litigated and resolved against 
Trinidad; (2) whether the executive is 
operating under a valid treaty authorizing 
extradition, which isn't disputed here; and 
(3) whether the extraditee's crime falls into 
the political offense exception, which 
Trinidad doesn't allege. 
There's absolutely no authority suppOliing 
Trinidad's claim that habeas review is 
available to challenge the destination to 
which a detainee is to be extradited based on 
how he might be treated there. He therefore 
fails to present a claim for which the federal 
habeas statute provides jurisdiction. 
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), on 
which my colleagues rely heavily in their 
various opinions, stands in marked contrast. 
St. Cyr challenged the executive's authority 
to continue to detain and then deport him 
The Court found abundant historical 
evidence that such a challenge was 
traditionally cognizable on habeas review. 
Also in contrast is M1lna! v. Geren, 553 U.S. 
674 (2008), where the Supreme Court found 
habeas jurisdiction to consider a challenge to 
petitioners' transfer based on the treatment 
they'd receive, then rejected that challenge 
on the merits. The only claims entertained in 
Muna! were constitutional ones. And M1lna! 
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does not suggest there's statutory habeas 
jurisdiction for claims of this kind. 
There's thus no need to assess the effect of 
the FARR Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1231 note, or the 
REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). Both 
statutes explicitly disavow any 
congressional intent to create jurisdiction for 
review of CAT claims outside a limited 
immigration context. 
St. Cyr urged against "adopting a [ statutory] 
construction that would raise serious 
constitutional questions" by "preclud[ing] 
judicial consideration on habeas," but 
recognizing our lack of jurisdiction here 
does no such thing. A serious constitutional 
question would arise only if we interpreted a 
statute to preclude the type of habeas review 
protected by the Constitution's Suspension 
Clause. But, unlike St. Cyr, Trinidad doesn't 
present a claim implicating this type of 
habeas review, because his claim isn't 
cognizable on habeas. How Trinidad will be 
treated by the government of another 
country after he leaves the United States 
doesn't implicate any of his rights under the 
United States Constitution. In finding his 
challenge outside the bounds of the federal 
habeas statute, there's no judicial 
consideration to "preclude" and thus no 
constitutional problem to "avoid." 
The per curiam thus rightly overrules 
Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F .3d at 1015-16, 
which held in the context of a CAT 
challenge to extradition that, "since potential 
extraditees meet the other requirements for 
habeas standing under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(2000), a habeas petition is the most 
appropriate form of action for fugitives 
seeking review ofthe Secretary's extradition 
decisions." Cornejo-Barreto somehow 
found jurisdiction in the federal habeas 
statute via the Administrative Procedure Act 
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 703. But, as Cornejo-
Barreto itself acknowledged, "[t]he APA is 
not an independent grant of jurisdiction." 
Because there's no jurisdiction under the 
habeas statute, there can be no jurisdiction 
under the AP A. 
While, as in MlInaf, we have jurisdiction to 
hear Trinidad's due process claim, I agree 
with the per curiam that the claim is 
foreclosed by MlInaf itself, which found that 
identical claims in the transfer context "do 
not state grounds upon which habeas relief 
may be granted." 
2. The per curiam offers little explanation 
for finding jurisdiction to entertain 
Trinidad's CA T claim, instead simply 
asserting that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus 
historically provide[ d] a remedy to non-
citizens challenging executive detention." 
This characterizes Trinidad's claim at too 
high a level of generality and therefore 
conflate Trinidad's particular claim with 
other claims that are cognizable on habeas 
review in the extradition context. Trinidad, 
in fact, challenges something very specific: 
the destination to which the executive seeks 
to extradite him, based on his potential 
treatment there. As the Second Circuit has 
explained, "consideration of the procedures 
that will or may occur in the requesting 
country is not within the purview of a 
habeas corpus judge." That leaves Trinidad 
beyond the scope of habeas review-and, 
because the federal habeas statute predicates 
the exercise of habeas jurisdiction on the 
existence of a cognizable habeas claim, that 
also leaves Trinidad beyond the scope of our 
habeas jurisdiction. 
Statiing from a mistaken characterization of 
Trinidad's claim leads my colleagues to an 
equally mistaken conclusion about the role 
of the F ARR and REAL ID Acts. Because 
they erroneously view habeas jurisdiction 
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over Trinidad's claim as preexIstmg and 
presupposed, they ask the wrong question: 
whether these statutes have clearly 
"preclude [ d]" or "repeal [ed]" such 
jurisdiction. 
Consider In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 
176 (1847). After receiving an extradition 
request, the President referred it to a district 
judge, who approved Metzger's extradition. 
Metzger then filed a habeas petition with the 
Supreme Court. The Court found that it had 
no jurisdiction to grant habeas relief. Its 
reasoning was somewhat technical-the 
district judge had been acting in chambers 
rather than exercising Article III judicial 
power-but the result is instructive for our 
case: The Court saw no constitutional 
problem whatsoever in finding the absence 
of any jurisdiction, whether appellate or 
original, over Metzger's habeas petition 
challenging his extradition. That's because 
extraditees have no free-floating right to 
challenge their extradition via habeas 
petition. If an extraditee isn't challenging 
one of the few issues deemed by Congress to 
be suitable for judicial inspection, a federal 
court lacks jurisdiction over the challenge-
and that raises no constitutional problem. 
3. I note the thoughtful views of our 
colleague on the D.C. Circuit, Judge 
Griffith, on similar issues that have 
confronted his cOUli. Starting in Kiyemba v. 
Obama (Kiyemba 11), 561 F.3d 509 
(D.C.Cir.2009), Judge Griffith has asserted 
in the context of detainee transfers "that 
jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims 
against unlawful transfer-a fundamental 
and historic habeas protection-is grounded 
in the Constitution." What concerned Judge 
Griffith in Kiyemba 11 was very different 
from what's before our court: He addressed 
whether the transfer of the prisoners "will 
result in continued detention on behalf of the 
United States in a place where the writ does 
not run." Judge Griffith's concern that the 
United States would maintain control over 
the prisoners while evading judicial review 
doesn't apply to our case, where the United 
States seeks to extradite Trinidad and 
relinquish all control over him. Trinidad 
doesn't allege otherwise-indeed, his 
motivating concern is precisely that he'll be 
mistreated once he's no longer in American 
custody and instead in Filipino hands. 
Judge Griffith expanded on his earlier 
position with his dissental in Abdah v. 
Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C.Cir.2011). In 
suppOli of his assertion of "the long-
established right of a prisoner to question his 
jailer's authority to transfer him to a place 
where it would be difficult or impossible to 
execute the writ," Judge Griffith provides 
the history of habeas challenges to the 
executive transferring a prisoner beyond the 
writ's reach in order to evade habeas 
jurisdiction. None of his examples, however, 
involves extradition, in which the executive 
transfers a prisoner abroad, not to evade 
habeas review, but to deliver him pursuant 
to an extradition treaty to a country seeking 
to prosecute him for crimes he allegedly 
committed there. Judge Griffith's examples 
of American colonial state laws demonstrate 
an extradition exception to the general 
prohibition on transfers and, accordingly, an 
exception to the reviewability of such 
transfers via habeas petition. 
Most recently, Judge Griffith concurred in 
Omar, 646 F.3d 13, 646 F.3d 13, where he 
"disagree[ d] with the majority's suggestion 
that we have no jurisdiction to consider [the 
transferee's] claim" because "the 
Constitution's guarantee of habeas corpus 
entitles him to asseli any claim that his 
detention or transfer is unlawful." Judge 
Griffith thus finds constitutional habeas 
jurisdiction to hear CAT claims. But his 
assertion that there's constitutional habeas 
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jurisdiction for "any claim" of unlawful 
detention or transfer suffers from the same 
flaw that afflicts the analysis of Judges 
Thomas and Tallman here: It's too broad. 
Centuries of extradition case law have 
carved out the specific types of challenges 
an extraditee may raise on habeas review. 
To sayan extraditee can find jurisdiction in 
the federal habeas statute to raise "any 
claim" would be a radical departure from 
those centuries of unbroken precedent. 
4. While federal habeas jurisdiction IS 
enshrined in a federal statute, the writ of 
habeas corpus remains a common law writ. 
And, like all creatures of the common law, it 
can and should evolve over time. What 
yesterday may have failed to qualify as a 
cause of action seeking habeas relief may 
qualify tomorrow. Because, in the habeas 
context, a cause of action and the 
jurisdiction to hear it are inextricably linked, 
federal habeas jurisdiction also can evolve 
through common law decision-making. 
This raises the question: Even if habeas 
jurisdiction has never before included the 
type of claim Trinidad raises, why not start 
today? That is, why shouldn't we embrace 
the evolution of habeas review so as to 
encompass a claim that challenges 
extradition on the basis of the conditions the 
extraditee may face in the receiving 
country? 
I'm a firm believer in robust federal habeas 
review where it's appropriate. But the 
federal habeas statute is not an open-ended 
invitation for federal judges to join the party 
whenever they're invited by someone who 
happens to be "in custody." 28 U.S.c. § 
2241(c), (d). Petitioning for the Great Writ, 
like filing most lawsuits, requires a 
cognizable cause of action. Exercising 
federal jurisdiction to hear a habeas petition 
requires the same. Centuries of case law 
show that Trinidad fails to present such a 
claim, and my colleagues show why there's 
wisdom in that practice. They simply fail to 
take that teaching to its logical conclusion. I 
therefore dissent as to Trinidad's CAT 
claim, and would order the district court to 
dismiss that claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
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"MunafSequel on Way to Court" 
SCOTUSblog 
July 9,2012 
Lyle Denniston 
A Philippine national who fears he will be 
tortured if he is returned to his home country 
will be asking the Supreme Court this 
summer to hear his challenge-a case that 
would put before the Justices a major test of 
what they meant in the unanimous decision 
in Munaf v. Geren four years ago. The 
Ninth Circuit COUli has blocked his transfer 
for 90 days to allow his lawyers to file at the 
Supreme Court. 
The case involves Hedelito Trinidad y 
Garcia, who has been charged in the 
Philippines with kidnapping for ransom. 
His lawyers submitted evidence to the Ninth 
Circuit when his extradition was under 
review that five other men accused in the 
same criminal case have been tortured by 
Philippine officials. The Circuit Court also 
accepted a State Department report asseliing 
that torture is common among the security 
forces and police in that country. His 
attorneys are relying upon a 1984 treaty, the 
Convention Against Torture, that has been 
in force in the U.S. since 1994. 
While the Circuit Court has allowed 
Trinidad y Garcia's attorneys to put before 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton their best 
case for barring his extradition under that 
treaty, the decision actually leaves Clinton 
almost complete discretion to turn down the 
plea. All she needs to do is to file with a 
District Court judge a formal paper saying 
that she has done her legal duty to weigh his 
claim, that she has considered his evidence, 
and that she had made a ruling. Justice 
Department attorneys told the Circuit COUli 
that Clinton would do just that when the 
case got back to her. Under the Circuit 
Court ruling, the federal judge has no 
authority to inquire in any way into whether 
the Secretary's decision was justified or 
satisfied the anti-torture treaty. That is the 
conclusion that his attorneys will be 
challenging in their forthcoming plea to the 
Supreme COUli. 
The Circuit Court decision is based in large 
part on the 2008 Munaf decision, which was 
not an extradition case, as such. Rather, it 
involved a request by the government of 
Iraq to turn over to its custody, for criminal 
prosecution, two U.S. citizens who were 
being held by the U.S. military in Iraq. 
They had been accused of violating Iraq's 
criminal laws and were wanted for trial 
there. The Supreme Court concluded that, 
while a U.S. court had the authority to hear 
the challenge by the two citizens to being 
handed over, an American judge had no 
authority to second-guess the validity of 
Iraq's planned prosecution. 
The Supreme Court decided the MlIna! case 
on the same day in June 2008 that it decided 
the more famous case of BOll1nediene v. 
Blish, giving detainees at Guantanamo Bay a 
constitutional right to challenge their 
captivity in a U.S. habeas court. That 
decision far overshadowed Muna! when the 
two rulings came out. Since then, however, 
MlIna! has turned out to have more staying 
power, and, in fact, a considerable capacity 
to expand in scope. It has been used to bar 
habeas judges from second-guessing U.S. 
decisions on when a detainee may leave 
Guantanamo, and now, in the Trinidad y 
Garcia case, to bar a federal judge from 
second-guessing the Secretary of State's 
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rulings on when to allow an accused non-
citizen to be sent home even in the face of a 
claim of potential torture. In the meantime, 
the D.C. Circuit Court has taken away much 
of the meaning of Boumediene, leaving 
federal habeas judges with only a kind of 
advisory role to the Executive Branch on 
when a detainee at Guantanamo is being 
lawfully held, and with no power to order 
directly that a detainee be released in the 
face of Executive Branch objection. 
In the Philippine extradition case, former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had 
ordered his return for prosecution, but a 
federal District judge ruled that a transfer 
would violate his rights under the anti-
torture treaty, and ordered him released. 
The Ninth Circuit initially agreed in a three-
judge panel decision, but then the en bane 
Circuit Court, dividing 8-3, overturned the 
release order, and directed that the case go 
to Clinton, the current Secretary, for final 
action. 
In asking the Ninth Circuit for a stay, 
Trinidad y Garcia's attorneys argued that his 
case "involves critical issues regarding the 
ability of a person facing torture to obtain 
meaningful judicial review." They added 
that the Circuit COUli ruling "addresses 
separation of powers concerns and the 
availability of 'the Great Writ' and 
undoubtedly presents an impOliant question 
of federal law." 
The stay motion also noted that three 
Supreme Court Justices, in a dissent in a 
Guantanamo transfer case involving a 
detainee who had a fear of being tOliured if 
sent abroad, that such a dispute raised 
"impOliant questions" about what the Muna! 
precedent meant for habeas corpus law, 
issues that the Supreme Court had not 
resolved in Muna! itself. Those three were 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was 
joined in dissent by Justices Stephen G. 
Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. 
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"DoJ to Seek Extradition of No.3 Kidnapper" 
The Philippine Star 
October 12, 2004 
Aurea Calica 
The government will seek the extradition of 
Hedelito Trinidad, the country's No.3 most 
wanted kidnapper, who was arrested in the 
u.s. last week, Justice Secretary Raul 
Gonzalez said yesterday. 
Gonzalez said he has asked the Department 
of Foreign Affairs to cancel the passport of 
Trinidad and put him under the watchlist of 
the Bureau of Immigration. 
The DOJ chief said he has also asked the 
Philippine consulate in Los Angeles to 
coordinate with the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for the early return of 
Trinidad. 
He said the DO] would prepare the 
extradition request to be sent to the US 
government. 
Trinidad, a dentist, allegedly financed 
kidnap gangs in the country and had an 
P850,000 bounty on his head. 
He was arrested by the FBI agents at his 
residence in West Covina near Los Angeles, 
California on Thursday. 
Officials of the Department of the Interior 
and Local Government said Trinidad was 
arrested while trying to sell a van to an FBI 
agent who posed as buyer. 
The National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force 
(Naktf) and the FBI had been working since 
March to capture Trinidad. 
They got a break last month after members 
of the Filipino community in West Covina 
told them their prey was engaged in the 
vehicle buy-and-sell business in the area as a 
cover, officials said. 
Trinidad did not resist arrest when five FBI 
agents went on Thursday to his Los Angeles 
home pretending to buy his van. 
Philippine National Police (PNP) chief 
Director General Edgar Aglipay said 
Trinidad was this year's biggest catch in the 
government's anti-kidnapping effOlis. 
Several Philippine cOUlis issued arrest 
warrants for Trinidad, who is the alleged 
mastermind of six kidnappings in 2001 
alone, Aglipay said. 
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"Why the 'Munaf Sequels' Matter: A Primer on FARRA, REAL ID, and 
The Role of the Courts in Transfer/Extradition Cases" 
Lal1jare 
June 12,2012 
Steve Vladeck 
Yesterday's news out of the Supreme Court 
may well have obscured another significant 
detainee-related legal development: As Lyle 
Denniston has noted over at SCOTUSblog, 
on Friday, the en banc Ninth Circuit handed 
down a thoroughly fractured decision in 
Garcia v. Thomas, a complicated 
extradition-related habeas case raising the 
question whether courts may inquire into 
Executive Branch assurances that an 
individual facing extradition will not be 
tortured or otherwise mistreated by the 
country to which his extradition is being 
sought. To make a (as we'll see, very) long 
story short, the Court of Appeals held that, 
while the federal courts have j1lrisdiction to 
entertain such habeas claims, they may not 
provide relief so long as the Secretary of 
State complies with her statutory and 
regulatory obligations, i.e., she avers that it 
is not "more likely than not" that the 
detainee in question will be tortured 
subsequent to his transfer. In other words, 
merely by filing a piece of paper, the 
Executive Branch can make these cases go 
away, albeit on the merits. 
In the process, the Ninth Circuit 
simultaneously (1) embraced the D.C. 
Circuit's logic in "Kiyemba 11," which so 
held in the context of the Uighurs; (2) 
thereby compounded the Kiyemba 11 panel's 
(in my view, egregious) misreading of the 
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in M1Ina! v. 
Geren in applying it to an entirely ordinary 
extradition case; and (3) created a circuit 
split with a different D.C. Circuit opinion 
("Omar 11"), which had held that the REAL 
ID Act of 2005 divested the federal coutis of 
jurisdiction in such cases. Even without 
trying to count the votes from the 110 pages 
worth of concurring and dissenting opinions 
in Garcia, I think it's safe to say that the 
Ninth Circuit has only made a complicated 
legal issue that much murkier, and it may 
well be time for the Supreme Court to pay 
attention ... Below the fold, I try to explain 
how the pieces all unfold (with my 
apologies in advance for the preposterous 
length; my hope is to bring some clarity to 
the complexity). 
I. CAT and FARRA 
What's behind all of these cases is the U.N. 
Convention Against TOliure (CAT), Article 
3 of which provides that "No State Party 
shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a 
person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to 
tOliure." There are no exceptions to Article 
3's "nonrefoulment" principle, and there is 
substantial authority for the proposition that 
nonrefoulment is itself a "jus cogens" norm 
of customary international law. Regardless, 
although the United States has taken the 
position that CAT is non-self-executing, we 
implemented most of our obligations under 
CAT (including Article 3's "nonrefoulment" 
mandate) through the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 
(FARRA), which provides that "It shall be 
the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary 
return of any person to a country in which 
there are substantial grounds for believing 
the person would be in danger of being 
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subjected to torture, regardless of whether 
the person is physically present in the 
United States." 
Although there is therefore no question that 
non-citizens in removal proceedings may 
invoke F ARRA/CA T defensively as a basis 
for relief from deportation, the harder 
question is whether FARRA may be 
enforced offensively in civil litigation, 
especially habeas, by those who can't raise a 
F ARRA/CA T claim in a removal 
proceeding (including individuals facing 
extradition and military transfer, as opposed 
to deportation). This issue is complicated by 
section 2242( d) of FARRA, which provides 
that "nothing in this section shall be 
construed as providing any court jurisdiction 
to consider or review claims raised under the 
Convention or this section, . . . except as 
part of the review of a final order of removal 
pursuant to [the immigration laws]." 
Importantly, though, that FARRA doesn't 
provide jurisdiction should not matter in 
habeas cases, since a different federal statute 
already confers power upon the federal 
courts in such cases so long as the petitioner 
claims detention "in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States." The question is whether FARRA 
takes avvay habeas jurisdiction over 
F ARRAICAT claims. And at least initially, 
every circuit court to reach the issue 
answered that question in the negative, 
holding that nothing in FARRA provided the 
kind of "clear statement" that the Supreme 
Court's St. Cyr decision required to find that 
Congress meant to take away habeas 
jurisdiction. Thus, at least until 2005, it was 
settled that U.S. detainees facing transfer 
or extradition (or non-citizens facing 
removal who couldn't pursue relief in 
immigration proceedings) could raise 
FARRA/CAT as a basis for habeas relief, 
and numerous litigants did so. 
II. The REAL ID Act of 2005 
As part of the judicial review provisions of 
the REAL ID Act of 2005, the purpose of 
which was to streamline judicial review in 
immigration cases, Congress enacted new 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4): 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 
2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus 
provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of 
such title, a petition for review filed with an 
appropriate court of appeals in accordance 
with this section shall be the sole and 
exclusive means for judicial review of any 
cause or claim under the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other 
Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, except as 
provided in subsection (e) of this section. 
Because the point of REAL ID was to 
channel review of immigration claims into 
the direct review process, it is thoroughly 
unlikely that Congress thereby intended to 
take away all jurisdiction in cases in which 
such review was unavailable (e.g., detainee 
transfer and extradition cases). Put another 
way, it seems difficult to read a provision 
designed to deal only with immigration 
cases as also applying to claims that could 
never arise in deportation proceedings. 
Nevertheless, the categorical language of 
REAL ID does appear to satisfy St. Cyr's 
"clear statement" requirement, and thereby 
raises a constitutional question about 
whether the Suspension Clause protects the 
ability of individuals facing transfer or 
extradition to challenge their transfer or 
extradition via habeas .... 
III. Munafv. Geren 
Ironically, that constitutional question went 
wholly unaddressed by the Supreme Court 
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in its 2008 decision in M1Ina! v. Geren-
which raised the substantive question of 
what, exactly, federal courts reviewed m 
cases in which an individual objected to 
their potential transfer based on torture. 
Writing for a unanimous COUli, Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested that, although the 
Court clearly had jurisdiction over a claim 
brought by two u.s. citizens detained in 
Iraq, the merits were settled by the State 
Department's assurance that the two 
detainees would not be tortured in Iraqi 
custody. As he explained, 
Petitioners here allege only the possibility of 
mistreatment in a prison facility; this is not a 
more extreme case in which the Executive 
has determined that a detainee is likely to be 
tortured but decides to transfer him anyway. 
... In these cases the United States explains 
that, although it remains concerned about 
torture among some sectors of the Iraqi 
Government, the State Department has 
determined that the Justice Ministry-the 
department that would have authority over 
Munaf and Omar-as well as its prison and 
detention facilities have " 'generally met 
internationally accepted standards for basic 
prisoner needs. '" ... 
The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess 
such determinations-determinations that 
would require federal courts to pass 
judgment on foreign justice systems and 
undermine the Government's ability to 
speak with one voice in this area. 
Although the Chief's opmlOn thereby 
seemed to suggest that there was nothing for 
courts to do in such cases once the 
Executive Branch made the relevant 
assurance, there were two critical caveats: 
First, as he noted, "this is not a more 
extreme case in which the Executive has 
determined that a detainee is likely to be 
tortured but decides to transfer him 
anyway." (As Justice Souter noted in his 
concurrence, "I would extend the caveat to a 
case in which the probability of torture is 
well documented, even if the Executive fails 
to acknowledge it"). Second, the Court 
specifically sidestepped the possibility that 
FARRA might require relief in such cases 
notwithstanding the Executive Branch's 
assurance. As the Chief explained, "Neither 
petitioner asserted a F ARR Act claim in his 
petition for habeas, and the Act was not 
raised in any of the certiorari filings before 
this Court. ... Under such circumstances we 
will not consider the question." (In a 
footnote, the Chief raised two potential 
shortcomings with a FARRA claim in that 
case, but didn't resolve either of them.) In 
other words, Mlinafrequired deference to 
the Executive Branch, but did not address 
whether such deference could ever be 
overcome, whether in a case where the 
detainee's claim arose under FARRA or 
otherwise. 
IV. Kiyemba II 
This is where we finally get to the 
Guantanamo litigation. In Kiyemba ll, the 
Uighurs detained at Guantanamo filed suit 
seeking notice and a hearing before their 
transfer to a third-party country, in order to 
ensure an opportunity to contest that transfer 
on the ground that they credibly feared 
tOliure. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit 
held that M1Ina! pretermitted such claims, in 
light of the government's blanket (and not 
country-specific assurance) that it doesn't 
transfer to torture. I've previously explained 
in some detail why, as Judge Griffith 
explained in his partial concurrence / paliial 
dissent, this result simply doesn't follow 
from M1Ina/, including that (I) unlike in 
M1Ina/, the government's assurance didn't 
address the conditions in a specific country; 
(2) Muna! didn't deal with claims arising 
under FARRA; and (3) MlI1uif itself wasn't 
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categorical (as noted above), leaving open 
the possibility that the detainee might 
introduce evidence contradicting the 
government's own conclusion. 
For present purposes, the relevant point is 
that the D.C. Circuit's rationale went to the 
merits: the misreading of M1lna! aside, 
Judge Ginsburg's logic was that the 
government's assurances foreclosed relief, 
not that the courts were otherwise powerless 
to intervene. The D.C. Circuit declined to 
revisit that conclusion by a 6-3 vote, and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari (although 
in a related case, Justice Ginsburg noted for 
herself and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor 
that they would have granted a stay of a 
detainee's involuntary repatriation to 
Algeria "to afford the Court time to 
consider, in the ordinary course, important 
questions raised in this case and not resolved 
in Munaf." 
V.OmarII 
Okay. So far, we've introduced the statutory 
background, M1Inaj, and the D.C. Circuit's 
perversion thereof in Kiyemba ll. In one 
sense, that's all one needs to understand 
Friday's decision in Garcia, because the 
heart of the en bane Ninth Circuit's per 
curiam opinion is its agreement with 
Kiyemba ll-the courts have jurisdiction, 
but once the Secretary of State makes the 
relevant promises, that's the end of the 
matter. But earlier this summer, the D.C. 
Circuit went one significant step further, and 
here the Ninth Circuit has now created a 
circuit split: 
In "Omar 11," which is the case of the 
other detainee in M1Ina! on remand from the 
Supreme Comi, Judge Kavanaugh wrote for 
a divided panel (the same panel that decided 
Kiyemba II) that the REAL ID Act does in 
fact divest the federal courts of habeas 
jurisdiction over CAT/F ARRA claims, and 
that, in the process, it does not violate the 
Suspension Clause. I won't rehash here my 
detailed series of posts on why Omar 11 fails 
to persuade. For present purposes, the 
relevant point is that on this point, the Ninth 
Circuit has now created a circuit split. 
Here's what the per curiam opinion in 
Garcia says: 
Neither the REAL IO Act nor 
FARRA repeals all federal habeas 
jurisdiction over Trinidad y Garcia's 
claims, as the government asserts. A 
statute must contain "a particularly 
clear statement" before it can be 
construed as intending to repeal 
habeas jurisdiction. Even if a 
sufficiently clear statement exists, 
courts must determine whether "an 
alternative interpretation of the 
statute is 'fairly 
possible'" before concluding that the 
law actually repealed habeas relief. 
FARRA lacks sufficient clarity to 
survive the "paliicularly clear 
statement" requirement. The REAL 
ID Act can be construed as being 
confined to addressing final orders of 
removal, without affecting federal 
habeas jurisdiction. Given a 
plausible alternative statutory 
construction, we cannot conclude 
that the REAL 10 Act actually 
repealed the remedy of habeas 
corpus. 
Thus, Garcia does two very different things: 
(1) it endorses Kiyemba II's misreading of 
M1lna! as categorically foreclosing on the 
merits CA T/F ARRA claims in cases in 
which the Executive Branch promises that 
the detainee will not be transferred to 
torture; and (2) it rejects Omar II's holding 
that the REAL ID Act deprives the federal 
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courts of jurisdiction in such cases (and 
thereby sidesteps the constitutional question 
that Dmar II resolved). 
VI. Taking Stock 
If you've made it this far, congratulations! 
You may be wondering why all of this 
matters .... Let me suggest two reasons: 
1. The law governing detainee transfers is 
going to continue to matter at least until and 
unless we're no longer holding individuals 
in military detention at Guantanamo or 
inside the United States. To that end, 
understanding whether courts may hear such 
claims on the merits, and what the 
appropriate standard is, is a pretty big deal-
and there's now arguably a circuit split on 
the subject. Ultimately, whatever the right 
answers are (is there jurisdiction? can 
detainees attempt to rebut the government's 
assurances?), clarity would be useful. 
2. Reasonable people may disagree with me 
(and Judge Griffith) that Kiyemba II badly 
misreads Muna! But assume for the moment 
that we're right-and that it does. One could 
possibly have dismissed Kiyemba II as a 
Guantanamo-specific decision, and therefore 
one that could largely be ignored going 
forward. The Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Garcia converts Kiyemba II into generally 
applicable law that will prevent litigants in 
even totally conventional extradition cases 
from attempting to vindicate claims under 
F ARRAICA T (at least so long as it is 
official U.S. policy not to transfer to 
tOliure), and may therefore put the United 
States in violation of its obligations under 
CAT. To the extent that this is not what the 
Justices had in mind in M1fna/(or Congress 
in the REAL ID Act), this is a pretty big 
deal. .. 
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"Blocking Parts of Arizona Law, 
Justices Allow Its Centerpiece" 
New York Times 
June 25, 2012 
Adam Liptak 
The Supreme Com1 on Monday delivered a 
split decision on Arizona's tough 2010 
immigration law, upholding its most hotly 
debated provision but blocking others on the 
grounds that they interfered with the federal 
government's role in setting immigration 
policy. The court unanimously sustained the 
law's centerpiece, the one critics have called 
its "show me your papers" provision, though 
they left the door open to further challenges. 
The prOVISIOn reqmres state law 
enforcement officials to determine the 
immigration status of anyone they stop or 
arrest if they have reason to suspect that the 
individual might be in the country illegally. 
The justices parted ways on three other 
provisions, with the majority rejecting 
measures that would have subjected illegal 
immigrants to criminal penalties for 
activities like seeking work. 
The ruling is likely to set the ground rules 
for the immigration debate, with supporters 
of the Arizona law pushing for "show me 
your papers" provisions in more states and 
opponents trying to overturn criminal 
sanctions for illegal immigrants. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy said, "Arizona may have 
understandable frustrations with the 
problems caused by illegal immigration 
while that process continues, but the state 
may not pursue policies that undermine 
federal law." 
Justice Antonin Scalia summarized his 
dissent from the bench, a rare move that 
indicated his deep disagreement. Rarer still, 
he criticized a policy that was not before the 
court: President Obama's recent 
announcement that his administration would 
not deport many illegal immigrants who 
came to the United States as children. 
Justice Scalia's point was a naITOW one-
that the states should have the right to make 
immigration policy if the federal 
government is not enforcing its own 
policies-but it continued a charged back 
and forth between the conservative justices 
and Mr. Obama. In his 2010 State of the 
Union address, Mr. Obama criticized the 
court's Citizens United campaign finance 
ruling, which the court reiterated in a 
separate ruling on Monday. 
The court also announced that it was 
extending its term until Thursday, signaling 
that it would issue its much-anticipated 
ruling on Mr. Obama's health care law then. 
Both Mr. Obama and Mitt Romney, the 
presumptive Republican presidential 
nominee, quickly responded to the 
immigration ruling. Mr. Romney-traveling, 
by coincidence, in Arizona-said in a brief 
statement that states had the right and the 
duty to secure their borders. 
Mr. Obama emphasized his concern that the 
remaining provision could lead to racial 
profiling, an issue that the court may yet 
consider in a future case. "No American 
should ever live under a cloud of suspicion 
just because of what they look like," Mr. 
Obama said in a statement, adding that he 
was "pleased" about the parts that were 
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stlUck down. 
In her own statement, Gov. Jan Brewer of 
Arizona, a Republican, said she welcomed 
the decision to uphold what she called the 
heart of the law. The decision, she said, was 
a "victory for the lUle of law" and for "the 
inherent right and responsibility of states to 
defend their citizens." 
Still, the lUling was a partial rebuke to state 
officials who had argued that they were 
entitled to supplement federal eff011s to 
address illegal immigration. 
The Obama administration argued that 
federal immigration law trumped-or pre-
empted, in legal jargon-the state's efforts. 
Last year, the United States C0U11 of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San 
Francisco, blocked the four provisions on 
those grounds, including the one the 
Supreme C0U11 upheld. 
In its challenge, the administration did not 
argue that it violated equal-protection 
principles. At the Supreme C0U11 argument 
in April, Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli Jr. acknowledged that the federal 
case was not based on racial or ethnic 
profiling. 
In the majority OpInIOn, Justice Kennedy 
wrote that the lUling did not foreclose other 
"constitutional challenges to the law as 
interpreted and applied after it goes into 
effect." 
Meanwhile, Attorney General Eric H. 
Holder Jr. said on Monday that the federal 
government would "continue to vigorously 
enforce federal prohibitions against racial 
and ethnic discrimination." 
Five other states have enacted tough 
measures to stem illegal immigration, more 
or less patterned after the Arizona law: 
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina 
and Utah. But most states avoided creating 
new crimes for immigration violations, as 
Arizona did in two provisions that were 
struck down. 
Lower courts have stayed the carrying out of 
parts of those laws, and they will now revisit 
those decisions. 
In upholding the requirement that the police 
ask to see people's papers, the court 
emphasized that state law enforcement 
officials already possessed the discretion to 
ask about immigration status. The Arizona 
law merely makes that inquiry mandatory if 
the police have reason to suspect a person is 
an illegal immigrant. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. called the administration's attack 
on the provision "quite remarkable." 
"The United States suggests," he wrote, 
"that a state law may be pre-empted, not 
because it conflicts with a federal statute or 
regulation, but because it is inconsistent 
with a federal agency's current enforcement 
priorities. " 
Justice Kennedy added that the state law 
contained safeguards, including ones 
instlUcting officials not to consider race or 
national origin unless already permitted by 
law. 
Further restricting the sweep of the majority 
OpInIOn, Justice Kennedy wrote that 
"detaining individuals solely to verify their 
immigration status would raise 
constitutional concerns." The decision left 
open, he said, "whether reasonable suspicion 
of illegal entry or other immigration crime 
would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a 
detention, or whether this too would be pre-
243 
empted by federal law." 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. 
Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined Justice 
Kennedy's majority opinion. Justice Elena 
Kagan disqualified herself from the case, 
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 
presumably because she had worked on it as 
the solicitor general. 
Had the case ended in a 4-to-4 tie, the 
appeals court's ruling blocking all four 
aspects of the Arizona law would have 
stood. 
Three justices dissented in part, each writing 
separately and only for himself. Justices 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas said they would 
have sustained all three of the blocked 
provisions. Justice Alito would have 
sustained two of them while overturning one 
that makes it a crime under state law for 
immigrants to fail to register with the federal 
government. 
The two other prOVisiOns blocked by the 
majority were one making it a crime for 
illegal immigrants to work or to try find 
work and another allowing the police to 
arrest people without warrants if they have 
probable cause to believe they have done 
things that would make them deportable 
under federal law. 
Scholars who have followed the work of the 
court for decades said they could not recall 
an instance similar to Justice Scalia's 
commentary on a political dispute outside 
the record of the case under consideration. 
"After this case was argued and while it was 
under consideration," Justice Scalia said in 
his written dissent, "the secretary of 
homeland security announced a program 
exempting from immigration enforcement 
some 1.4 million illegal immigrants." This 
month, the Obama administration said it 
would let younger immigrants-the 
administration estimates the number at 
800,000-who came to the United States as 
children avoid deportation and receive 
working papers as long as they are not over 
the age of 30 and have clean criminal 
records, among other conditions. 
"The president said at a news conference 
that the new program is 'the right thing to 
do' in light of Congress's failure to pass the 
administration's proposed revision of the 
Immigration Act," Justice Scalia went on. 
"Perhaps it is, though Arizona may not think 
so. But to say, as the court does, that 
Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing 
applications of the Immigration Act that the 
president declines to enforce boggles the 
mind." 
He added that Arizona and other states 
should not be left helpless before the "evil 
effects of illegal immigration." 
Justice Kennedy responded that "federal law 
makes a single sovereign responsible for 
maintaining a comprehensive and unified 
system to keep track of aliens within the 
nation's borders." 
"The national government has significant 
power to regulate immigration," he wrote. 
"The sound exercise of national power over 
immigration depends on the nation's 
meeting its responsibility to base its laws on 
a political will informed by searching, 
thoughtful, rational CiViC discourse." 
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"S.B. 1070: In Plain English" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 25, 2012 
Amy Howe 
The Court didn't rule on the health care 
cases today, but it still issued a blockbuster: 
its decision in Arizona v. United States, the 
federal government's challenge to Arizona's 
controversial immigration law. And 
although Arizona prevailed last year at the 
Court in a case involving a different effort to 
regulate immigration (in that case, by 
punishing businesses that hire illegal 
immigrants), it did not fare as well this year. 
Instead, the decision was largely (but not 
entirely) a victory for the federal 
government: the Court held that three of the 
four provisions of the law at issue in the 
case cannot not go into effect at all because 
they are "preempted," or trumped, by federal 
immigration laws. And while the Court 
allowed one provision-which requires 
police officers to check the immigration 
status of anyone whom they detain or arrest 
before they release that person-to go into 
effect, even here it left open the possibility 
that this provision would eventually be held 
unconstitutional if not applied narrowly in 
Arizona. 
Background 
As I explained before the oral argument, the 
Arizona legislature believed that the federal 
government was not doing enough to fight 
illegal immigration. So it took matters into 
its own hands by passing S.B. 1070, which 
seeks to put so many restrictions on illegal 
immigrants in the state that they will give up 
and go home-a policy known as "attrition 
by enforcement." 
But before S.B. 1070 could go into effect, 
the United States went to federal court to 
block it, arguing that the law violates the 
Constitution (and therefore cannot be valid) 
because it is trumped by federal immigration 
laws. (The federal government's suit did not 
present the question whether the statute 
exhibited racial discrimination.) The lower 
courts agreed that four provisions of S.B. 
1070 were invalid: 
• Section 2(B), popularly known as 
"show me your papers," which 
requires police officers to check the 
immigration status of anyone whom 
they arrest or detain and allows them 
to stop and arrest someone if they 
believe that he is an undocumented 
immigrant; 
• Section 3, which makes it a crime to 
be ill Arizona without valid 
immigration papers; 
• Section 5(C), which makes it a crime 
to apply for or hold a job without 
proper immigration papers; and 
• Section 6, which allows a police 
officer to arrest someone, without a 
warrant, if the officer believes that 
he has committed - at some point in 
time-a crime that could cause him 
to be deported. 
Decision 
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 
Court, which had the full support of the 
Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor. (Justice Elena Kagan did 
not participate in the case, presumably 
because she was involved in earlier stages of 
the case while she served as the Solicitor 
General of the United States.) So the fifth 
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vote of the Chief Justice was critical to 
having an actual ruling by the Supreme 
Court; otherwise, the Court would have tied 
four-to-four on three provisions of S.B. 
1070, leaving no final Supreme Court 
decision. 
Before turning to the specific provisions of 
the law at issue, the Court began with an 
overview of the federal government's near-
exclusive authority over immigration issues 
that left the reader with little doubt that 
much-if not all-of S.B. 1070 would be 
struck down: while the Court acknowledged 
that Arizona had valid concerns about the 
effects of illegal immigration, the Court 
explained that the federal government's 
power to regulate immigration is "extensive 
and complex." Among other things, the 
Court emphasized that it is "fundamental" 
that foreign countries be able to 
communicate with just one government-
the federal government-about immigration 
issues; equally important is the "broad 
discretion" that the federal government has 
when it decides whether and how to enforce 
immigration laws. 
With that groundwork laid, the Court then 
turned to the four provisions of S.B. 1070 at 
issue in this case. First up was Section 3 of 
the law, which makes it a crime to fail to 
carry valid immigration papers while in 
Arizona. The state had argued that this 
prOVISIOn should survive because it 
essentially does the same thing as federal 
law, which also requires immigrants to carry 
valid papers. But the majority of the Court 
was unconvinced. First, the Court explained 
that Congress had already made clear that it 
would provide the full (and only) set of 
standards to govern when and how 
immigrants must register with the federal 
government-a concept known as "field 
preemption." When Congress has provided 
this full set of standards, the Court 
continued, state efforts to govern the same 
thing cannot be valid, even if the state laws 
and regulations are identical to the federal 
ones. So it wouldn't matter if Section 3 did 
the exact same thing as the federal laws. But 
in any event, the Court continued, it doesn't, 
because the penalties for a violation of 
Section 3 are different from (and tougher 
than) those imposed by federal law. 
The Court next turned to Section S(C) of 
S.B. 1070, which would make it a crime to 
apply for or hold a job in Arizona unless you 
have valid immigration papers. Unlike 
Section 3, Section S(C) has no counterpart in 
federal law. But the Court again relied on 
the concept of "field preemption" to hold 
Section S(C) invalid, explaining that 
Congress had set up a comprehensive 
system to deal with employment of 
undocumented workers. Although Arizona 
argued that Section S(C) does not conflict 
with any federal laws because the federal 
system only deals with employers, and does 
not make it a crime for undocumented 
workers to work in this country, the Court 
was unmoved. To the contrary, it explained, 
Congress made a "deliberate choice" not to 
criminalize the very conduct that Arizona 
now seeks to make a crime. 
The third and final provision that the Court 
struck down was Section 6 of S.B. 1070, 
which received virtually no attention at the 
oral argument in April. It would allow police 
officers to arrest someone without a warrant 
if the police officer has probable cause to 
believe that the individual has done 
something that would justify his deportation 
from the United States. Here too the COUli 
emphasized the federal government's 
control of the process of deporting (also 
known as removing) undocumented 
immigrants from the United States. Under 
the federal system, an undocumented 
immigrant can only be arrested and held for 
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possible removal if there is a warrant for his 
arrest or if he is likely to escape before 
police can get a warrant. Because Section 6 
would give state law enforcement officials a 
much broader power to make arrests than 
under the federal system, the Court 
concluded, it cannot stand. 
Much of the late April oral argument in the 
case focused on Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, 
labeled by opponents as the "show me your 
papers" provision, which requires police 
officers to check the immigration status of 
anyone whom they arrest or detain and 
allows them to stop and arrest someone if 
they believe that he is an undocumented 
immigrant. At oral argument in April, it 
seemed likely that the provision could 
survive, and it did-at least for now. The 
COUli relied heavily on the fact that Section 
2(B) requires police officers to contact the 
federal government to verify an individual's 
immigration status, which is something that 
police officers could do on their own 
initiative anyway (and which Congress has 
in fact encouraged state and local 
governments to do). 
Citing language in the Arizona law that 
prohibits police officers from considering 
race or national origin, the Court held that 
the provision could at least go into effect for 
now. But it left open the possibility that 
opponents of the law could return to comi to 
challenge it once it has been enforced and 
Arizona courts have a chance to interpret it. 
The Supreme Court made quite clear that the 
key to the provision surviving in the future 
will be whether it is interpreted in a way that 
does not prolong detentions of people who 
are stopped by police. The upshot is that if a 
person is arrested, Arizona can check his 
immigration status while it holds him. But if 
the person is merely detained-for example, 
at a traffic stop-the immigration check will 
probably take too long and he will probably 
have to be released. The check can then 
continue without the individual there. 
Three Justices-Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito--agreed with the other five members 
of the Court that Section 2(B) was not 
trumped by federal law and could go into 
effect, but they disagreed with other aspects 
of the majority's conclusions. Justice 
Scalia's opinion (which represented his 
views alone) was by far the most strongly 
worded of the three, with the same mix of 
scorn and disbelief that he displayed at oral 
argument. And the overarching theme of his 
dissent was the same as well: as a sovereign 
state, Arizona has a right to keep out people 
who aren't supposed to be in this country, 
much less in Arizona. And S.B. 1070 only 
applies to people who aren't supposed to be 
here at all. 
Justice Scalia singled out for special 
criticism the federal government's argument 
that it needs sole control over immigration 
issues because it needs "to allocate scarce 
enforcement resources wisely." Given the 
myriad problems that illegal immigration 
has created for Arizona, Justice Scalia 
asked, why on earth should this mean that 
Arizona can't spend its own money and 
resources to combat illegal immigration? 
But what Justice Scalia seemed to find 
particularly galling was the President's 
recent announcement-made after the oral 
arguments in this case-that it would allow 
some young adults who came to the country 
illegally as children to remain here 
indefinitely if they can meet celiain criteria. 
The administration of the new program, 
Justice Scalia predicted, will entail 
"considerable" costs that "will necessarily 
be deducted from immigration 
enforcement"-casting doubt on the validity 
of the federal government's lament 
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regarding the need to conserve scarce 
resources. 
Justices Thomas and Alito filed OpInlOnS 
that were both shorter and more reserved 
than Justice Scalia's. Like Justice Scalia, 
Justice Thomas would have allowed all of 
the provisions of S.B. 1070 to go into effect, 
based on his own narrow views about 
federal preemption generally. Justice Alito, 
by contrast, agreed with the Court that 
Section 2(B) should be allowed to go into 
effect and that Section 3 is trumped by 
federal immigration laws, but he disagreed 
with the majority's conclusion that Sections 
5(C) and 6 were trumped as well. 
After today's decision in this case, the Court 
recessed until Thursday morning at ten, 
setting the stage for an all-but-celiain 
announcement of the Court's decision in the 
challenges to the Affordable Care Act. We'll 
be back at nine that morning to cover the 
release in our Live Blog; later on that day, 
we'll repoli on the opinion in Plain English. 
Once again, stay tuned .... 
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"Raising Arizona: Supreme Court's Immigration Decision 
Creates More Questions Than It Answers" 
The Huffington Post 
July 19,2012 
Ginny Sloan 
Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Arizona v. United States, a closely watched 
case in which the federal government 
challenged Arizona's controversial 
immigration law, SB 1070. The decision and 
its impact has since been dissected in both 
legal and media circles. Perhaps more than 
anything, however, the immediate aftermath 
of Arizona highlights the host of difficult 
questions around state and local immigration 
enforcement that the Supreme Court didn't 
answer. 
Specifically at issue in Arizona were four 
provisions of SB 1070: Section 3, which 
criminalizes willful failure to complete or 
carry immigration papers; Section 5, which 
makes it a crime for undocumented 
noncltizens to work; Section 6, which 
authorizes the warrantless arrest of any 
person police have probable cause to believe 
is removable from the United States; and 
Section 2B, which requires law enforcement 
officials to verify the immigration status of 
any person lawfully stopped or detained 
when they have reason to suspect that the 
person is here unlawfully. 
The Court cautiously upheld Section 2B-at 
least for now-but struck down sections 3, 
5, and 6. The fallout was immediate. 
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer claimed 
victory, not just for Arizona but for the 10th 
Amendment, explaining that by upholding 
"the heati of SB 1070" the Court had 
reaffirmed "the inherent right and 
responsibility of states to defend their 
citizens." The Depatiment of Homeland 
Security (DHS) responded by promptly 
terminating agreements that had authorized 
Arizona state and local law enforcement 
agents, under federal supervision, to enforce 
immigration law in the field. DHS also set 
limits on when its immigration officials 
should respond to a scene at the request of 
Arizona law enforcement, and set up a 
hotline to report civil rights violations. 
Governor Brewer railed against the 
"disarmament" of Arizona's immigration 
enforcement capabilities, calling the actions 
"a new low" for the Obama administration. 
It bears emphasizing that the only question 
before the Court in this case was whether 
four provisions of SB 1070 were 
"preempted;" that is, whether Arizona 
overstepped its bounds by passing state 
legislation that undermines federal 
immigration law. Many other questions 
remain: Can "show me your papers" laws 
like Section 2B be implemented without 
racial profiling? What aspects of copycat 
laws now subject to constitutional 
challenges in states like Alabama, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Utah and Indiana will 
survive post-Arizona? And, in particular, 
how free are states and local jurisdictions 
across the country to choose a different 
path? 
A longstanding battle being waged at both 
the state and local level over the 
government's Secure Communities program 
is in many ways the flip side of the Arizona 
fight. Under Secure Communities, 
fingerprints collected during the booking 
process that are regularly sent to the FBI to 
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be checked against its criminal databases are 
also sent to DHS to be checked against its 
immigration databases. If there is an 
immigration "hit," Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) is 
automatically notified. ICE can then issue a 
"detainer," or a request to local law 
enforcement to hold the person up to 48 
hours beyond when he or she would 
otherwise be released so that ICE can 
assume custody. 
The government describes Secure 
Communities as a simple information 
sharing mechanism. Some critics believe it's 
a dangerous depOliation dragnet. The rub is 
that the federal government says the Secure 
Communities is mandatory-and will be 
extended to all jurisdictions in the country 
by 2013-notwithstanding that some states 
and localities simply don't want it. Just last 
week, the Washington D.C. City Council 
passed legislation limiting the circumstances 
under which the District will honor 
immigration detainers. Other localities 
across the country have adopted, or are 
considering, similar limits on their 
cooperation with federal enforcement 
efforts. At the state level, the California 
Senate recently passed the Trust Act, 
legislation that would prohibit California 
law enforcement from complying with an 
immigration detainer unless the arrestee was 
convicted of a serious or violent felony and 
the detaining agency has adopted a plan to 
guard against racial profiling and other 
potentially damaging consequences of 
Secure Communities. 
In contrast to Arizona, these and other 
states' and localities' view certain federal 
immigration enforcement efforts as overly 
harsh or detrimental and don't want to 
participate, at least not on the federal 
government's terms. What's the scope of 
their right to resist (rooted in the 10th 
Amendment or otherwise)? 
The questions raised in Arizona and that 
remain in its aftermath lie at the heart of a 
series of ongoing tugs of war between the 
federal government and states and localities 
that are playing-and in the absence of 
comprehensive immigration reform will 
continue to play-a critical role in setting 
the boundaries of immigration enforcement. 
In Arizona, Justice Kennedy urged that these 
struggles take the form of a "searching, 
thoughtful, rational civic discourse." We at 
The Constitution Project (TCP) couldn't 
agree more, and in an effort to make a 
meaningful contribution to such a discourse, 
TCP has assembled a new Immigration 
Committee that includes members with 
widely divergent views and experiences who 
are eager to heed Justice Kennedy's call. 
Although TCP has already made a few 
forays into immigration policy-calling for 
reform of both the immigration detention 
system and the ways in which we use 
immigration law as a counterterrorism 
tool-it is clearly an area where TCP's 
approach to assembling a panel of issue 
experts from across the ideological 
spectrum, then asking them to develop 
bipartisan, consensus-based solutions to 
tough constitutional questions, can be more 
fruitfully brought to bear. We look forward 
to being a part of the national conversation 
on this impOliant issue. 
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"Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on the Supreme Court's 
Ruling on Arizona v. The United States" 
Department of Justice 
June 25,2012 
Attorney General Eric Holder issued the 
following statement today: 
"I welcome the Supreme Court's decision 
to strike down major provisions of Arizona's 
S.B. 1070 on federal preemption grounds. 
Today's ruling appropriately bars the State 
of Arizona from effectively criminalizing 
unlawful status in the state and confirms the 
federal government's exclusive authority to 
regulate in the area of immigration. 
"While I am pleased the Court confirmed 
the serious constitutional questions the 
government raised regarding Section 2, 1 
remain concerned about the impact of 
Section 2, which requires law enforcement 
officials to verify the immigration status of 
any person lawfully stopped or detained 
when they have reason to suspect that the 
person is here unlawfully. As the Court 
itself recognized, Section 2 is not a license 
to engage in racial profiling and 1 want to 
assure communities around this country that 
the Department of Justice will continue to 
vigorously enforce federal prohibitions 
against racial and ethnic discrimination. We 
will closely monitor the impact of S.B. 1070 
to ensure compliance with federal 
immigration law and with applicable civil 
rights laws, including ensuring that law 
enforcement agencies and others do not 
implement the law in a manner that has the 
purpose or effect of discriminating against 
the Latino or any other community. 
"We will also work to ensure that the 
verification provision does not divert police 
officers away from traditional law 
enforcement efforts in order to enforce 
federal immigration law, potentially 
impamng local policing efforts and 
discouraging crime VIctIms, including 
children of non-citizens, victims of domestic 
violence, and asylum seekers, from 
repoliing abuses and crimes out of fear of 
detention or deportation. We will continue 
to use every federal resource to protect the 
safety and civil rights of all Americans." 
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"Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority" 
The Nevil York Times 
June 25,2010 
Charlie Savage 
Stymied by political opposition and focused 
on competing pnontIes, the Obama 
administration has sidelined efforts to close 
the Guantanamo prison, making it unlikely 
that President Obama will fulfill his promise 
to close it before his term ends in 2013. 
When the White House acknowledged last 
year that it would miss Mr. Obama's initial 
January 2010 deadline for shutting the 
prison, it also declared that the detainees 
would eventually be moved to one in 
Illinois. But impediments to that plan have 
mounted in Congress, and the administration 
is doing little to overcome them. 
"There is a lot of inertia" against closing the 
prison, "and the administration is not putting 
a lot of energy behind their position that I 
can see," said Senator Carl Levin, the 
Michigan Democrat who is chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and 
supports the Illinois plan. He added that "the 
odds are that it will still be open" by the next 
presidential inauguration. 
And Senator Lindsey Graham, a South 
Carolina Republican who also supports 
shutting it, said the effort is "on life support 
and it's unlikely to close any time soon." He 
attributed the collapse to some fellow 
Republicans' "demagoguery" and the 
administration's poor planning and decision-
making "paralysis." 
The White House InSIStS it IS still 
determined to shutter the prison. The 
administration argues that Guantanamo is a 
symbol in the Muslim world of past detainee 
abuses, citing military views that its 
continued operation helps terrorists. 
"Our commanders have made clear that 
closing the detention facility at Guantanamo 
is a national security imperative, and the 
president remains committed to achieving 
that goal," said a White House spokesman, 
Ben LaBolt. 
Still, some senior officials say privately that 
the administration has done its part, 
including identifying the Illinois prison-an 
empty maximum-security center in 
Thomson, 150 miles west of Chicago-
where the detainees could be held. They 
blame Congress for failing to execute that 
endgame. 
"The president can't just wave a magic 
wand to say that Gitmo will be closed," said 
a senior administration official, speaking on 
condition of anonymity to discuss internal 
thinking on a sensitive issue. 
The politics of closing the prison have 
clearly soured following the attempted 
bombings on a plane on Dec. 25 and in 
Times Square in May, as well as Republican 
criticism that imprisoning detainees in the 
United States would endanger Americans. 
When Mr. Obama took office a slight 
majority suppOlied closing it. By a March 
2010 poll, 60 percent wanted it to stay open. 
One administration official argued that the 
White House was still trying. On May 26, 
Mr. Obama's national security adviser, 
James Jones, sent a letter to the House 
Appropriations Committee reiterating the 
case. 
But Mr. Levin portrayed the administration 
as unwilling to make a serious effort to exert 
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its influence, contrasting its muted response 
to legislative hurdles to closing Guantanamo 
with "very vocal" threats to veto financing 
for a fighter jet engine it opposes. 
Last year, for example, the administration 
stood aside as lawmakers restricted the 
transfer of detainees into the United States 
except for prosecution. And its response was 
silence several weeks ago, Mr. Levin said, 
as the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees voted to block money for 
renovating the Illinois prison to 
accommodate detainees, and to restrict 
transfers from Guantanamo to other 
countries-including, in the Senate version, 
a bar on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Somalia. About 130 of the 181 
detainees are from those countries. 
"They are not really putting their shoulder to 
the wheel on this issue," Mr. Levin said of 
White House officials. "It's pretty dormant 
in terms of their public positions." 
Several administration officials expressed 
hope that political winds might shift if, for 
example, high-level Qaeda leaders are 
killed, or if lawmakers focus on how 
expensive it is to operate a prison at the 
isolated base. 
A recent Pentagon study, obtained by The 
New York Times, shows taxpayers spent 
more than $2 billion between 2002 and 2009 
on the prison. Administration officials 
believe taxpayers would save about $180 
million a year in operating costs if 
Guantanamo detainees were held at 
Thomson, which they hope Congress will 
allow the Justice Department to buy from 
the State of Illinois at least for federal 
inmates. 
But in a sign that some may be making 
peace with keeping Guantanamo open, 
officials also praise improvements at the 
prison. An interagency review team brought 
order to scattered files. Mr. Obama banned 
brutal interrogations. Congress overhauled 
military commissions to give defendants 
more safeguards. 
One category-detainees cleared for release 
who cannot be repatriated for their own 
safety-is on a path to extinction: allies 
have accepted 33, and just 22 await 
resettlement. Another-those who will be 
held without trials-has been narrowed to 
48. 
Still, the administration has faced a 
worsening problem in dealing with the 
prison's large Yemeni popUlation, including 
58 low-level detainees who would already 
have been repatriated had they been from a 
more stable country, officials say. 
The administration asked Saudi Arabia to 
put some Yemenis through a program aimed 
at rehabilitating jihadists but was rebuffed, 
officials said. And Mr. Obama imposed a 
moratorium on Yemen transfers after the 
failed Dec. 25 attack, planned by a Yemen-
based branch of Al Qaeda whose members 
include two former Guantanamo detainees 
from Saudi Arabia. 
As a result, the Obama administration has 
been further entangled in practices many of 
its officials lamented during the Bush 
administration. A judge this month ordered 
the government to release a 26-year-old 
Yemeni imprisoned since 2002, citing 
overwhelming evidence of his innocence. 
The Obama team decided last year to release 
the man, but shifted course after the 
moratorium. This week, the National 
Security Council decided to send the man to 
Yemen in a one-time exception, an official 
said on Friday. 
Meanwhile, discussions have faltered 
between Mr. Graham and the White House 
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aimed at crafting a bipartisan legislative 
package that would close Guantanamo while 
bolstering legal authorities for detaining 
terrorism suspects without trial. 
Mr. Graham said such legislation would 
build confidence about holding detainees, 
including future captures, in an untainted 
prison inside the United States. But the talks 
lapsed. 
"We can't get anyone to give us a final 
answer," he said. "It just goes into a black 
hole. I don't know what happens." 
In any case, one senior official said, even if 
the administration concludes that it will 
never close the prison, it cannot 
acknowledge that because it would revive 
Guantanamo as America's image in the 
Muslim world. 
"Guantanamo is a negative symbol, but it is 
much diminished because we are seen as 
trying to close it," the official said. "Closing 
Guantanamo is good, but fighting to close 
Guantanamo is O.K. Admitting you failed 
would be the worst." 
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"What's Left of the Guantanamo Litigation? Nothing." 
The BlIffington Post 
June 11,2012 
Shayana Kadidal 
Four years ago tomorrow, the Supreme 
Court ruled that Guantanamo detainees have 
a right to challenge the legality of their 
detention in federal court. The case, 
BOllmediene v. Blish, was at the time hailed 
as a landmark separation-of-powers 
decision, routinely assigned as required 
reading in law schools now as part of the 
first-year curriculum. Today, the Supreme 
Court effectively undid that decision. 
In the four years since the Bo1tmediene 
decision, detainees have won approximately 
two-thirds of the cases that have been heard 
by federal trial courts (the "district" courts). 
However, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, the most conservative court of 
appeals in the nation, has reversed every 
single detainee victory that the government 
has chosen to appeal. Seven detainees had 
petitioned the Court to hear their appeals 
from D.C. Circuit decisions in the last few 
months, and the Court had gathered the 
cases for consideration over the last few 
weeks. Today, the Court announced that it 
would not review any of them-without 
even so much as a peep of dissent from any 
of the nine justices. 
Most of the detainees in Guantanamo are not 
litigating their cases because they have 
already been cleared for release-87 of the 
remaining 169. In the few dozen contested 
cases occupying the middle ground between 
"cleared" and "likely to be charged in 
military commission," many detainees won 
rulings that their detention was unlawful 
throughout 2009 and 2010. But the Court of 
Appeals, in the course of a few months, 
ruled that hearsay was broadly admissible in 
these cases. That was enormously significant 
because, as numerous newspaper accounts 
over the last four years have demonstrated, a 
small number of prisoners at Guantanamo 
lodged accusations against hundreds of 
fellow detainees (often while suffering clear 
symptoms of mental illness or post-abuse 
trauma, and reportedly receiving benefits 
like video game systems). Their years-old 
hearsay statements during interrogations 
could now be taken seriously without giving 
the accused's lawyers a chance to cross-
examine them. Nearly every detainee ever 
held at Guantanamo faces hearsay 
allegations that they were, for example, seen 
at one of the numerous hostels where other 
foreigners suspected of ties to the Taliban 
also stayed. The Court of Appeals has 
opined that that in itself is "overwhelming" 
evidence of detainability. And it has robbed 
the trial courts of an age-old prerogative-to 
judge the testimony of the accused more 
trustworthy that the hearsay from his 
accusers-by ruling in one case that a mass 
of such hearsay must outweigh the judge's 
determination that the accused was telling 
the truth. The leading case in the group of 
seven seeking review by the court today, 
Latif v. Obama, challenged a Court of 
Appeals decision allowing that a 
government intelligence report should be 
presumed to be accurate. That document 
was the government's primary evidence 
justifying Latirs detention, and the district 
judge found in Latirs favor despite it, but 
two judges of the Court of Appeals reversed 
that rUling. In dissent, Judge Tatel stated that 
the ruling "moving the goal posts" and 
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"calls the game in the government's favor." 
The net effect is that it is now next to 
impossible to win a case through appeal-a 
fact confirmed by a concurring opinion from 
a D.C. Circuit judge stating baldly that he 
doubted "any of [his Court of Appeals] 
colleagues will vote to grant a petition" if 
the government could "muster even 'some 
evidence'" (no matter how dubious the 
source) against the detainee. Because of the 
skewed legal standards created by the 
appeals comi, only one of the last 12 cases 
before the trial courts has resulted in a 
detainee victory. As Judge Tatel said in 
Latif, "it is hard to see what is left of the 
Supreme Court's command In 
Boumediene. " 
Since Boumediene, the Supreme COUli has 
not heard argument in another Guantanamo 
case. Up till now we had assumed that was 
largely because Justice Kagan, as an 
administration insider, had recused herself 
from hearing detainee cases. There seemed 
grounds for hope in the possibility that she 
would eventually stop recusing herself and 
vote in favor of review on one of these 
cases. But in today's votes she did not 
recuse herself-and we still lost. 
In the wake of the justices' continued 
silence, the judges of the D.C. Circuit have 
been left with the last word in Guantanamo 
cases. They have used it to openly mock the 
Supreme COUli's authority, with one 
claiming that BOllmediene made "airy 
suppositions" about the practicality of 
providing judicial review, another stating 
"taking a case [for review] might obligate 
[the Supreme COUli] to assume direct 
responsibility" for the decision, and a third 
comparing the Justices to Tom and Daisy 
Buchanan in The Great Gatsby as "careless 
people, who smashed things up" and who 
"let other people clean up the mess they 
made." 
In BOllmediene the Supreme Court's stated 
that Guantanamo detainees must receive 
"meaningful review of both the cause for 
detention and the Executive's power to 
detain." But that great victory in 
BOllmediene now means next to nothing to 
our clients, because the D.C. Circuit is 
playing the part Arkansas Governor Orval 
Faubus played at Little Rock. The problem 
for us is that no one is playing the part of 
Dwight Eisenhower or the Warren Court. 
Ironically, today has proved that the D.C. 
Circuit's scalding criticism of the Supreme 
COUli was largely correct-the high court is 
happy to lay down platitudes, without the 
courage or commitment to follow through 
on enforcing the details as the Warren Court 
did in Cooper v. Aaron, when it forced 
school desegregation down the throat of an 
intransigent Arkansas state government. 
Perhaps the real loser today, as now-
depmied Justice Stevens said after Bush v. 
Gore, "is the Nation's confidence in the 
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of 
law." 
That this happened without a single dissent 
is even more shocking (and probably a sign 
of what the Court has lost with the departure 
of Justices Stevens and Souter). Put to one 
side concerns about granting everyone a day 
in court, and fair process. Innocence, after 
all, is what caused most people to care about 
Gtmo in the first place-the fact that 
hundreds of detainees were sold into custody 
by bounties paid to warlords and corrupt 
Pakistani police, and held based on no real 
evidence. Surely the Court knows that this 
still characterizes the typical detainee rotting 
in Guantanamo today. The majority of 
detainees today are cleared for release-87 
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in total-and they have been detained now 
for three years since the interagency Task 
Force cleared them by unanimous consent of 
the CIA, FBI, DOD, State and Justice 
Departments. Yet only two detainees have 
been released by the Obama administration 
since January 2011. Ultimately the fate of 
the rest is in the hands of the president, who 
seems utterly uninterested in fulfilling the 
promise he made on his second day in office 
to close what is the most infamous prison in 
the world. 
Lost in all of this is what motivated 
President Bush and candidates McCain and 
Obama to call for closure of the prison back 
in 2008-not humane concerns for men 
wrongly held for nearly 10 years (for the 
three reasons above, politicians need not 
pretend to care about that anymore), not the 
$700,000 cost per year per prisoner of 
continuing to hold all those cleared 
detainees (which, in a sign of the cynicism 
of the American public, seems to be the 
talking point with the most traction), but 
rather the impact the whole system of 
indefinite detention without charge (of 
which Guantlnamo is merely the prime 
symbol) has on the international perception 
of the United States. The cost of a false 
positive may in fact be higher than the cost 
of a wrongful release when our 
government's announced enemies in the 
"war on terror" are first and foremost 
seeking to convert young men to their 
po litical cause. Yet the most signi ficant 
political upheaval in the Muslim world-the 
many revolutions of the Arab Spring-
moves forward without any perceptible 
influence from an administration desperate 
for credibility with the democratic 
movements on the ground. As long as the 
reality at Guantanamo is so far out of sync 
with our aspirational values as a nation, that 
is as it should be. 
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For almost four years, the Supreme COUli 
has left it to lower courts to SOli out the legal 
review that the Justices mandated for 
prisoners held by the U.S. military at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with a remarkable 
result: the detainees very often win in 
District Court, but not one has ever gotten 
released from confinement by court order. 
The reason: the government has never lost 
any of its appeals in the D.C. Circuit Court, 
and that series of rulings has been 
accompanied by caustic criticism of the 
Supreme Court by three of the Circuit 
Court's judges. The Supreme Court has 
never reacted, but lawyers in eight new 
cases are now urging it to do so. 
Based on actual experience since the Court's 
historic ruling in 2008 in BOllmediene v. 
BliSh, one of two things appears to be true: 
the COUli is satisfied with the results and 
essentially has taken itself out of the 
Guantanamo controversy, or the COUli has 
not found a suitable new case that four 
Justices want to review and is still waiting. 
In the meantime, the Executive Branch, 
though frustrated by frequent efforts in 
Congress to control the fate of the 171 men 
still at Guantanamo on the theory that most 
if not all of them are terrorists, has not again 
suffered a courthouse setback like the one in 
BOllmediene and in three other Supreme 
Court decisions before that. 
Last Term, the Court opted not to hear any 
of eight cases brought to it by Guantanamo 
detainees' lawyers. One factor that seemed 
to be at work then was that Justice Elena 
Kagan, a former U.S. Solicitor General who 
previously had some role in detainee matters 
in the Obama Administration, took no part 
in most of those cases. With eight new cases 
now on file, Kagan so far has not 
disqualified herself from any, although the 
occasion for doing so has not yet arisen in 
several of them. She did recuse in a 
preliminary vote in a potential ninth new 
case, but that one has not developed fully 
yet. There is another pending case, but it 
was filed for former detainees, no longer 
held by the U.S. 
The government-in both the Bush and 
Obama Administrations-has taken the view 
that the BOllmediene decision entitles 
Guantanamo detainees to a single court test 
of their detention, but that, if they win that 
case, actual release or transfer is a matter for 
the Executive Branch, either under its 
control of immigration and deportation 
matters or its diplomatic authority. The 
Circuit Court has embraced that claim, but 
also has gone far to make it harder for any 
detainee to win such a case in the first place. 
In one of the more recent Circuit Court 
rulings, the dissenting judge argued that it 
was "hard to see what is left of the Supreme 
Court's command in BOllmediene that 
habeas review be 'meaningful. '" The 
majority of the Circuit Court, that judge 
added, has "called the game in the 
government's favor." 
Among the lengthy list of cases in which 
District COUli judges have ruled against 
further detention, a number have involved a 
judge's sharp criticism of the quality of 
proof in intelligence reports offered by the 
government. But, when the Circuit Court has 
decided appeals, it has regularly found the 
evidence sufficient to support futiher 
confinement on the theory that official 
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evidence is entitled to judicial deference. It 
has sent a few cases back to District Comi 
for further review, but has yet to clear any 
detainee for release. Releases that have 
occurred have been at the discretion of the 
Executive Branch. 
Although the government has regularly won 
in the Circuit Court with an argument that 
only the lowest accepted standard of proof 
need be satisfied to justify continued 
detention, a senior judge on the Circuit 
Court, Laurence H. Silberman, has criticized 
the Justice Department for not pressing for 
an even more permissive view of detention 
authority and has expressed doubt that any 
of his colleagues would vote to release any 
detainee without viliually absolute proof 
that they do not actively support a terrorist 
group. "Some evidence" should be enough, 
Silberman has written. Another senior 
judge, A. Raymond Randolph, has likened 
the Justices in the majority in B01l1nediene to 
fictional characters in The Great Gats by, 
"careless people" making messes for other 
people to clean up. One of the more junior 
judges, Janice Rogers Brown, has castigated 
the B01imediene ruling for its "airy 
suppositions" about the nature of war and 
for using logic that would lead the Executive 
Branch to adopt a policy of taking no 
prisoners. Judge Brown has also argued that 
international law should put no limits on the 
President's detention power. 
Lawyers in some of the new cases in the 
Supreme Court have recounted those 
criticisms, just to be sure the Justices are 
aware of them. In one of the new petitions, 
the lawyers argued that the Circuit Court 
had "demonstrated open disdain" for the 
BOllmediene ruling, and had "whittled 
procedural protections in these habeas 
hearings down to almost nothing." 
The Obama Administration, by contrast, has 
filed papers in a few of the new cases, 
contending-as it did in the previous ones 
that the system of court review of 
Guantanamo cases that has unfolded since 
the BOllmediene ruling is working as it 
should, and that the government will do its 
best diplomatically to find a place to 
relocate any prisoner who has won a court-
ordered release-if the government lost an 
appeal. It has also said that Judge 
Silberman's remarks on how hard it should 
be for any detainee to gain release is not the 
view that prevails on the Circuit Court, and 
that the government does not share Judge 
Brown's view that international law does not 
limit detention power. The government's 
basic view on detention authority is that it 
may hold anyone who was "part of' a 
terrorist network or organization. When the 
government has chosen not to respond to 
some of the new petitions, the Court has 
sought a response. 
It is not clear at this point just how the Court 
is processing the new cases. None is 
currently scheduled for a specific 
Conference of the Justices, although some 
were set previously and then were postponed 
without explanation. Two cases, though, are 
on temporary hold at the lawyers' request 
while a later case was being prepared; it has 
since been filed. That is the case of Latif v. 
Obama (11-1027), which is the one in which 
Judge Brown leveled her harshest criticisms 
at the BOllmediene decision. 
As usual, it will take the votes of four 
Justices to grant review of any of the cases. 
Because the BOllmediene decision came on a 
5-4 vote, and the four Justices who were in 
dissent remain on the Comi, votes to review 
more recent Circuit Court decisions that 
went against detainees probably would have 
to come from among the three Justices who 
remain from the 2008 majority-Justices 
Anthony M. Kennedy (the opinion's author), 
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Stephen G. Breyer, and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg-along with at least one vote from 
one of the two newer Justices, Kagan and 
Sonia Sotomayor. Two years ago, Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor indicated 
a willingness to take on a new case at some 
point. Kennedy did not join in that 
comment, and Kagan was not on the Court 
then. Kagan's recusals last Term thus 
lowered the prospect of four votes to grant 
in earlier cases. As a matter of pride of 
authorship, though, Kennedy is the Justice 
whose work in BOllmediene has drawn the 
sharpest critique from some of the Circuit 
Court judges. 
Perhaps the most provocative question 
raised in the new petitions-and it is an 
issue that seemed clearly designed to get 
Justice Kennedy's attention-is this one: 
"Whether the court of appeals' manifest 
unwillingness to allow Guantanamo 
detainees to prevail in their habeas corpus 
cases calls for the exercise of this Court's 
supervisory power." The question is based 
on the premise that the Court, in 
BOllmediene, had said that habeas review for 
Guantanamo detainees had to be 
"meaningful" and that actual release had to 
be an option open to District Court judges. 
That question is raised in the Latif case, 
involving a Yemeni national, Adnan Farhan 
Abdul Latif. A District judge ruled in his 
favor, but Judge Brown's opinion for the 
Circuit Court majority reversed, and laid 
down the legal principle that government 
intelligence reports are entitled to a 
presumption that they are accurate. That 
opinion prompted an unusual, though 
sharply worded, dissent from Circuit Judge 
David S. Tate!' The same question is also 
asked in the case of another Yemeni, 
Hussain Salem Mohammed Almerfedi, who 
won his case in District Comt, then the 
Circuit Court ruled against him, more 
broadly than the government had asked. 
Without knowing at this point when the 
eight new cases will be sent to the Justices 
for initial consideration, and assuming that 
at some point all will be ready, they can now 
be grouped by the issues they seek to raise. 
First, there is a list of issues and the cases 
raising them, by case title and docket 
number. Later in the post, the petitions are 
listed with links to all of the filings so far 
sent to the Comt in each. 
1. Definition of government power to 
detain at Guantanamo 
Al-Bihani v. Obama (10-1383)-seeks a 
basic definition of detention power, limited 
by the laws of war 
Uthman v. Obama (11-413)-challenges 
detention for one who did not actually fight 
against U.S. or allied forces and provided no 
direct support to terrorists 
Almerfedi v. Obama (11-683)-chalienges 
detention authority if based on non-
incriminating facts 
Al-Madhwani v. Obama (11-7020)-
challenges detention based on "guilt by 
association" with suspected terrorists, based 
on visits to guesthouses and training 
facilities 
A l-Alwi v. Obama (11-7700)-chalienges 
detention based on ties to the Taliban after 
hostilities had ended 
2. Circuit Court refusal to uphold any 
release order 
Almerfedi (11-683) and Latif(II-1 027) 
3. Procedural rights of detainees in court 
Uthman (11-413 )~violation of the habeas 
Suspension Clause if habeas review is not 
meaningful 
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Almerfedi (11-683)-validity of reqUIrIng 
detainee to rebut government evidence 
found to be credible 
Latif (11-1 027)-challenges presumption of 
accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports, and 
challenges Circuit Court power to find facts 
on its own 
Kandari v. u.s. (11-1054)-right to restrict 
government's use of hearsay evidence 
Al-Madhwani (11-7020)-right to 
constitutional due process protection 
A I-A lwi (11-7700)-inadequate time for 
attorney to prepare a defense 
4. Government power to transfer out of 
Guantanamo over objection 
Abdah v. Obama (11-421 )-right of attorney 
to advance notice in order to challenge 
planned transfer to a nation where the 
detainee fears torture 
Here are the eight new cases, listed by 
docket number: 
10-1383-Al-Bihani v. Obama 
11-413-Uthman v. Obama 
11-421-Abdah v. Obama 
11-683-Almerfedi v. Obama 
ll-I027-Latifv. Obama 
11-1 054-Kandari v. u.s. 
11-7020-Al-Madhwani v. Obama-Chief 
Justice recused 
11-7700-Al-Arwi v. Obama 
Beyond those eight cases filed for current 
prisoners at Guantanamo, lawyers for two 
former detainees there are seeking to revive 
their claim that they have suffered harmful 
consequences of having been treated as 
enemies and held by the U.S. military. The 
claims of Nazul Gul, an Afghan, and Adel 
Hassan Hamad, a Sudanese national, both 
claim innocence of any terrorist acts. The 
petition is Gul and Hamad v. Obama (11-
7827). The U.S. government response was 
filed on Thursday but is not yet available. 
Finally, there is another current detainee 
case, but all of the papers in it are sealed. It 
is El Falesteny v. Obama, pending on a 
motion (llM59) to file a classified petition 
under seal. Justice Kagan is recused. 
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